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Abstract 
The Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan) is tasked with improving welfare by 
internalizing the negative externalities derived from the past 130 years of policy 
development which has over allocated water resources to irrigators in Australia’s Murray-
Darling Basin (MDB). As water scarcity increases these welfare losses are compounded. 
For example, during the Millennium Drought water could not be delivered to urban 
communities, critical environmental flow was not provided, and the typically elastic private 
demand for water transformed into an inelastic demand function exposing capital 
investment to climatic risk. 
 
The Basin Plan utilizes the common property concept to internalize externalities by 
reducing the quantity of the privately held (irrigators) surface rights by 3,200 gigalitres (GL) 
and transferring these rights to an environmental steward. By restoring environmental 
flows, externalities are internalized as the environment gets a share, and the ‘quality’ of the 
water resources improves thus increasing economic welfare. To facilitate this transfer, an 
adjustment package has been designed that provides a net increase in groundwater and 
allocates over $10 billion in funding, split between two programs to purchase surface 
water. Some $3.1 billion has been allocated to purchase 1,500GL of property rights from 
irrigators while $5.8 billion has been allocated to gain 1,700GL by subsidizing investments 
in water use efficiency programs.  
 
Water resources in the MDB are highly variable and are characterized by floods and 
droughts events. This variability is expected to increase as climate change is forecast to 
reduce supply and increase the variability of rainfall. Consequently the long run success of 
the Basin Plan will be dependent on the efficiency of these alternative strategies to source 
surface water for the environment subject to this inherent variability and increasing 
uncertainty. 
 
By representing uncertainty about water supply within alternative states of nature (drought, 
wet and normal), the state-contingent approach (SCA) provides the capacity to examine 
how irrigators adapt to both the state of nature and alternative policy settings by changing 
inputs, production systems and transition towards opportunistically irrigating in favorable 
states of nature. By being able to model output and decision maker uncertainty separately, 
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the SCA approach then overcomes the limitations of other decision making approaches. 
By setting up the Basin Plan as an optimization question, the net change in national 
welfare from irrigation can be examined against the assurance that the Basin Plan 
objectives are achieved (i.e. policy constraints of minimum flow targets and quality 
improvements). This provides the capacity to illustrate how alternative climate scenarios 
could alter the possibility of meeting the water reform objectives listed in the Basin Plan. 
 
The analysis reveals that: the increased groundwater access creates inequitable wealth for 
irrigators and shifts climate risk towards the environment; that the optimal bundle of 
property rights the environmental steward needs to purchase changes by spatial location 
and property right description in response to the climate scenarios; that irrigators could be 
locked in unsustainable levels of debt by investing in water-use efficiency technology; and 
the current design of the Basin Plan may not deliver lasting welfare benefits. 
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Foreword 
It’s no secret that I was employed by Professor John Quiggin in 2004 to help build the 
original version of the Murray-Darling Basin model that this thesis uses. Professor Quiggin 
planned to use that model to illustrate the benefits of a state-contingent approach to risk 
and uncertainty to help understand water property rights in the Murray-Darling Basin 
(MDB). Originally my input was rather like a dodgy apprentice builder working for an 
architect who had a vision but an incomplete set of plans. Let’s just say building the initial 
model was an experience and I promised myself I would not quit until the model was 
completed.  
 
During this time Dr Thilak Mallawaarachchi provided an enormous amount of 
encouragement, support, sanity, solutions and error checking during the initial build. 
Effectively Thilak was the builder that guided me through my apprenticeship as the model 
was constructed in two different platforms. By building a version of the model in GAMS (by 
Thilak) and a version in Excel (me) not only allowed for rigorous error checking but 
confirmed the initial findings. The combination of John’s vision, the quality assurance by 
Thilak and my role as the goffer enabled the original model to be presented at the 
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Conference in February 2005. 
Well for the rest of 2005 and 2006 I spent my time playing with the model like a back yard 
car enthusiast stripping down the model and rebuilding it time after time to either fix 
(tweak) assumptions, update the data or add new features.  
 
Sometime during that process I thought the model might have some merits. When the 
model was used in conjunction with Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics 
to review the increasing severity of drought and examine climate change impacts, it 
provided a ready understanding of what was occurring in the MDB. These results 
contrasted findings in other models. Primarily the results we provided suggested that 
irrigators would not increase investment in perennial horticultural activities as water 
scarcity increased.  
 
The 2005 to 2007 phase in the Millennium Drought was a critical time and to put it simply 
all known rules in the MDB broke. Suddenly the prior information in regards to the value of 
water property rights, the reliability of those rights, water trade and environmental 
degradation and management responses became obsolete.  
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When the true value of high security entitlements in the Southern MDB was revealed, a 
combination of events occurred, Firstly, in the short run, the scarcity of water supply 
created price spikes in the water market as perennials producers rushed into the water 
market to protect their capital assets. This is a classic supply response to an inelastic 
commodity. Secondly, in the medium term, farmers’ practices adjusted by switching inputs 
and outputs changing the nature of demand and supply in the water market. Those 
producers with annual commodities realized the opportunity cost of production and 
increased the volume of water in the market. For example, dairy producers changed their 
input mix by selling water and purchasing in supplements Perennial producers adapted 
their management strategies by reducing the area irrigated; purchasing water at different 
times in the season; using carry-over provision in dams; and altering existing water 
management systems. Consequently this change in demand and supply reduced the price 
of water in the allocation market in subsequent seasons.  
 
The work undertaken in 2006 had predicted these adaptations and impacts. My faith in the 
model is and continues to be based on the critical assumption of the state-contingent 
approach that producers respond to states of nature and adapt by changing inputs and 
outputs. Ultimately the thesis highlights that further work on using a stochastic description 
of either water inputs or the states of nature is required to highlight imperfect state 
identification, learning and adaptation. Or as Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) discuss, 
decision makers rapidly adapt via utilizing ‘ecologically rational’ cognitive heuristics. In 
other words decision makers rapidly adapt to new information, they might not always get it 
right but they cannot be modeled as passive to change. This work is now on-going as this 
thesis morphed into a review of the Basin Plan. 
 
The significant shift in social perception allowed the 2007 Water Act to appear overnight 
causing a massive public injection of cash into research allowing for new data to become 
available for modeling through time. About the same time another major shift in Australian 
public policy began, the Garnaut Climate Change Review. 
 
In late 2007 John and the Risk and Sustainable Management Group (RSMG) were 
commissioned to work on the Garnaut Climate Change Review and the report was 
delivered in 2008. During this time I got thinking about the approach we were using. 
Centrally the results from the Garnaut model, illustrated that significant shifts in how water 
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was used occurred when the frequency of the states of nature changed, so what if our 
data was wrong? So I started asking stupid questions and struggled to comprehend a 
couple of papers. My issue was simply this. What would happen if I didn’t use discrete 
values in the model we built? And more importantly does it matter? It was about this time 
that Professor Quiggin suggested I do a PhD and Associate Professor Colin Brown agreed 
to be my principal supervisor, so here I am.  
 
However, doing a part-time PhD over the same time as the Water Act was in process has 
proven interesting. A central part of the Water Act has been the development of the Basin 
Plan. The Basin Plan is designed to restore the balance between all consumptive water 
users in the MDB. While juggling the PhD and working on a range of issues, the RSMG 
held its first workshop on the MDB asking if we finally got it right. Well a lot has changed 
since the first Basin Plan was released and working for and debating the Basin Plan has 
shaped the final plan for the thesis.  
 
The thesis has evolved as I have been allowed to explore, make mistakes and become 
aware of how much I still don’t know. I have found this a rather humbling experience for a 
number of reasons and I think I now understand just how much of an opportunity I have 
been given to do this PhD.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On 27 February 2014, after seven years of developing a strategy to deal with the problems 
associated with the over allocation of water to irrigators in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin 
(MDB), the implementation phase of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan) was 
signed by all parties (Vidot 2014). There remains a small window of opportunity to 
influence both the final legislative agreement and the implementation review before 
Australia misallocates a large proportion of the $13 billion in public funds set aside to deal 
with water reform in the MDB. The Basin Plan proposes that the environment needs an 
additional 3,200 gigalitres (GL) and this will be sourced by purchasing 1,500GL water 
property rights from irrigators and obtaining 1,700GL of water via investing in water–use 
efficiency infrastructure programs. This thesis will argue that in light of water supply 
uncertainty derived from climatic variability and climate change, infrastructure investment 
programs will lock resources back into inefficient production areas and possibly create a 
legacy of rural debt and failure that may take generations to overcome, while providing 
little in the way of social and environmental benefits. 
 
The thesis obtains these results by utilizing the state-contingent analysis approach to risk 
and uncertainty (SCA), developed by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) to help overcome the 
“profession[s] ... weak position to offer definitive policy analyses in matters related to risk” 
(Just & Pope 2003, p. 1255). It is SCA’s ability to represent a decision maker’s choice to 
optimally reallocate resources by type, place, date and by state of nature (Rasmussen 
2003) that allows for risk strategies to be explored. By describing the future uncertainty 
about water supply within three alternative states of nature (i.e. droughts, normal and wet 
years) the decision maker’s response to risk signals can then be examined by: altering the 
description of each state of nature; and the frequency of each state occurring. Policy can 
then be evaluated, to examine how: individuals’ respond to risk from changes to their 
consumptive share of water resources (Basin Plan): and the threats climate change poses 
to all water users and policy outcomes. By reviewing how policy outcomes for all water 
users may be impacted by climate change, a discussion can then occur about how water 
reform policies could be adapted to maximize the benefits from public funding.   
 
This thesis adapts the SCA model of the MDB developed by Adamson, Mallawaarachchi 
and Quiggin (2007) to examine, how the Basin Plan may change economic welfare, 
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environmental flows and water quality. The model simplifies the definition of water quality 
as a measurement of salinity, which is the externality derived from consumptive water use. 
The partial-equilibrium model can determine the optimal private use of water resources, 
subject to a set of biophysical and policy constraints in the MDB via having a direct flow 
network that tracks changes to water and salt. The model has been adapted to provide a 
constrained economic welfare analysis of policy by examining the Basin Plan’s twin 
metrics of success: a minimum water flow to the sea; and a specified salinity target. 
 
The thesis examines each of the Basin Plan’s approaches to obtain water for the 
environment separately and then tests how sensitive the solutions are to a changing 
climate. Firstly, as the Basin Plan utilizes the common property concept to negate 
externalities (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975; Ostrom 1990) the model has been adapted 
to incorporate Randall’s (1975) arguments that changes in welfare can be determined from 
the reallocation of conjunctive water property rights to examine the private response to 
alternative institutional settings. The Basin Plan’s intuitional settings are a new sustainable 
diversion limit (SDL), improved water quality and providing a minimum water flow target. 
This thesis then examines how the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office (CEWO) 
could purchase an optimal bundle of alternative water property rights (or portfolio) to 
achieve the Basin Plan objectives. This entitlement portfolio consists of a spatially explicit 
set of alternative water rights structures that must provide sufficient water security for the 
CEWO. Additionally the thesis also explores the mixed signals provided to irrigators from 
the Basin Plan’s conjunctive (surface and groundwater) SDL to examine if the net change 
in the water available creates intra- and inter-generational wealth transfers.  
 
The second Basin Plan implementation strategy involves subsidizing the cost of adopting 
water-use efficient technology to obtain water for the environment. The analysis examines 
the impact subsidized capital may have on irrigators investment patterns and the 
corresponding outcomes that investment has on future water security and water quality for 
all water users.  
 
The analyses findings suggest that although the Basin Plan’s design allows for water 
reform, that would benefit society, the Basin Plan’s implementation strategy is flawed. The 
results suggests that the Basin Plan’s implementation provides a direct short term wealth 
transfer to irrigators from purchasing used water, increasing ground water consumption 
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and subsidizing capital investments. Additionally, by incentivizing water-use efficiency 
programs, water may become locked into regions and perennial commodities, which could 
reduce future water trading opportunities to mitigate drought risks. This loss of water trade 
to manage drought coupled with increased capital investment, could then expose 
irrigators, the urban community and environment to irreversible consequences if climate 
change reduces future water security. 
 Background 1.1
Over 14% of the Australian continent is located in the MDB (MacDonald & Young 2001) 
and it spans 13o of latitude (24o to 37o South) and 13o longitude (138o to 151° East) 
(Thoms, Rayburg & Neave 2008) (Figure 1-1). The MDB includes large parts of New 
South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), South Australia (SA), Victoria (VIC) and the 
entire Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The MDB has two major rivers systems: the 
Darling River, which runs north to south; and the Murray River including its significant 
tributary the Murrumbidgee River, which runs east to west. The length of the MDB river 
system is estimated to be 440,000 km and it facilities water delivery to agricultural and 
urban users, and to ecological assets (Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) 2010c). 
 
The MDB conjunctive water resources are derived from surface runoff, groundwater 
aquifers and inter-basin transfers and these assets are expected to satisfy the increasing 
cultural, social, economic and environmental demands placed on it. However, like many 
watersheds in the world, water resources are currently over-allocated towards irrigation 
activities. This imbalanced water share, combined with the negative externalities derived 
from its overutilisation, reduces welfare (Connell & Grafton 2008; Crase 2008). With an 
incomplete specification of known and future conjunctive water resources supply, 
uncertainty exists over the total volume required to rebalance the system. The MDB has 
the second most variable inflows into a river basin in the world (McMahon & Finlayson 
1991). Climate change is expected to reduce MDB wide river inflows and increase the 
severity and duration of drought events (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2009).  
 
Over 10% of Australia’s population resides within the MDB (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) 2008c) and a further 5% of the Australian population (ABS 2010a), living in the City 
of Adelaide (Adelaide), relies on the MDB to supplement their potable water supplies. 
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There are over 30,000 wetlands in the MDB (MDBA 2010c), of which 16 are identified by 
the Ramsar Convention of Wetlands1 as wetlands of international importance. 
 
.  
Figure 1-1 The Murray-Darling Basin2  
 
Over 41% of the nation’s irrigators live in the MDB and approximately 65% of all irrigated 
land in Australia is located in the MDB. Approximately 80% of the MDB is dedicated to 
agricultural activity and the MDB produces between 35-40% of Australia’s gross value of 
agricultural production (GVAP) and one-third of the GVAP is derived from irrigation 
activities, which utilize only 2% of the arable land in the MDB (ABS 2008c, 2008d). The 
level of irrigated output has been achieved by diverting over 60% of the MDB’s conjunctive 
                                            
1
 http://www.bom.gov.au/water/nwa/2010/mdb/context/physical 
 
2
 Source Quiggin et al. (2008) 
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water resources3 to irrigators. However, this level of water consumption has proven to be 
unsustainable and has reduced economic welfare in the MDB and Australia. Policies have 
continued to be designed to incentivize private water use and have failed to internalize the 
externalities derived from the use of that water. Consequently in response to the design 
and implementation of policy, private and public resource have been misallocated, water 
quality has been degraded and environmental assets have been irreversibly damaged or 
lost (Davidson 1969; Quiggin 1988).  
 
The Basin Plan enacts the ‘common good’ approach (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975) to 
deal with externalities, by transferring a proportion of over allocated private water rights 
away from irrigators to be managed by a ‘public trustee’ tasked with improving the ‘quality’ 
(e.g. lower salinity) of the resource base. The Basin Plan proposes that the environment 
needs 3,200GL of surface water to rebalance the system (MDBA 2012c) and that the 
water will be managed by the CEWO. The Basin Plan stipulates two clear objectives for 
the environmental water: improve the ‘quality’ of water resources that are used for the 
urban community in Adelaide and provide a minimum flow to the mouth of the river (MDBA 
2012c).  
 
The 2007 Water Act (Commonwealth of Australia 2008) prohibits the compulsory 
acquisition of water from irrigators but rather utilizes two programs which are designed to 
encourage irrigators participation in the Basin Plan. The first is a direct market purchase of 
water entitlements rights via a $3.1 billion program known as Restoring the Balance (RtB). 
The second subsidizes off-farm storage/delivery infrastructure upgrades and on-farm 
irrigation water use efficiency strategies via a $5.8 billion program known as Sustainable 
Rural Water Use and Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP) (Crase & O'Keefe 2009). The final 
Basin Plan provided an additional $1.7 billion to purchasing additional water rights and 
addressing water delivery constraints in the MDB, and extended the final implementation 
timeline by five years to 2024 (MDBA 2012c). 
 The Economic Questions 1.2
The prior section raises four questions that require further investigation. First, what were 
the driving forces over the past 130 years of water resource development that have 
                                            
3
 See Section 2.4 for a detailed description of the groundwater, surface supplies and inter-basins transfers 
that define the conjunctive water supply in the MDB. 
 6 
 
encouraged an over-allocation of water resources to MDB irrigators? Second, how have 
policies and management evolved to deal with climate impacts on water supply security, 
and what relevant lessons are available for the Basin Plan? Third, how do the alternative 
Basin Plan implementation strategies alter intra and intergenerational welfare? Fourth, can 
the public funding allocated to the Basin Plan be justified? 
 Water Reform 1.2.1
Water reform in MDB has been locked in an on-going economic and policy debate. The 
combination of floods and prolonged droughts in the MDB, continues to expose policies 
that inadequately incorporate risk and uncertainty (Khan 2008). This policy design failure 
has encouraged private and public resource misallocation. The economic failure of policy 
occurs when there is a: misrepresentation how water scarcity transitions the production 
demand curve for water from elastic to inelastic (Randall 1981); misunderstanding how 
irrigators adapt to water supply shocks (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2009) ; and 
an inability to deal with the complex nature of trade-offs between all water users over time 
(Rostow 1959).  
 
Section 2 will present an argument that for the last 130 years of State and Federal policy 
development within the MDB there has been political “romanticism and recklessness” 
(Cummins & Watson 2012) that has attempted to drought proof agriculture to promote 
regional economic development. By assuming that water supply is always available, the 
development of high input irrigation production systems is expected to facilitate regional 
economic development (Davidson 1969). In this political game, each State entity (see 
Section 2.1) has then attempted to maximize their economic gains by over-allocating water 
within their allocative boundaries.  
 
This State based game comes at the expense of other States, requiring the Federal 
Government to appease disputes between all players (Cummins & Watson 2012). This 
approach to water resource development reduces welfare for: the inter- and intra-state 
based irrigators; dryland producers (Davidson 1969); the environment (Roshier et al. 2001; 
Young & McColl 2009); and rural communities (Buikstra et al. 2010). Thus the cycle of 
water reform has created the negative externalities that affect all water users within the 
MDB (Keating et al. 2002; MDBA 2011a; Quiggin 1988). However, welfare loss is not just 
 7 
 
contained within the physical boundaries of the MDB but to all who value its very existence 
(MacDonald et al. 2011). 
 
This State Government based approach to water development in the MDB is evident over 
the first three stages of water resource development (i.e. exploration; expansion; and 
maturity, see Table 2-1). This development approach encouraged a continual policy reform 
cycle in the 1980’s. Each new reform was sometimes correlated with an incremental step 
towards the problem resolution. However, each policy initiative created a legacy of 
obstacles and transaction costs (Mallawaarachchi et al. 2012) that inhibited swift and real 
reform (Cummins & Watson 2012). As these incremental policy steps failed to deal with 
the fundamental problem of resource misallocation, the duration between each new reform 
process contracted. This continual reform cycle entailed a new round of public expenditure 
to deal with the private and public transaction cost legacy. 
 
The Millennium Drought (Section 3) forced a reevaluation of all known data about water 
security when the State based approach nearly caused the collapse of the entire river 
system (Chiew et al. 2011; Heberger 2011). In 2007, the Water Act (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2008) provided an alternative approach to deal with the water reform process, 
when the Federal Government assumed responsibility for developing a Basin Plan 
(Section 4). to ‘restore the balance’ between all water users (MDBA 2012c). This then 
shifted the State based welfare maximization process to a national welfare objective. The 
Basin Plan is the key component of the latest stage of water resource development , the 
‘contractionary’ stage (Cummins & Watson 2012). 
 Water Policy Failure & Water Security 1.2.2
While the efficiency and transparency (Connell & Grafton 2011) of the institutions and 
governance frameworks (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011) enacted to overcome the legacy 
of past water reform vital for a successful Basin Plan, that is not the thesis focus. This 
thesis is a quantitative analysis of the Basin Plan’s goals and implementation strategies 
and utilizes a state-contingent approach in an attempt to overcome the following applied 
policy problems.  
 
‘A problem with the advancement of applied policy advice on water markets is that 
theoretical models and empirical analysis usually bog down when faced with the 
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three scourges of quantitative institutional analysis: nonconvexity, irreversibility, and 
uncertainty’ (Howitt 1995a, p. 1192). 
 
In Sections 2, 3 and 4 it will be debated that Howitt’s three modeling limitations of, non-
convexity, irreversibility, and uncertainty, are derived from inadequately incorporating 
known and future water resource variability when allocating property rights. By providing 
the CEWO with a water entitlement portfolio, the Basin Plan then overcomes past 
allocation problems where the environment only received the residual flow once water had 
been allocated to the property right owners (Brennan & Scoccimarro 1999). As discussed 
in Section 2.2, the cycle of drought and floods in the MDB creates constraints and 
opportunities necessitating irrigator adaption (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 
2007). This adaptation occurs when the demand for water transitions from elastic (no 
scarcity) to inelastic (scarcity) which then creates non-convexity (Lee & Howitt 1996; 
Randall 1981). In periods of extreme drought, this non-convexity creates irreversible 
losses for all water users, especially for those users without defined rights. Complicating 
the policy problems with water scarcity is that climate change is expected to alter both the 
known mean and variance of the water resources available (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & 
Quiggin 2007, 2009; Quiggin et al. 2010; Schrobback, Adamson & Quiggin 2011). 
 
For the Basin Plan to provide lasting economic, social and environmental benefits, policy 
makers must explore both the variation of known supply, the future threats to that supply 
and gain an understanding of how water resources are used by all users so that the 
economic outcomes from changes to supply can be examined. Climate change is 
expected to have deleterious impacts on the MDBs future water supply (Garnaut Climate 
Change Review 2008; Gleick & Heberger 2012; Kingwell 2006). By understanding how 
water users adapted to past extreme drought events, policy can be designed to enhance 
the flexibility required to cope with future adverse climatic futures. By encapsulating a goal 
of resilience into the policy approach, ideally water reform should lead to a long run 
outcome that preserves the welfare gains derived from well allocated public expenditure 
(Chugh & Bazerman 2007; Grant & Quiggin 2013b).  
 Changes to Economic Welfare 1.2.3
For maximum economic benefits, policies designed to address natural resource 
externalities must have clear goals (Pannell 2009). Clear goals provide a mechanism to 
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evaluate the achievement of a policy, but goals alone do not provide the necessary 
information about how a policy should be implemented. Decision makers need to: 
understand the inherent risks and uncertainty in achieving an outcome; the economic 
costs and benefits involved in adopting and implementing a policy; provide justification on 
why compensation is or was not offered; and be aware of how policy can change welfare 
in society. 
 
The economic foundation behind the Basin Plan is the common property approach. The 
establishment of common property helps to internalizes externalities by improving the 
‘quality’ of the resource base (i.e. water). Improvements in water quality are possible by 
transferring property rights away from private users and giving them to an institution who 
manages those water resources for the common good (Quiggin 1988). As property rights 
allow for neoclassical and institutional approaches to be adopted, a “…constrained utility 
maximization [approach] to predict individual and aggregate responses to existing and 
alternative structures of incentives” (Randall 1975, p. 731) can then be adopted.  
 
This thesis divides water users and the utility they gain from water access into three 
groups: producers who gain economic rents from irrigating; society whose utility increases 
when water quality improves; and the environmental 4  gains accrued by improving the 
resilience of the ecosystem (see Section 2.6). By treating water as an input for social, 
environmental and economic activities the trade-offs between users can be modeled within 
Randall’s constrained profit maximization approach. Where profit is the net return from 
irrigation activates and the constraints are defined by the Basin Plan’s SDL limits and the 
policy goals of water quality and environmental flows. This approach then merges 
Randall’s framework for evaluating welfare changes derived from a reallocation of water 
resources and Pannell’s requirements to judge policy successes.  
 
By setting up the constrained welfare maximization question in its dual form, the solution 
then can optimize economic returns from irrigation while achieving the Basin Plan 
objectives5 at least cost. The scarcity value of water resource can be determined from 
alternative Basin Plan settings for the SDL, environmental flows and water quality goals. 
                                            
4
 For this thesis, it is assumed that as quality of the environment improves, an associated increase in social 
welfare occurs. It is also assumed that everyone in society wants environmental quality to increase. 
5
 To improve readability, the term Basin Plan objectives refers to the objectives that are listed in the Basin 
Plan.  
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Additionally by treating environmental gains and water quality as constraints (i.e. minimum 
acceptable standards), there is no need to monetize the environmental or social gains 
from improvements in water. Rather the joint-value of environmental gains and 
improvements can be determined by the dual value derived from the optimal solution. It is 
assumed that these standards (i.e. environmental gains and water quality) are consistent 
with social attitudes.  
 
However, the above approach does not deal with the methodological problems associated 
with optimizing irrigation production under water scarcity. As discussed, to create lasting 
water policy, the risk and uncertainties associated with water supply need to be accounted 
for and debate over the appropriate way to internalize these problems into models poses 
two key issues. 
 
“First, there is a need to refine our understanding of the role of risk/uncertainty in 
agriculture. For example, the current prospects for climate change raise the issue of 
how farmers will react to it. This can involve “rare events” that have not been 
observed before. It creates two significant challenges: (1) rare events are difficult to 
evaluate empirically (suggesting an important role for “ambiguity”); and (2) the 
question is raised of the way decision-makers (including farmers) should adjust their 
management strategies in response to this new uncertainty. 
 
Second, our understanding of the farmers’ decision-making process remains 
incomplete. While farm management studies have typically taken this issue 
seriously, difficulties in dealing with heterogeneous managerial abilities have limited 
our progress. The recent interest in behavioral economics appears to provide new 
opportunities for further explorations of this topic” (Chavas, Chambers & Pope 
2010, p. 370). 
 
The Millennium Drought highlighted how irrigators adapted to extreme drought conditions 
that were outside prior experiences (see Section 3). The modeling work by Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2007; 2009) has illustrated that the state-contingent 
approach (Chambers & Quiggin 2000) provides a behavioral economic approach to deal 
with allocating resources under uncertainty about water supply.  
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The thesis then deals with the reallocation of property rights via a common property 
approach to maximize net social welfare described as changes from maximizing rent from 
irrigation subject to the institution goals of the Basin Plan. In such a manner, the trade-offs 
between economic rents and achieving social and environmental goals occurs at least cost 
via the use of dual optimization. By optimizing water resource allocation utilizing the SCA 
model (section 1.3.1), producers’ adaption in respect to both alternative policy settings and 
the availability of water by state of nature can be determined. This approach then allows 
for climate change uncertainty to be expressed via changes to mean expected runoff 
availability in normal, drought and wet states of nature but also the frequency in which 
alternative states occur. This provides the capacity to compare and contrast the RtB and 
the SRWUIP to provide recommendations for the Basin Plan. 
 Identifying & Dealing With Gaps in the Basin Plan Analysis Literature  1.3
A significant number of economic analyses, discussions and theoretical analyses of the 
Basin Plan and climate change impacts on the MDB have been conducted prior to its 
formulation. Grafton and Jiang (2010) and Connor (2011) provide a literature review of the 
models and approaches that have been used to analyze water resources and the Murray-
Darling Basin Plan and Grafton and Jiang (2011) provide a comparative study of outcomes 
from alternative models used to examine the MDB. The MDBA (2011e) details the 
economic models used, the analysis undertaken and the surveys conducted that provided 
economic guidance during the development of the Basin Plan. Many of these studies are 
discussed throughout the thesis but only the major studies and models are presented here 
to illustrate the remaining research gaps.  
 RSMG Model of the MDB (State-Contingent Analysis) 1.3.1
The SCA model developed by Adamson, Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2007) provided an 
example of how the SCA could be used to help bridge the gaps in understanding how 
decision makers adapted under uncertainty, which was an ongoing debate (Just & Pope 
2003; Rasmussen 2003) and remains so (Chavas, Chambers & Pope 2010). The state-
contingent theory is outlined in Section 5, the model is presented in Section 6 and the data 
sets used are documented in Section 7. 
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The model has been used to examine the possible impact a changing climate could have 
on MDB water resources (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2009). That paper 
examined how negative impacts on water resources could be modeled as either an 
increased frequency of droughts or a mean reduction in water availability across all states 
of nature. The authors argued that the greatest threat to irrigator’s economic viability was 
not from a proportional reduction in water supply but from adverse water states (i.e. 
droughts) becoming more frequent. While irrigation adaption to steady reduction in the 
supply of water may be achieved with a proportional reduction in the area irrigated, as the 
frequency of droughts increases, irrigators are forced to adopt new production and 
management strategies to minimize the risk of negative returns on capital.  
 
This thesis adds to the literature on climate change threats to water resources in the MDB 
from the addition of two papers (see Section 4.4). First Quiggin et al. (2010) used 
projected climate change scenarios (Garnaut Climate Change Review 2008) on water 
resources at catchment and not a basin scale to illustrate the spatial threats to water 
supply. Quiggin et al argued by adopting a carbon mitigation policy, the future private and 
public costs of adapting to the known and unknown consequences of climate change are 
lowered. 
 
Second, Schrobback, Adamson and Quiggin (2011) provided an example of the 
unintentional consequences that could occur from investing in carbon mitigation policies. 
The paper argued that carbon farming incentives could result in large scale timber 
plantations being established. Due to their extensive root systems, trees have the capacity 
to intercept greater volumes of water as it flows across the surface, than many other 
landscapes. Additionally deep rooted trees can extract directly from the water table when 
required. Therefore plantations in high rainfall zones reduce the quantity of water available 
for downstream users. This unintended outcome from policy thereby creates a second 
round negative shock to water resources, and a substantial reallocation of wealth from 
irrigators to subsidized plantation owners. The lessons learnt from Quiggin et al. (2010) 
and Schrobback, Adamson and Quiggin (2011) have been incorporated into the SCA 
model used to evaluate the Basin Plan.  
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  ABARES Two Stage Modeling Process (Positive Mathematical Programing 1.3.2
& Computerized General Equilibrium) 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) utilizes a 
two state process for analyzing water issues in the MDB. The first stage is a partial-
equilibrium model titled ‘Water Trade Model’ (Hafi, Thorpe & Foster 2009) to allocate 
resources. The ‘Water Trade Models’ results are subsequently used by a computerized 
general equilibrium (CGE) model titled ‘AusRegion Model’ (ABARES 2003). This process 
provides the capacity to optimize the interaction of water and landscape transformation 
within the MDB and then determine the wider economic impacts from changes to the 
landscape. ABARES provided input throughout the development of the Basin Plan and 
their last published contribution examined the 2011 version of the Basin Plan (ABARES 
2011). 
 
The ‘Water Trade Model’ has a directed flow network that can model water use on a 
monthly basis and determines salinity impacts yield. The model then mimics management 
decisions on how irrigation resources would be used based upon response to soil moisture 
via concave production functions. This is a traditional approach to representing climatic 
variability impacts on production (Section 5.3). To prevent large scale landscape 
transformation into and away from irrigation, the model provides “‘smooth’ responses to 
shocks as compared to sharp responses in models with Leontief production technology 
[such as (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2007)]” (Hafi, Thorpe & Foster 2009, p. 
3).  
 
The ‘smooth’ responses are an application of the positive mathematical programming 
(PMP) approach (Howitt 1995a, 1995b). The PMP approach relies on calibrating the 
production functions according to what has occurred in the past. All commodity areas then 
reduce proportionally rather than just the “least profitable activities responding” (Hafi, 
Thorpe & Foster 2009, p. 3). A smooth reduction in all commodity areas then implies that 
all resources are currently optimally allocated. Alternatively, this suggests that the current 
level of externalities is also both optimal and socially acceptable, which implies there is no 
economic or policy problem. 
 
Doole and Marsh (2014) reviewed the use of PMP analysis when examining policy 
changes in response to nitrification problems in New Zealand’s dairy industry. By critically 
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analyzing the PMP process Doole and Marsh (2014) determined that “arbitrary 
results…[which are]…potentially implausibl[e]...[occur when the model is] applied outside 
of the calibrated baseline”. These findings are consistent with the Heckelei and Britz 
(2000) and Heckelei and Wolff (2003) reviews of PMP which identified that PMP assumes 
that the current baseline is optimal. As discussed by Randall (1975), when the current 
returns from property rights are used in policy analysis, a bias towards the status-quo 
occurs devaluing the benefits from reallocating rights. This misunderstanding of the true 
economic return from water property rights, can be associated with methodological 
approaches that either use gross margin returns and not economic returns thereby failing 
to understand on-farm capital costs (Brennan 2006), or from using subsidized 
infrastructure costs (Davidson 1969). 
 
This poses complex questions for the methodological approach of the partial equilibrium 
approach. If the calibration bias towards existing land allocations prevents the model from 
adapting to large shocks, then can it provide meaningful analysis once the baseline alters? 
As discussed, water supply during the Millennium Drought was outside known parameters 
(Section 3.3), and climate change is expected to alter both the mean and variance of 
rainfall. Climate change will then alter the profitability and feasibility of alternative 
production systems (Adams 1989; Adams et al. 1988; Crimp et al. 2008). If PMP is then 
used to predict climate change shocks, how can it be used to predict producer responses 
towards these new climate settings? The value of PMP results within the ABARES CGE 
framework must then be questioned. 
 TERM-H20 (Computerized General Equilibrium) 1.3.3
TERM-H2O is a CGE model which provides a detailed analysis of how a policy impacts on 
the local economy (e.g. labor, investment, income) flows through to macro-economic 
indicators (Dixon, Rimmer & Wittwer 2011). This second round analysis then helps 
illustrate the regional costs and benefits from policy changes, providing insight and clarity 
to the policy discussion. However, TERM-H2O was not designed to model water flow but 
rather it uses predefined water volumes to be used in a given area.  
 
It is the capacity of the partial-equilibrium model, described in Section 6, to represent water 
as it travels through the Basin that provides additional information. The dynamic 
constrained optimization nature of the model allows for the relationship between land use 
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and water flow to be determined. Consequently, the model can be used to examine how 
climate change could alter the models optimal investment patterns. By holding land 
allocation constants and using the predicted climate change impacts to water supply, the 
model can examine if there is sufficient water flowing in a catchment to prevent the 
environmental and social constraints from being violated. These alternative approaches 
have been used to compliment other analyses where the SCA model has provided input 
into TERM-H2O.  
 
Consequently while the analysis work by Dixon, Rimmer and Wittwer (2011) and Wittwer 
and Dixon (2013) can determine the wider economic benefits of the implementation 
program and can reveal the wealth transfer to irrigators, TERM-H2O cannot determine the 
bio-physical limitations of the implementation program. 
 The Analytical Gaps of the Basin Plan 1.3.4
The analysis of the Basin Plan and the evaluations of the Basin Plan implementation 
strategies have: concentrated on the practical limitations of the alternative approaches of 
the plan (Connell & Grafton 2008; Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011; Crase, O'Keefe & 
Dollery 2009; Grafton 2007); discussed the cost-effectiveness of the alternative 
approaches to restore environmental flows (Grafton 2010), including alternative strategies 
utilizing trade solutions (Connor et al. 2013; Loch, Bjornlund & McIver 2011); provided 
strategies for optimizing the approaches but no solution (Crase & Gawne 2011; House of 
Representatives 2011); analyzed their second round impacts without optimizing on-farm 
and environmental water use (Dixon, Rimmer & Wittwer 2011; Hone et al. 2010; Wittwer & 
Dixon 2013), evaluated the farmer’s perceptions of the strategies (Cheesman & Wheeler 
2012; Wheeler & Cheesman 2013); examined the impact that a general reduction in water 
availability would have on irrigated production rather than a specific implementation 
strategy (Grafton, Chu, et al. 2011; Grafton & Jiang 2011); discussed the limitations of the 
models used to evaluate the Basin Plan (Connor 2011); provided the analysis for an 
individual catchment (Qureshi et al. 2010) examined the RtB using a single water property 
right (Qureshi et al. 2010) or derived a solution for the Southern Murray-Darling Basin 
(SMDB) only (Qureshi et al. 2007). The partial-equilibrium analyses utilised the tradational 
stochastic function approach to modeling risk and uncertainty (see Section 5). 
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For example, the ABARES process has been used to investigate the impact of a uniform 
RtB (i.e. buy-back) strategy in the MDB. That analysis examined three buy-back strategies 
where 5, 6 and 7% of surface entitlements were purchased uniformly across the Basin. 
Critically, by assuming that all areas lose a fixed percentage of entitlements, the approach 
failed to determine efficiency gains from an optimal portfolio of entitlements for the 
environment. Consequently, the model was developed assuming that irrigators will 
passively adapt to the loss of water by reducing the area irrigated, despite predicting an 
increase in the price paid for water. Additionally the report suggests that the SRWUIP will 
“assist in offsetting the effect of the buyback on water availability for irrigation” (Hone et al. 
2010, p. 61). However, they miss a logical question, if water-use efficiency is beneficial for 
irrigators, why do they need a subsidy?  
 
Both Crase and Gawne (2011) and Nguyen, Goesch and Gooday (2013) furthered the 
discussion of why an optimal RtB strategy is required to maximize the environmental 
benefits, the authors do not derive a solution. The closest effort to optimize the RtB was by 
Qureshi et al. (2010) who also investigated the role of water-use efficiency to obtain 
environmental water for single catchment. Quershi et al.’s analysis used a single water 
entitlement with a constant reliability.  
 
Therefore research has not examined how the Basin Plan’s environmental targets could 
be achieved from purchasing an optimal portfolio of water property rights6. This thesis then 
updates and adapts Adamson (2012) to provide an optimal entitlements purchase strategy 
for the CEWO with fixed budgetary limits. By using the above constrained optimization 
approach, the model can be used to determine how CEWO’s portfolio would have to be 
adapted to deal with alternative climate settings, while still obtaining the water needed to 
achieve the Basin Plan’s goals 
 
No quantitative analysis exists, of how the SRWUIP could be optimized to achieve the final 
Basin Plan’s goals. However both Heaney and Beare (2001) and Qureshi et al. (2010) 
provide insight into the consequences to river flow from investing in water-use efficiency 
technology.  
 
                                            
6
 Section 2.5.3 defines three alternative structures of surface property rights as high security, general 
security and supplementary water. 
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Heaney and Beare (2001) used an average water use model with passive decision makers 
in the SMDB and did not consider climate change impacts on water resources. Heaney 
and Beare (2001) highlighted the negative downstream impacts for all water users from 
changes in river flow and salinity levels derived from investment in water-use efficiency 
technology. This analysis helped generate debate about the merits of needing a set of 
trading rules by region. They argued that the economic problem stemmed from the lack of 
property rights associated with return flows. From this viewpoint it was argued that 
irrigators, who invested in water-use efficiency, should be penalized, either in the form of 
taxes or being forced to surrender the water gained from efficiency, and that increased 
salinity mitigation was required. 
 
However, the strategies suggested Heaney and Beare (2001) are counterintuitive as they 
send the wrong incentives to producers. With irrigators having clearly defined property 
rights on water (see Section 2.5.3) and being responsible for non-point pollution of salt 
(see Section 2.5.2), why should society discourage an individual from optimizing their 
resources? By extending Heaney and Beare’s argument in the opposite direction, society 
is now being asked to provide on-going farm support for inefficient producers. This 
strategy then fails to deal with the problem of over-allocation of water resources, as, if the 
gain from investing in water-use efficiency infrastructure is less than the penalty applied, 
farmers will continue to invest in efficiency programs. 
 
Qureshi et al. (2010) examined the benefits from investing in water efficiency to obtain 
environmental flows in a single catchment. While the paper introduces alternative climatic 
states of nature, the model still expresses a passive producer who fails to reallocate 
resources by state of nature. Additionally by specifying a historic upper and lower area 
bounds for each of the 12 commodities the model framework then has a calibration issue 
like the ABARES ‘Water Trade Model’ as the area dedicated to a single crop cannot 
exceed past experiences which inhibits resource reallocations. While the use of a single 
catchment prevents minimizing, the transformation costs (private and public) that can be 
gained from a regional solution and downstream consequences on the quantity and quality 
of water from upstream of investment decisions cannot be determined (Heaney & Beare 
2001). 
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While substantial work on climate change impacts on: future conjunctive water resources 
in the MDB (Jones & Page 2001; Pittock 2003), the environment (Roshier et al. 2001); the 
need for producer adaptation and adoption responses (Connor et al. 2012; Goesch et al. 
2009; Marangos & Williams 2005); the threats to urban communities (Buikstra et al. 2010; 
Cooper, Rose & Crase 2012); estimations of catchment (Connor et al. 2009) and MDB 
wide economic impacts (Beare & Heaney 2002; Jiang & Grafton 2012), threats to existing 
MDB water sharing rules and water trade (Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) 2008; Loch et al. 2012); the impact climate change will have on the 
Basin Plan (Connell & Grafton 2011; Grafton & Jiang 2010); and the economic benefits for 
the MDB from mitigating carbon emissions (Garnaut 2008; Quiggin et al. 2010; The 
Treasury 2008) exists, no substantial work exists in examining the impacts climate change 
will have on the alternative proposed approaches to obtaining water for the environment 
and the economic consequences of failing to take climate change into account for 
environmental targets, urban users or irrigator’s sunk investments. 
 
Lastly, this thesis is the only quantitative analysis of the final plan. The legislated Basin 
Pan has three major changes to the 2011 version of the Basin Plan analyzed by ABARES 
(2011) and Adamson, Quiggin and Quiggin (2011). First the Basin Plan’s surface water 
SDL has been decreased, requiring more water to be returned to the environment. 
Second, the process in which the surface water SDL is to be reclaimed has been altered. 
The surface water SDL specifies both a catchment reduction and a SDL reduction in a 
trading region. The Basin Plan has expanded the total number of trading regions from two 
(Northern Murray-Darling Basin (NMDB) and the Southern Murray-Darling Basin (SMDB)) 
to five (NMDB, NSW, SA, VIC and SMDB). This increased disaggregation of the SMDB 
trading regions will introduce inefficiencies into obtaining the surface water SDL, as rather 
obtaining water from the least efficient SMDB producers, now the least efficient producers 
in each trading zone are targeted. Third, unlike the previous versions of the Basin Plan in 
2010 (Mallawaarachchi, Adamson, Chambers, et al. 2010) and 2011 (Adamson, Quiggin & 
Quiggin 2011), the finalized Basin Plan increases the groundwater SDL up 929GL (Table 
7-5). So while other authors may have examined the RtB and the SRWUIP, no other study 
has examined the outcomes for irrigators from the new groundwater SDL, nor analyzed 
the spatial changes to investment patterns from decreasing surface water use and 
increasing groundwater consumption. 
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 The Objectives of this Thesis 1.4
This thesis utilizes the SCA model to build a constrained-welfare maximization solution of 
the final Basin Plan. To examine:  
1. if the Basin Plan internalizes the externalities derived from the development of 
water resources in the MDB; 
2. changes to welfare (social, economic and environmental);  
3. the total adjustment package offered by the Basin Plan which includes increased 
groundwater resources, the price offered by RtB and the funds provided by the 
SRWUIP; 
4. the alternative strategies for obtaining water to achieve the Basin Plan’s goals by: 
a. deriving an optimal water right portfolio to achieve the Basin Plan’s goal; 
b.  undertaking a partial equilibrium analysis of the SRWUIP; and 
5. the Basin Plan’s resilience to a changing climate.  
 Summary 1.5
The failure to take account of the inherent climatic risk and uncertainty in allocating water 
resources within the MDB will continue to reduce welfare. The thesis aims to explore not 
only the causes of the uncertainty but how private individuals adapt to resource scarcity 
once it is revealed. By identifying the policy limits and the unintended consequences, the 
aim is to prevent another cycle of private and public resource misallocation.  
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2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RESOURCES IN THE MURRAY-
DARLING BASIN  
 Introduction 2.1
Water resource development in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) is the culmination of 130 
years of ‘romantic and reckless’ policy, which has created a legacy of obstacles that will 
inhibit swift reform (Cummins & Watson 2012). Policy romanticism and recklessness is 
neither the sole domain of water, nor is it unique to Australia (Chan 1982; Jairath 2003) but 
rather water policy is the outcome of a political game between rent seekers (Epstein & 
Nitzan 2002). This political game is an amalgamation of how well the game, correctly 
interprets current and future social preferences (Escobar 2013; Rostow 1959) and the 
design and implementation of the policy. Thus water reform is not only dependent on: the 
efficiency and effectiveness of policy makers to interpret the problem and its solution 
(Colebatch 2006); but how the policy is supported by the available institutions, frameworks 
and regulations required to implement policy (Brennan 2006; Garrick et al. 2009); and how 
the policy interacts with other social settings (Adamson, Zalucki & Furlong 2014).  
 
But no matter how well the institutions and regulatory frameworks are designed, the 
success of natural resource policy is fundamentally depended on the supply of the 
resource in question and how demand responds to the allocated supply. This thesis will 
argue, that it is the highly variable nature of known water supply and the uncertainty 
surrounding future water supply in the MDB (Khan 2008), that drives Howitt’s (1995a) non-
convex demand responses and creates irreversible outcomes. However, the combination 
of transaction costs and policy incentives to treat water scarcity as a temporary 
phenomenon, it can encourage decision makers to wait for rainfall rather than transform 
production systems to mitigating non-convex responses.  
 
Past policy has attempted to deal with the uncertainty associated with water supply by: 
investing in large scale storage solutions of offset supply variability (Davidson 1969; 
England 1960); designing private water allocations rights to reflect the alternative levels of 
water security (Colby 1990; Loch et al. 2012); allocating drought funding to offset income 
loss; and provide structural support (Productivity Commission (PC) 2009). This process 
has evolved into a continual cycle of public support and adjustment mechanisms (Bromley 
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2007; Grafton 2007, 2010) designed to retain water resources within communities (Lopez-
Gunn et al. 2012; Musgrave 2008), at society’s expense (Scheierling, Young & Cardon 
2006). Past policies, built upon prior social acceptances, have shaped the expectations 
and investment patterns of private individuals (Mallawaarachchi et al. 2012). These at ‘risk’ 
private irreversible losses (Clark et al. 1979) have stimulated the continuing cycle of 
reform. Past reform embraced engineering solutions to deal with supply variability and 
water quality, rather than economic solutions to deal with water resource over allocation 
(Olmstead & Stavins 2007). Despite policy makers talking about improving the 
environment, they have introduced signals encouraging irrigated production to expand 
(Connell 2007). 
 
This attitude of providing assistance, ‘until it rains’ approach, is only viable in the short-run. 
In the long run once the realized, or the potential, irreversible losses exceed public 
acceptance, policy reform ‘should’ be altered to reflect the new social settings (Rostow 
1959). However, each new policy reform stage, must take time to traverse the private and 
public legacy of prior reform (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011) in an effort not to make 
things worse and minimize the adjustment process cost (Grafton 2010; Quiggin 2012). 
 
Cummins and Watson (2012) divide the historical social acceptance of the MDB water 
resource development into four incremental learning stages: exploration, expansion, 
maturity and contraction (Table 2-1). The exploration stage consisted of learning about the 
natural variability of water resources supply; the expansion stage attempted to increase 
the volume and reliability of supply; the maturity stage occurred when policies’ started 
shifting from engineering solutions towards market solutions; and finally the contraction 
stage, where net quantity of water rights owned by private individuals will be reduced. The 
Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan) is the key component of the contraction stage and 
is the focus of this thesis. 
 
This thesis concentrates its analytics on the threats that variability and uncertainty about 
future water supplies pose to the implementation of Basin Plan. However, it must be 
conceded that other risks such as political interference, institutional failings and 
operational barriers may also prevent the Basin Plan from achieving its objectives. This 
section then pays homage, although briefly, to how past reform has shaped the 
development of water resources in the MDB water resources. For a detailed discussion 
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about the historic MDB reforms and their limitations, please consult Connell (2007), 
Connell and Grafton (2011), Crase, O'Keefe and Dollery (2013), Davidson (1969), 
Musgrave (2008) and Randall (1981). However, before embarking on a brief tour of 130 
years of rent seeking in the MDB, a quick discussion about how the supply and demand 
for water impacts on private users is required.  
 The Private Demand Response Function to a Given Supply of Water 2.2
In its simplest terms, water economics is about understanding the nature of water supply 
and the consumer’s demand response to the quantity of water available. Again, in its 
simplest terms, water policy is about altering demand and supply curves towards the 
socially desired levels of impounded supply and consumption. Figure 2-1 provides the 
simplified description of a private individual’s short-run demand response to a specified 
allocation of water. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Private Demand Response to Water Supply 
 
At equilibrium, the supply of water 𝑞𝑤 meets the needs of the producer, who is willing to 
pay 𝑝𝑤 to access this water, which provides the unitary of demand (i.e. (𝐸𝑑) = 1). When the 
water supplied to the producer contracts to the left of 𝑞𝑤, then the producer is willing to pay 
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≥ 𝑝𝑤  to obtain water from the market to meet their demand for water. When water 
becomes scarce, the price paid for water becomes relatively inelastic (i.e. 0 <  𝐸𝑑 < 1) 
(Randall 1981) as producers attempt to keep commodities alive. Under periods of extreme 
scarcity, prices can become inelastic. However with insufficient water for all users, 
irreversible losses must occur as either the price exceeds their ability to purchase water 
(i.e. Olmstead and Stavins (2007) ‘choke price’ at 𝑝∗) or there is no water to purchase. 
When the supply of water expands to the right of 𝑞𝑤, the price of water falls. When water is 
no longer scarce its price becomes a relatively elastic good. As prices fall, producers can 
opportunistically enter the market and purchase additional water to engage in productive 
activities. Under perfectly elastic demand, consumption continues up until the point at 
which, the consumer cannot either store or utilize any additional water 𝑞∗ with existing 
infrastructure. 
 
Past water policy has attempted to influence both the long run demand for and supply of 
impounded water. By engaging in nation building exercises to drought proof economic 
activity in the MDB, policy has shifted the supply of water to the right. As the true cost of 
developing and supplying water was never passed on to irrigators, the demand for water 
also rapidly increased (Davidson 1969). 
 The Four Stages of Water Resource Policy in the MDB7  2.3
Table 2-1 aligns the key historical water initiatives into a summarized version of Cummins 
and Watson (2012), four distinct phases of water resource development and the 
discussion pertaining to the detail of the fourth stage are explored in Section 4. Table 2-2 
builds upon Randall’s (1981) work, which outlined the economic characteristics associated 
with the first three stages8 of water resource development and are treated as separate due 
to the economic signals they provide to consumers.  
 
 
 
                                            
7 This section draws heavily from work published in Loch, Adamson and Mallawaarachchi (2014) and Loch, 
Wheeler and Adamson (2014).  
 
8
 The economic characteristics of the fourth stage of water reform are presented in Table 4-1 
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Table 2-1 Evolution of Governance Mechanisms for MDB Management 
Year  Initiative Stage 
1880 Water and Conservation Act provided riparian rights to access water resources 
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
  1886 Irrigation Act provided states with the power of veto on private water rights and 
to manage and use water in the riverine system  
1901 The Constitution provided the states ‘reasonable use’ of water assets (Section 
100) and the Federal Government retained the powers to ensure free trade 
between States (Section 98) 
1905 Water Act nationalized the riverine system and replaced irrigation trusts with 
central control to ensure urban and irrigation supplies 
1915 River Murray Waters Agreement; water sharing between New South Wales 
(NSW) & Victoria (VIC); and entitlements for South Australia (SA) 
E
x
p
a
n
s
io
n
 
1917 River Murray Commission established to implement the 1915 agreement 
1949 Snowy Mountain Scheme (Snowy Scheme) begins  
 
1982 River Murray Waters Agreement amended to allow management of 
environmental problems 
M
a
tu
ri
ty
 
1985 Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council established to provide integrated 
planning and management of water, land and environmental resources 
1987 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 
1989 First Interstate Environmental Agreement to address salinity and drainage 
1992 Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) established (replacing River 
Murray Commission) 
1994 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Water Reform Framework 
1995 MDB States and territories agreed to define an upper limit on extractions in the 
MDB, the starting basis for the CAP 
1996 Commonwealth National Heritage Trust established in response to crisis in 
water quality 
1997 The CAP arrangements put into place, if not fully agreed to or signed by all 
States and Territories 
2002 The Living Murray Initiative; identify projects to improve river health and 
establish icon sites in the Basin 
C
o
n
tr
a
c
ti
o
n
 
2004 National Water Initiative; improved management of water and increased 
compatibility between states to facilitate expanded water trading 
2007 Water Act; established Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) to create MDB 
Plan (replacing MDBC) 
2008 Water for the Future plan; referred some state powers to the Commonwealth 
2010 Water for the Future Initiative: 10 year plan to balance water needs of farmers, 
communities and the environment. 
2010 Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan released 
2012 Basin Plan passes through Federal Parliament into law 
2014 Basin Plan implementation phase signed by all parties 
Adapted from: Loch, Wheeler and Adamson (2014), Musgrave (2008), National Water Commission (NWC) 
(2011c), State Library of South Australia (2013) and The Senate (2010)  
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 The Exploration Stage of Water Resource Development 2.3.1
Prior to Federation in 1901, the formal structures and policies provided to coordinate the 
management of MDB water resources during the exploration stage of water resource 
development were either rudimentary or non-existent. The primary focus at this time was 
to ensure that there was sufficient water to meet the needs of rural communities and 
livestock. Each individual State had the ability to allocate a ‘reasonable use’ within their 
state, they were locked in “self-interest and political gamesmanship” (Clark 1971, p. 11) 
attempting to gain the largest share of the MDBs water resources. The Australian 
Constitution split water resource allocation between States and the Federal governments. 
The State’s ability to allocate a ‘reasonable use’ of water assets was reconfirmed by the 
Constitution. However, in an effort to ensure free trade between all States, the Federal 
Government obtained powers to provide sufficient water to enable navigation rights along 
the river (Table 2-1). This divergence in allocative power is a recognition of the state 
versus national welfare debate.  
 
Due to a lack of storage and delivery infrastructure water resources, irrigation communities 
established during the exploration stage suffered from water insecurity (Table 2-2). 
Drought events exposed that this lack of water security increased the competition and 
conflict for water resources between all water users (Cooper, Rose & Crase 2012). The 
notable droughts of the establishment stage included: a series of dry years in the 1890s; 
the Federation Drought (1901-02); and again in 1912 (Loch, Wheeler & Adamson 2014). 
These drought events stimulated the politic ‘necessity’ to provide water supply security 
(Cummins & Watson 2012). The political debate focused its attention on the need to 
provide water for unlimited urban growth and prevent economic downturns in a rural based 
economy as “irrigation was the cure for drought” (Davidson 1969, p. 49). However, it was 
the 1914-15 drought that provided the political catalyst needed for the River Murray Water 
Agreement (MDBA 2010c) and heralded the start of the expansion stage of water resource 
development in the MDB.  
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Table 2-2 The Economic Characteristics of the Four Stages of Water Resource Development 
Market characteristic Exploration Expansion Maturity Contraction 
Long run supply of 
impounded water 
 
Elastic Elastic to Inelastic Inelastic The idealistic economic 
characteristics of the 
contraction stage are 
revealed in Section 4.5 
“ 
“ 
Demand for delivered 
water 
 
 
Minimal, Often no or minimal 
charge to access water. 
Elastic at low prices, inelastic 
at high prices. 
Low but growing demand. 
Demand is elastic at low prices 
and inelastic at high prices. 
High and increasing 
demand. Elastic at low 
prices; inelastic at high 
prices. 
Physical condition of 
impounded and 
delivery system 
 
Little to no infrastructure. All 
infrastructure new. 
Infrastructure is in good to new 
condition. 
Aging infrastructure in 
need of expensive 
upgrading or repair. 
Competition for 
water between all 
users 
Nil, only during extreme 
droughts. 
Increasing but minimal. Can 
occur during droughts creating 
a new round of investment in 
long run supply. 
 
Intense apart from during 
floods. 
“ 
Non-Convexity  
 
No No Yes “ 
Externalities Nil Minimal Extensive externalities  “ 
 
Social cost of 
subsiding increased 
water use 
Zero to very low  Fairly Low High and rising  “ 
Adapted from Randall (1981) and Cummins and Watson (2012) 
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 The Expansion Stage of Water Resource Development 2.3.2
The River Murray Water Agreement provided the governance structure required to deal 
with the divergent State attitudes towards the quality, availability and use of water 
resources (Craik & Cleaver 2008). The River Murray Commission (Table 2-1) implemented 
the River Murray Water Agreement and it facilitated the rapid expansion phase by utilizing 
public investment to develop the water resource infrastructure network that is still in use 
(MDBA 2010c).  
 
Despite the expectation that farmers would be willing to pay for water security, the true 
cost of water was never passed on (Davidson 1969). With social approval, public funds 
were allocated to engineering solutions to mitigate supply variability and deal with water 
quality management issues. This social acceptance of on-going subsidization of water, 
then negated the need for price solutions to deal with supply uncertainty (Connell 2007). 
The presiding social belief was that, a secure water supply for livestock and food 
production were national priorities (Davidson 1969). Randall (1981) suggests that during 
this stage the combination of low costs for impounding water (dams) and, as the negative 
externalities from water resource use have not been realized, society was rational. With 
the cost of dams remaining low due to the availability of “favorable sites” (Randall 1981, p. 
195), the economic debate was concerned with determining the appropriate rate of 
impounding future water supply and not about the economic efficiencies associated with 
developing water use (Randall 1981).  
 
With the perception that the social costs to build infrastructure were low and with a political 
desire to develop regional and urban Australia, public policy was used to stimulate the 
demand and supply of water. For example, post the 2nd world war, commodity 
subsidization schemes were used to encourage participation in soldier resettlement 
irrigation schemes and work started on Australia’s largest water storage and supply 
system, the Snowy Hydro Scheme (Duane 1960; England 1960). In 1954, Adelaide’s 
water security fundamentally changed when the pipeline linking it to the Murray River was 
completed, as in drought periods the pipeline has provided up to 90% of potable supplies 
(Connell 2007).  
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It is estimated, that from 1940 to 1980 a tenfold increase in the storage capacity of the 
MDB occurred (Figure 2-2) and in response, diversions steadily increased to allow up to 
65% of the impounded water resources to be accessed for consumptive use (NWC 
2011c). However, the 1980’s spelt the end the expansion stage of water resources in the 
MDB. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Development of public water storage capacity in the MDB9 
 The Maturity Stage of Water Resource Development 2.3.3
By exhausting all of the favorable low cost dam sites in the maturity stage of water 
resource development, all future public investments in water storage then faced an 
inelastic and incremental cost function (Table 2-2). As Randall (1981) notes, the maturity 
stage is also characterized by: the social realization that national welfare is reduced by 
failing to internalize the negative externalities from water use; that the competition between 
all water users has become intense during drought periods; and that public infrastructure 
needs to be upgraded. As the maturity stage continues, even in periods of normal rainfall, 
the combination of modifying the river’s flow, over-allocating irrigation supplies and return-
flows from irrigation, results in increasing river salinity and frequent algal blooms (MDBC 
2007a).  
 
                                            
9
 Source (MDBA 2010b)  
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With increasing public awareness and economic questioning about the net benefits of 
water resource development (Davidson 1969), the political justification of continuing to 
allocate public expenditure on developing new water resources becomes increasingly 
difficult (Connell 2007). Decision makers then refocused away from increasing supply and 
towards improving the water quality, as represented by the 1989 interstate agreement on 
salinity and drainage (Table 2-2). This strategy then allowed public funding to be refocused 
towards dealing with externalities (salinity) and in some cases this was combined with a 
moratoria on the granting of further consumptive extraction rights (Loch et al. 2013). By 
improving the quality of water (Section 2.5.2), irrigators could now develop water rights 
which had remained underutilized due to the externality of salt. Consequently, the 
improvement of water quality in one area then essentially transported the externalities of 
over-utilization to downstream users (Quiggin 1991).  
 
The economic debate over who should pay (i.e. polluter or society) for ameliorating the 
negative externalities from water use (Chan 1982) helped change the global social 
awareness about sustainable nature of water resource management in river basins (Sitarz 
1993). These discussions shifted policy focus away from utilizing direct regulations (e.g. 
water quality targets and water allocations) towards market-based instruments (e.g. 
property rights and trade) in an attempt to achieve environmental objectives (Jordan, 
Wurzel & Zito 2005; MDBC 2007a). The benefits of this approach had already been 
discussed, by Randall in 1981 when he proposed that the development of transferable 
water entitlements and an efficient market, would allow the true price of water use to be 
determined (i.e. inclusive of the cost of externalities). Randall hypothesized that price 
discovery would efficiently reallocate water property rights and that the costs of irrigation 
modernization would then be borne by the water user. Thus, price discovery would prevent 
the need for public funds to upgrade existing infrastructure. 
 
In 1994, a critical step within the mature water resource development stage occurred when 
the MDB States and Territories agreed that an upper bound on surface water extractions 
needed to be established to deal with water use externalities (Table 2-2). This ‘CAP’ on 
extractions was based on recommendations to limit diversions to 1994 levels by the ‘Audit 
of Water Use’ (MDBC 1995)10 and was enacted in 1997.  
                                            
10
 For consistency with latter discussion, the CAP in the mature stage of development is interchangeable 
what is later termed the Current Diversion Limit (CDL). 
 30 
 
The CAP had four critical features. First, it defined the scarcity of private surface water 
resources within the basin. Second, the CAP failed to deal with groundwater resources 
(Connell & Grafton 2011). Third, it started the process of decoupling water and land rights 
to facilitate permanent trade (Bjornlund 2003). Fourth, despite debate arguing that net 
benefits would be accrued by society (inclusive of higher water costs for irrigators) by 
increasing environmental allocation, the CAP failed to established environmental rights 
(Crase 2008).  
 
Ultimately, by defining a maximum water offtake, the value of water rights was revealed. 
This awareness of value provided incentives for private individuals to gain rent from selling 
or activating property rights that were either undeveloped ‘sleeper’ and or infrequently 
used ‘dozer’ rights (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011). Consequently, water use increased 
and compounding the externalities the CAP was designed to mitigate (Cummins & Watson 
2012; MacDonald & Young 2001). Additionally, Randall’s hypothesis that true price 
discovery would occur, could not be tested as a series of market impediments including: 
trading rules; regional export limits; termination fees; and other administrative costs, were 
established (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 2008; Roper, 
Sayers & Smith 2006).  
 
Critically the CAP resulted in the residual environmental share of water being penalized by 
water managers attempting to preserve ‘private rights’ (Mallawaarachchi et al. 2008) and 
this environmental penalization was highlighted during dry periods. The on-going nature of 
over allocation of water and resultant externalities allowed the economic discussion to 
return towards debating the need to reduce private water consumption. This discussion 
then helped debate the need to establish environmental rights, which is the central 
objectives of the fourth stage in water reform (Connell & Grafton 2008).  
 
These prior stages of water resource development, then built the infrastructure (see Figure 
2-3) designed to manage the variable nature of conjunctive water supply in the MDB and 
mitigate water quality issues. These stages also locked policy makers into a series of 
transaction costs and in many cases policy solutions refocused water resources back into 
inefficient areas via on-going subsidies (Crase & O'Keefe 2009) 
  
 31 
 
 
Figure 2-3 The Modification of the MDB11 
                                            
11
 Adapted from http://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/files/river-murray-system-poster.pdf 
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 Conjunctive Water Resources in the MDB  2.4
The total average annual conjunctive water supply available in the MDB is 25,467 
gigalitres (GL). Of all water sources rainfall is the largest and accounts for 22,925GL; then 
groundwater extractions of 2,373GL; and Snowy River hydro transfers 1,118GL of water 
into the MDB (Table 7-1). 
 The Spatial and Temporal Distribution of Rainfall  2.4.1
Rainfall in the MDB has summer-dominant patterns in the Northern Murray-Darling Basin 
(NMDB) and winter-dominant patterns in the Southern Murray-Darling Basin (SMDB) 
(Figure 2-4). The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2008b) estimates that the highest 
long term average annual patterns occur in the south-eastern corner where 900–1,200 
millimeters (mm) falls, eastern areas receive 400–900mm, and precipitation steadily 
declines in the western and north western part of the MDB where only 100–400mm is 
expected. These average rainfall patterns provide the MDB with 530,000GL of rainwater 
resources. However, on average 94% of all rainfall is absorbed by the soil and 2% of 
rainfall recharges groundwater aquifers, only 4% of rainfall becomes runoff (i.e. inflows into 
the river system of 22,925GL).  
 
Water averages are misleading in the MDB. Not only is the rainfall to runoff value 
contingent on natural and modified landscape features, but the MDB experiences severe 
droughts and floods. The conversion of rainfall into runoff is a complex relationship which 
includes variables, including but not limited to: the intensity, duration and temporal nature 
of the rainfall event; and the natural and human induced spatial characteristics of the 
landscape over which the rainfall event occurs (Jones et al. 2001 & 2008; Preston & Jones 
2008; Schrobback, Adamson & Quiggin 2011).  
 
Changes in the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) weather patterns bear a statistically 
significant relationship to quantity of rainfall that falls in the MDB (Kamruzzaman, Beecham 
& Metcalfe 2013). The ENSO is measured by the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) and it 
has three phases: the El Niño phase classified by negative SOI values and the La Niña 
phase characterized by positive SOI values; and a neutral phase. The La Niña is 
associated with generating above average rainfall, the El Niño signals that large-scale 
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droughts are possible, especially in the SMDB, and the neutral phase is associated with 
average rainfall patterns (Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2-4 Long-Term Average Rainfall 12 
 
The cycle between the La Niña and El Niño phases results in the MDB having the second 
most variable water supplies in the world (Khan 2008). This variability of water supply 
determines agricultural output (Podbury et al. 1989). Rainfall variability across MDB is not 
                                            
12
 Source Chiew et al (2008) 
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uniform. This is typified by the Darling River, which has the most variable inflows in 
Australia (Khan 2008). The impact of ENSO on rainfall is illustrated in Chart 2-1 and Chart 
2-2 where the inflows into the Murray River and Menindee Lakes13, over the period 1982 to 
2010 are presented respectively.  
 
An analysis of the data used to construct Chart 2-1 reveals that the Murray River has a 
mean inflow of 11,000GL, a median inflow of 9,000GL and a standard deviation of 
7,800GL. The maximum recorded inflow into the Murray River occurred in 1957 when 
49,000GL arrived and the minimum inflow was 1,000GL in 2007. The data depicted in 
Chart 2-2 indicates that the Menindee Lakes have a mean inflow of 2,000GL, a median 
inflow of 850GL and that the standard deviation exceeds 3,000GL. The maximum 
recorded inflow into the Menindee Lakes exceeded 18,500GL in 1957 and its minimum 
inflow was just 35GL in 1920. These datasets highlight the importance that rainfall events 
in the south eastern MDB (Figure 2-4) have in providing the largest proportion of inflows 
into the MDB and the role that La Niña and El Niño events have on the reliability of those 
inflows. 
 
Chart 2-1 Inflows into the Murray (GL ‘000)14 
 
 
Estimating the total conjunctive available water resources in the MDB is complex due to 
the lack of time series and uniformed data collection methods. For example, Chart 2-1 and 
Chart 2-2 provide some of the best available information for water management in the 
                                            
13
 Please consult Figure 2-3 for the spatial location of both the Murray River and the Menindee Lakes, which 
is along the Darling River. 
 
14
 Source MDBA pers. comm. Jim Foreman, January 2011 
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MDB but all data until 2009 is derived from modeled outputs. Decision makers must take 
care with modeled outputs in case the model design prevents the tail of distributions being 
fully explored (Section 4.3.1). Connell (2007) states, that this lack of data and knowledge 
about water resources and their use in the MDB has prevented real water reform.  
 
Chart 2-2 Inflows into Menindee Lakes (GL ‘000)6 
 
 Groundwater 2.4.2
As aquifer recharge zones can lie outside the geographical boundaries of water basins, 
the rate at which groundwater reserves recharge may have no correlation with local rainfall 
events. As depicted in Figure 2-5, irrigators in the NMDB access groundwater from the 
Great Artesian Basin, whose recharge zones include the Gulf of Carpentaria (Smerdon et 
al. 2012).  
 
This spatial disaggregation between the recharge and consumption of groundwater can 
help mitigate localized drought events (Kirby et al. 2014) provided that water managers 
manage the groundwater extraction rate carefully. If the groundwater extraction rate 
exceeds the time required to replenish the aquifer, then groundwater can become a 
depletable resource (Crosbie et al. 2008; Loáiciga 2003). High groundwater extraction 
rates can degrade water quality and the structural stability of the aquifer. Once the aquifer 
is compromised (Knapp & Baerenklau 2006), its natural ability to recharge may be 
impaired or permanently prevented (Brunke & Gonser 1997).  
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In this thesis, the conjunctive extractive value of groundwater has been set to the current 
allowable extractions and not the total resource base. This assumes that the rate of 
groundwater consumption is sustainable. This thesis therefore cannot determine the long 
term sustainability of groundwater resources but it can raise questions about its use and 
value under alternative climate settings. 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Australian Groundwater Resources15 
 Inter-Basin Transfers 2.4.3
The Snowy Mountain Scheme provides the capacity to transfer water, into the Murray 
River and the Murrumbidgee River (England 1960) from the Snowy River Basin16. These 
inter-basin transfers provide the SMDB with 1,118GL (Table 7-1) of high quality water (e.g. 
low salinity) which dilutes MDB derived water supplies thus benefiting all water users in the 
SMDB (Bell & Heaney 2000). These Inter-basin transfers were designed to shift water 
from areas with a relative elastic demand function for water (1 < 𝐸𝑑 < ∞) to areas of 
                                            
15
 Source Deloitte Access Economics (2013) 
 
16
 Figure 2-3 provides the location of the Snowy Hydro-Electric Scheme 
Gulf of 
Carpentaria 
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relatively inelastic demand  (0 < 𝐸𝑑 < 1) . However, these inter-basin transfers created 
ecological (MacPhee & Wilks 2013), economic and social harm (Pigram 2000) in the 
Snowy River catchment.  
 
The restoration of Snowy River flows remains the subject of on-going debate. If climate 
change alters both the total volume and variability of inflows into the Snowy River 
catchment (Quiggin et al. 2008), then this inter-basin debate for an equitable share of 
water resources will intensify. Restoring flows to the Snowy River then… 
“…implies that flows to the Murray-Darling Basin must be reduced. Even if 
restoration of flows to the Snowy is accompanied by the implementation of water–
saving initiatives, the opportunity cost of diverting flows from the Murray-Darling 
remains relevant. 
 
Reduced flows to the Murray-Darling Basin could have a variety of consequences 
relating to the opportunity costs associated with restricting available water for 
electricity generation and for the irrigation for arable land. Reductions in flows could 
change the biophysical condition of the catchments downstream and the quality of 
drinking water for Adelaide (Pigram 2000)”. (Wagner, Quiggin & Adamson 2008, p. 
1). 
 
To prevent policy confusion, this thesis does not examine the impacts on returning flows to 
the Snowy River. 
 Managing the Supply and Quality of Water Resources  2.5
The delivery of water and its quality is subject to: hydrological realities, a complex set of 
regulations and management rules; and the capacity of the natural river system and capital 
infrastructure to supply water where needed (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011; Cummins & 
Watson 2012). The hydrological realities of water supply and its quality are dependent on 
rainfall, bushfires, landscape changes and ground-surface water connectivity (Young & 
McColl 2009).  
 
Approximately 60% (15,700GL) of the total conjunctive water resource base is diverted for 
consumptive use. The Current Diversion Limits (CDL) is comprised of 13,345GL of surface 
water and 2,370GL of groundwater extractions (Table 7-1). In practice, CDL are estimates 
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due to unmetered groundwater extractions, consumption by river pumpers, livestock 
consumption, and other uses (MDBA 2012d). Additionally measurement errors exist and in 
2010-11 diversions were estimated at 6,311GL, ± 14% (i.e. 899GL) as… 
“…metered diversions have been assumed to have an accuracy of ± 5%, regional 
surveys ± 20% and user returns ± 40%. Accuracy for individual valleys has been 
calculated by volumetrically weighting the accuracy of bulk offtakes (direct diversion 
points) in that valley” (MDBA 2012d, p. 9). 
 
The capacity to deliver water at a given point in time is dependent upon the water diverted 
for consumption, the bundle of local and traded-in property rights, the capacity of the 
infrastructure network to deliver water, and the conveyance loss from transporting water 
along the river system (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2007). Historically, two 
management approaches for dealing with water supply variability have been adopted. The 
first option has been to penalize the residual water claimant, (i.e. the environment) in the 
short run, with the notion of providing compensation flows at some point in the future. 
Second, announcements concerning the percentage of allocation to be delivered to 
irrigators, subject to the description of the entitlements risk, are made throughout the year 
(Adamson, Quiggin & Quiggin 2011).  
 Flow Modification 2.5.1
Without a NMDB version of the River Murray Waters Agreement, the investment in public 
infrastructure in dams, locks, barrages and systems to facilitate inter-basin transfers has 
been concentrated in the SMDB (Figure 2-3). These public investments provide the 
capacity for water managers to meet peak consumptive irrigation demands in the spring 
and summer (Adamson & Loch 2014; Brennan & Scoccimarro 1999; Davidson 1969; 
Kingsford 2000). The later establishment of the NMDB and the way the CAP has been 
implemented (Mallawaarachchi, Adamson, Goesch, et al. 2010; MDBA 2010b) has 
allowed some on-going private investment to harvest overland flows in the NMDB to 
continue until recently (MDBA 2012d).  
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Chart 2-3 Change in Flow in the Southern MDB   
 
Source MDBC (1995) 
 Managing Water Quality & the Salinity Interception Scheme (SIS) 2.5.2
The Basin Plan (MDBA 2012c, pp. 80-1) lists nine monitored threats to water quality: 
salinity; suspended matter (e.g. river turbidity); water temperature; nutrient levels 
(including phosphorus and nitrogen); toxins derived from biological systems (e.g. toxins 
from blue-green algae17); toxins derived from human activity (e.g. pesticides and heavy 
metals); pathogens (e.g. Cryptosporidium and Giardia18); acidity; and dissolved oxygen 
levels (e.g. black water events19). Apart from subsequent sections that discuss the direct 
environmental harm from irrigation, this thesis constrains the discussion pertaining to 
water quality to just salinity. This limitation in discussing water quality is due to the design 
of the model described in Section 6. 
 
                                            
17
 Blue-green algae is a cyanobacteria, which is an algae like bacteria, that release toxins into the water 
(DSEWPC 2012). 
 
18
 Pathogens are transported into the river via animal waste (Environment Protection Authority 2005). 
 
19
 Black water events occur after flooding when high concentrations of organic matter are transported into the 
river system and decay. During the decomposition process, the organic matter releases tannins which 
darken the water and depletes the level of dissolved oxygen in the water. This deoxygenated water poses a 
health threat to aquatic species (MDBA 2012e).  
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Salinity in the MDB has two distinct but correlated forms, dryland salinity and water quality. 
Dryland salinity is primarily an externality associated with the removal of deep rooted 
vegetation. Extensive land clearing altered the water cycle and has allowed rising water 
tables to transport salt through the soil profile and up to the soil surface. When the water 
table falls, the salt remains behind. If subsequent rainfall events, fail to flush the salt away 
from the soil surface or vegetative root zones, economic harm can then occur to 
agricultural land, urban infrastructure and environmental assets (Keating et al. 2002). 
Irrigators can contribute to the dryland salinity problem by over irrigating and causing the 
water table to rise. 
 
The quantity of dissolved salts within water is measured by the water’s electrical 
conductivity20 (EC). A river’s EC is a function of the total salt load (natural salinity plus salt 
derived from irrigation activity) divided by the quantity of water in the river (Austin et al. 
2010). Salt is naturally mobilized within the landscape from surface inflows and from saline 
groundwater rising into the river system in periods of low flow (Smitt et al. 2002). The act 
of irrigation removes water from the river contributing to low flow events, while unutilized 
irrigation water returns back to the river transporting more salt into the river, thus the river’s 
salinity is concentrated further degrading water quality. 
 
Salinity is actively managed within the landscape at a farm, regional, state and national 
level to deal with its point and non-point pollution characteristics. Irrigators adapt to the 
point pollution problem (i.e. quality of water arriving to their farm) by altering commodity 
choices and over-irrigating to flush salt away from the root zones when required (Connor 
et al. 2012). However, over-irrigating to combat pollution on farms in turn contributes to the 
non-point social problem of salinity if irrigators fail to adequately manage saline drainage 
water (Smith & Maheshwari 2002) or allow the water table to rise. 
 
By monitoring water quality, active management can take place in an attempt to achieve 
‘end of valley’ targets. A major water quality target is ensuring that the water reaching 
Adelaide’s pipeline, at Morgan, is less than 800 EC, 95% of the time (MDBA 2012a; NSW 
Government 2000). Water quality monitoring then allows for salt to be managed within 
channel and before it reaches the river system. The active within channel management 
strategies include: diverting pulses of highly saline water (e.g. salt slugs) into dams or 
                                            
20
 EC is a measurement of water’s ability to conduct an electrical charge. 
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lakes; and using infrastructure to breakup and dilute salt slugs (MDBA 2011c). The 
monitoring of river quality helps determine the quantity of salt that needs to be extracted by 
the salinity interception schemes (SIS). For example, due to increased flows in the river, 
the quantity of salt removed by the SIS fell from 489,100T in 2009-10 to 324,000T in 2010-
11 (MDBA 2011a, 2012a).  
 
The SIS is an engineering solution designed to prevent groundwater salt from entering the 
river system and they consist of a borefield, pipeline and disposal option. Salt is removed 
… 
“…by constructing borefields that create a zone of pressure in the target aquifer that 
is equal to or slightly less than the pressure at the river. This creates a gradient 
where groundwater flow is towards the borefield rather than towards the river” 
(Telfer, Burnell & Charles 2012, p. 7) 
 
This water is then pumped from these borefields along pipelines towards impervious 
aquifers and surface storage systems. These naturally or conducted systems then 
impound the salty water or allow to it be evaporated. However, the success of the SIS 
encouraged more water to be used and required on-going investment in the SIS. Just like 
impounding water, the initial SIS had low social costs but now faces rapidly increasing 
costs depending on their location and construction (Figure 2-6). 
 
Initial SIS sites at Mildura-Merbein and Buronga, were able to target highly saline 
groundwater supplies and utilize natural disposal options (Telfer, Burnell & Charles 2012) 
keeping their costs lower than subsequent developments. The cost to remove each unit of 
EC in the initial SIS sites is estimated to be approximately $0.5 to $1.5 million. By utilizing 
existing disposal sites and pipeline infrastructure works, other SIS sites including 
Bookpurnon, Waikerie 2L and Pike were able to remove each unit of EC for between $1 to 
nearly $2 million. However, sites without access to existing infrastructure, or need to 
construct disposal basins (e.g. Mallee Cliffs); or intercept increasingly less saline 
groundwater, then face increasing costs to remove each additional EC. For example, the 
cost for the Upper Darling was estimated to exceed $4.5 million per EC (Department for 
Water 2011; Telfer, Burnell & Charles 2012).  
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Figure 2-6 Capitalized Cost of Salinity Mitigation ($)21 
 
The success water quality program has been determined by reviewing the water quality 
arrived at Morgan (Table 2-3). The data suggests that the quality target of providing water 
at 800 EC, 95% of the time for Adelaide has been achieved. It was only during the initial 
period (25 years) that the peak salinity levels exceed the 800EC. Therefore as a goal, the 
program has been a success but this is not an economic justification of the SIS as other 
more cost-effective strategies may exist. 
 
Table 2-3 Salinity Levels at Morgan, South Australia (EC) 
Period Time interval Average Median 
(EC) 
95th 
Percentile(EC) 
Peak %time 
>800EC 
1 year July 2010-June 2011 309 331 419 466 0% 
5 years July 2006-June 2011 432 426 696 785 0% 
10 years July 2001-June 2011 444 430 693 785 0% 
25 years July 1986-June 2011 511 484 797 1160 5% 
Source MDBA (2012a, p. 11) 
 
                                            
21
 Figure 2-6 was provided by MDBA pers. comm. Phil Pfeiffer, December 2013. Note without the raw data 
used to construct Figure 2-6 an analysis of the methodology and data used in its construct could not be 
undertaken. 
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 Water Diversions, Water Property Rights, Water Allocations & Water 2.5.3
Trade22 
Water property rights are used to define the level of water security provided to irrigators in 
the MDB (Brennan & Scoccimarro 1999; PC 2003; Randall 1975). The MDB has both 
surface and groundwater entitlements.23 In decreasing levels of security, surface water 
rights can be divided into three entitlement structures: high security, general security and 
supplementary. It is this variable nature of security by entitlement class that allows for a 
total of 16,890GL of surface property rights to exist on paper in the MDB (BOM 2011), 
despite the total surface CDL being only 13,345GL (MDBA 2012c). To model the mixed 
signals provided by the Basin Plan, this thesis has deliberately assumed there is only one 
entitlement class for groundwater (Section 8). 
 
The initial allocation of water a farmer receives in a season is dependent on; the available 
water in storage; the management rules within an irrigation district; and the bundle of 
alternative water rights they own. As the season is revealed, allocations can increase in 
response to supply, but once allocated, water cannot be taken away from a farmer (Loch 
et al. 2012). Therefore water rights are an ownership of water entitlements and the 
allocation is the quantity of water an individual’s rights receives. Therefore a direct positive 
correlation exists between a right’s reliability and its purchase price (Randall 1975) .  
 
The perceived annual reliability of these property rights has shaped the development of 
specific irrigation industries. For example, …  
“[t]he different irrigation crops in the various States are reflected in the States’ 
policies on security. In South Australia, where horticultural crops predominate, 
entitlements are effectively 100 per cent secure. In Victoria, irrigators’ entitlements 
are divided into water rights which are very secure (99 years in 100) and additional 
sales water which is allocated as a percentage (up to 120 per cent) of water right 
and which is less secure” (MDBC 1995, p. 29). 
 
To minimize risk on capital investments perennial production systems (vine and tree 
commodities) require access to highly secure water supplies. Perennial production 
                                            
22
 The terms ‘property rights’ and ‘water entitlements’ are interchangeable within this thesis. 
 
23
 This thesis does not disaggregate groundwater rights into alternate structures. The issues pertaining to the 
Basin Plan allowing trading between surface and groundwater are discussed in Section 8.6. 
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systems are long run investments due to their upfront costs and delays in reaching 
production maturity. Therefore adverse impacts on prices and yields can expose perennial 
capital investments to unsustainable levels of risk. The failure to provide sufficient water to 
perennials can result in reduced in yield and prices. Prices decrease as water constraints 
reduce the size of the fruit and degraded their quality. In periods of severe water shortage, 
the root stock can die resulting in capital loss (Carr 2012). Consequently, high security 
water provides as insurance against adverse climatic variability. 
 
Surface water rights provide less security (Clark 1971; MacDonald & Young 2001) and are 
utilized by producers who can: access other sources of water to augment their 
requirements; adjust the area under irrigation to match allocations (e.g. cotton and grains); 
or sell their water on the market (Mallawaarachchi & Foster 2009). Water trade in the MDB 
has two forms, permanent and allocation. Permanent trade is the transfer of a water 
entitlement from one individual to another (i.e. capital investment by trading a property 
right). Allocation trade occurs when an individual only trades the water they have been 
allocated in that season (i.e. akin to leasing the entitlement).  
 
This imbalance in property rights and CDL can also occur when producers have an 
inability, or reluctance to trade (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011; Crase & O'Keefe 2009) 
and/or lack the funds to fully develop water entitlements. In this case, water may only be 
used occasionally (i.e. dozers), or may have never been used (i.e. sleepers). However, by 
encouraging trade, underutilized resources can be engaged within a productive capacity. 
 Complexity in Water 2.5.4
The complex nature of property rights and hydrological realities creates a series of 
practical considerations, management rules and legal questions when dealing with water 
entitlements. For example, it is only once rainfall becomes run-off, that water property 
rights exist (Clark 1971). Once runoff enters a river system, at which point does a given 
water asset transition from an open access resource, to a common property resource and 
to a private right (Carruthers & Ariovich 2004)? The water flowing in a river system is a 
combination of both the used and unutilized irrigators’ entitlement portfolio, urban 
entitlements, defined environmental entitlements, open access (e.g. riparian rights for 
stock) and residual unallocated water. When water is diverted for consumptive use, it can 
have either private irrigation rights (Ditwiler 1975), or community rights for potable water, 
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and/or common property rights for environment. When water returns into the river system 
from consumptive use, then questions can be asked about who owns the reflow and who 
is responsible for negative impacts on water quality (Heaney & Beare 2001). Additionally 
there can be instances where irrigators, (can accidentally or deliberately) source water 
from the wrong entitlement structure. For example, Young and McColl (2008) identified 
instances where bores, operating beside rivers, were accessing surface water resources 
rather than groundwater resources.  
 Examining the Trade-Offs Between Water Users 2.6
The supply of water at a given scale and scope creates utility for farmers, rural 
communities, the environment and society as a whole. The allocation of water rights 
creates a legal framework governing water’s ownership and creates a “transfer of rights to 
wealth” (Castle 1978, p. 2). As the utilization of water creates externalities (i.e. salinity), an 
efficient allocation of water rights, between all users then allows for the conditions to 
maximize net social welfare 24  to emerge (Ditwiler 1975). This level of welfare then 
embodies the socially acceptable level of pollution or trade-offs that society is willing to 
accept for resource use (Coase 1960). 
 
Australia’s social welfare has been reduced due to the historic water development stages 
that have been over allocating water resources for consumptive use. Not only have 
irrigators gained wealth at society’s expense, but irrigators have also received subsidies to 
misallocate resources, in efforts to gain wealth. However, the value of water is neither 
constant by user group, nor through time (Quiggin 2001). Consequently as society has 
become aware of the losses in wealth, society’s values for water and the socially 
acceptable levels of pollution have changed. This has allowed the new ‘politic’ necessity to 
transfer water rights between users to emerge. When these rights transfer, a change in 
wealth will occur, facilitating the need for ethical debate about compensating those who 
generated wealth at society’s expense (Randall 1975). 
 
                                            
24
 Where social welfare is defined as: the economic gains from private water use; sufficient water supplies to 
meet social activities; and enough water to meet the environmental health standards that are consistent with 
society’s current expectations. 
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 Urban, Social & Cultural Issues 2.6.1
15% of Australia’s population is directly dependent on the MDB to provide all or part of 
their water needs and water is an integral part of the social and cultural framework 
required to create sustainable communities (Buikstra et al. 2010). Water is a social input 
which facilitates the community’s ability to: survive (i.e. need water to live); undertake 
household chores; promote economic activities; provide recreational activities; and meet 
the social and cultural values found within alternative communities (Halcrow 1978). 
Although this thesis fails to develop the complex issues surrounding indigenous 
Australian’s rights to water25, it acknowledges that these rights exist. This thesis treats all 
parts of society as one group and considers water as an essential input for human and 
community health.  
 
The total consumptive allocation to urban users within the MDB is estimated at 615 GL 
(MDBC 2007b) or 2% of the conjunctive water resources. This thesis assumes that the 
quantity of water allocated to urban areas is a fixed requirement when allocating water 
resources between competing users (Section 6.7.6). However, trade-offs between 
consumptive users still exist, when the quality aspect of water is considered.  
 
Research has revealed that communities within cities (Viscusi, Huber & Bell 2008) and 
rural areas (Cho et al. 2005) are willing to pay for increased water quality, including being 
willing to subsidize farmers to reduce nonpoint pollution (Hite, Hudson & Intarapapong 
2002). Therefore within this thesis, it will be assumed that all improvements in water 
quality, increases urban water users’ utility. 
 Environment 2.6.2
The irrigation sector has been in direct competition with the environment for land and 
water resources. In some cases, irrigation settlements have been developed on wetlands 
to take advantage of their biophysical attributes. The MDB has approximately 30,000 
                                            
25
 To develop an understanding of indigenous cultural values associated with water in Australia, the following 
four references provide an introduction into this complex area. See Jackson et al. (2012) and Mooney and 
Tan (2012) for a discussion on cultural values and debate concerning the need for engaging with ingenious 
cultures when undertaking water planning. Bark et al. (2012) discuss the internalization of cultural claims into 
the basin wide planning process when reallocating water shares. Nikolakis, Grafton and To (2013) 
deliberately contrast indigenous and non-indigenous values in water markets to develop policy approaches 
to prevent inequity in water resource shares from arising.  
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wetlands, fragmented across 25,000km2 (MDBA 2010b). Wetlands provide habitat, for a 
diverse range of resident and migratory fauna and flora, including 95 endangered species 
(MDBA 2010b).  
 
The developing of water for irrigation purposes has: reduced the flow to the sea from 
13,000GL to 5,000GL per annum (MDBC 2006a); altered river flow patterns (Chart 2-3); 
and degraded both the within-channel and extensive riverine environments. While the 
infrastructure network provides the capacity to meet peak agricultural demands for water it 
has come at the expense of the environment. By changing river flow patterns, the river’s 
morphology has changed as the natural patterns of sedimentation and erosion were lost. 
Infrastructure and flow management have also damaged the environment, when large 
scale dam water releases occur. By releasing water from a dam the river’s turbidity, 
sedimentation and the water temperature can rapidly alter, causing further environmental 
harm (Sherrick et al. 2004; Walker 1985). Additionally further river channel degradation 
occurs when return flows transport: biological wastes (Smakhtin 2001); chemical nutrients 
(Doole & Pannell 2011); and salts (Lester et al. 2011) back into the river. Some of these 
biological wastes contribute to the development of blue green algae in low flow events 
(MDBC 2007a).  
 
Kingsford (2000) identified three extensive wetland riverine degradation issues derived 
from water resource development. First, there is a reduced movement of genetic material 
between wetlands. Second, the total area of wetlands has contracted. Third, by using 
wetlands as storage facilities, the lack of a natural drying cycle has provided opportunities 
for invasive species. Additionally these changes to wetland inundation and drying patterns 
has led to the development of acid sulfate soil that can irreversibly degrade the ecosystem 
habitat (MDBA 2010c). These issues then prevent wetlands and their dependent local and 
migratory biota to withstand other and future adverse shocks 
 
Davies et al. (2008) reviewed the impact irrigation has had on the MDB environment 
(Table 2-4). This study examined twenty-three catchments in the MDB environment and 
examined four indicators: ecosystem health; fish stock; macoinvertebrate health; and 
hydrology. A five point scale from good and decreasing to extremely poor was then used 
to evaluate the indicators. In total only eight ‘good’ ratings were awarded across the four 
indicators and only one of those was awarded for ‘ecosystem health’ in the Paroo 
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catchment. The remaining seven ‘good’ ratings were awarded to the indicators evaluating 
the connectivity of the river’s hydrology. Overall Davies et al. judged that the river’s 
hydrology appears in better shape than the: health of the ecosystem (20 times rated poor 
to very poor); fish stock (20 times rated poor to extremely poor); and macroinvertebrates26 
(20 times poor to very poor). 
 
Table 2-4 Ecosystem Health in the MDB 
 Ecosystem Health Fish Macoinvertebrates Hydrology 
Good 1   7 
Moderate 2 3 3 11# 
Poor 7 9 18 5^ 
Very Poor 13 3 2  
Extremely Poor  8   
Total 23 23 23 23 
# 8 of these catchments were described as moderate to good 
^ 1 of these catchments was described as poor to moderate 
Source: Davies et al. (2008)
 
 
Some species have taken advantage of landscape modification to offset the loss of natural 
habitat (Adamson, Zalucki & Furlong 2014). For example, rice production systems can 
provide temporary on-farm wetland habitats for water birds (McIntyre et al. 2011; Roshier 
et al. 2001). Additionally infrastructure conveyance losses and irrigation return flows have 
facilitated the development of new persistent wetlands but these wetlands are now under 
threat from public investments in water efficiency programs (Heard 2009).  
 Agriculture and the MDB Economy 2.6.3
Nix and Kalma (1982) identify four distinct climatic zones in the MDB: sub-tropical, 
temperate, cool-temperate and semi-arid to arid. Soil moisture is an important factor in 
determining land use patterns in Australia followed by topography, the original vegetation 
cover and soil fertility (Davidson 1967). These biophysical constraints have favored the 
development of low-input, low-output production systems in Australia (Keogh 2009). 
However, as irrigation provides supplementary moisture, it negates the primary land use 
production constraint associated with dryland agricultural systems, creating opportunities 
to diversify into other activities and allowing for input intensification. It is this associated 
                                            
26
 Macroinvertebrates are freshwater crayfish, crustaceans and insects. 
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increase in off-farm inputs that has created a political desire to use the irrigation industry to 
help develop regional economies (Davidson 1967). 
 
In 2005-06, 18,634 or 31% of all farms in the MDB were directly involved in irrigation 
practices and these irrigators purchased goods and services from the wider MDB 
community. It is estimated that there are 65,472 businesses in the MDB and that 32% of 
them are identified as operating in the agricultural, forestry and fishing sector. Additionally 
10% of the MDB’s labor force is directly employed in agriculture or its support industries 
(ABS, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) & Bureau of 
Rural Sciences (BRS) 2009). 
 
The gross value of irrigated agricultural product (GVIAP) provides up to one third of the 
MDB’s total GVAP (i.e. GVIAP component of GVAP in Chart 3-6). The three major 
irrigated commodities produced in the MDB, in 2010-11, were pasture (375,000 hectares 
(Ha)), cotton (332,000Ha) and cereal crops (excluding rice) (165,000Ha). MDB produced 
the entire Australian rice crop and the majority of the nation’s cotton crop (ABS 2012b).  
 
Over the last decade, the area irrigated has fluctuated from 0.9 million to 1.8 million Ha per 
annum, Table 3-1. When the total area irrigated contracted, irrigators expenditure patterns 
for production inputs, casual labor and discretionary spending altered (Kirby et al. 2014). 
Droughts create negative second round impacts on the economic activity and employment 
in regional communities (PC 2009). Persistent droughts eventually force structural change 
in the irrigation sector altering a region’s economy (Buikstra et al. 2010; Dixon, Rimmer & 
Wittwer 2011). Consequently, proposed downward changes to the quantity of water 
available to irrigators, created wider public discussion (House of Representatives 2011; 
Quiggin, Mallawaarachchi & Chambers 2012) as a net reduction in water rights can be 
perceived as either a permanent drought or a permanent water trade out of a region. In 
this case some individuals fail to consider the wider benefits of reallocation and only 
concentrate on their perceived losses (see Section 8.1 for a continuation of this point). 
 Summary 2.7
The development of water resources in the MDB has focused on using impounded water 
storages to offset rainfall deficits (i.e. drought) so that irrigators have water when required. 
However, the realized spatial and temporal variability in rainfall continues to pose 
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allocation problems for water managers, forcing irrigators to adapt. As realized rainfall 
patterns have generally occurred within known bounds, the engineering solutions to 
reduce climatic variability have provided a degree of capacity to adapt within these 
bounds. The Millennium Drought illustrated that rainfall bounds are not fixed and that 
existing engineering and management solutions fail once critical threshold have been 
reached, forcing transformation.  
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3. FUTURE THREATS TO WATER SUPPLY: THE MILLENNIUM DROUGHT 
EXAMPLE 
 Introduction 3.1
To prevent problems associated with non-convexity uncertainty, and irreversibility, water 
managers must understand the variable nature of water supply and how water is used by 
society. This includes: determining the total conjunctive supply at the disposal of water 
managers (Young & McColl 2008); acknowledging the temporal and spatial aspects of 
water supply (Ditwiler 1975); recognizing the non-linear relationships which exists between 
the conjunctive sources of supply (Chiew, McMahon & O'Neill 1992; Moore 1979; Noel, 
Gardner & Moore 1980); and identifying the future known risks (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 
2011; Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2011) and uncertainties which may alter future water supply 
(Carey & Zilberman 2002; Randall 1981). 
 
By learning to adapt to water insecurity (Ash et al. 2007; Henzell 2007) by changing inputs 
and outputs, Ashton and Oliver (2012) found that irrigators could generate a positive return 
on capital and acquire off and on farm capital holdings. This capital portfolio diversification 
then provides farmers with greater resilience to other adverse events (Blank et al. 2004).  
 
However, water managers’ predictions about the future availability of water are often 
based on models that are built with historic data or in the case of the Murray-Darling Basin 
(MDB) with limited and fragmented data (Connell 2007). The complexity and limitations 
associated with determining the Murray-Darling Basin Plan’s (Basin Plan) Sustainable 
Diversion Limits (SDL) are detailed in Section 4.3.1 but to summarize, societies skills in 
predicting future rainfall is incomplete (Chiew et al. 2011) and models can only provide 
guidance on what may occur, and not will occur, in the future.  
 
The Millennium Drought (Section 3.3), reminded decision makers in the MDB that like any 
natural system, future rainfall events are not restricted to a draw from a known and 
complete dataset. Even if climate change is ignored, the future realized rainfall events in 
the MDB will inevitably set new minimums, maximums and patterns that will alter basin 
wide inflows. The Millennium Drought reset all known records regarding the severity and 
longevity of a drought event. Such was the contraction in water supply, it has been 
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compared to an adverse climate change shock and it forced irrigators to adapt and 
transform their production systems (Chiew et al. 2011; Criak & Cleaver 2008; Grafton & 
Jiang 2010; Heberger 2011; Mallawaarachchi, Adamson, Chambers, et al. 2010; Quiggin 
et al. 2010). This thesis regards the Millennium Drought as a ‘Black Swan’ event (Taleb 
2007) as new basin wide flow and water management models have been commissioned to 
overcome the limitations of past models (Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) 2010a). 
By understanding how irrigators adapted to this ‘Black Swan’ or ‘rare events’ (Chavas, 
Chambers & Pope 2010) it provides insights into how producers may reallocate resources 
in response to a changing climate.  
 
Climate change is expected to adversely impact both the supply and the quality of water 
(Preston & Jones 2008; Quiggin et al. 2010). The realized outcomes from climate change 
have the capacity to alter both the temporal and spatial security of alternative water 
entitlements (Crase & Gawne 2011; Randall 1981). These new rainfall patterns and 
changes to water security will subsequently force managers to adapt beyond past 
experiences (Mallawaarachchi et al. 2012). As the constrained-welfare approach (Section 
1.2.3) is dependent on understanding the private and institutional response to changes in 
their allocative water share, future threats to water shares need to be examined in order to 
develop policy outcomes that are resilient to future changes (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 
2011). To this end, we need to understand what has, and what could occur to water 
resources and their management in the MDB. 
 Future Threats to Water Supply 3.2
We can classify future problems and their contingencies into three levels of increasing 
unawareness white swans, grey swans and black swans (Taleb 2007). White swans are 
problems with known possible outcomes and contingencies (i.e. complete awareness). 
Black swan problems involve unforeseen contingencies (i.e. totally unaware) and can be 
created by models that are constrained by bounded awareness heuristics (Chugh & 
Bazerman 2007) and traditional approaches in modeling distribution tails (Chichilnisky 
2010). Once realized, black swan events shake the foundations of decisions and cause 
non-linear responses in awareness. In this regard, despite droughts being a frequent event 
in the MDB, the Millennium Drought can be perceived as a black swan event as the 
realized outcome was outside bounded heuristics and it forced non-linear behavioral 
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change in irrigators, water managers and policy development (Ashton & Oliver 2011, 2012; 
Heberger 2011; Hooper & Ashton 2009; Mallawaarachchi & Foster 2009).  
 
Climate change is neither a white swan nor a black swan but rather it is a grey swan. A 
grey swan is a situation where the problem is known and we are aware that the complete 
set of outcomes and contingencies is unknown. Grant & Quiggin (2013b) discuss that via 
inductive reasoning, decision makers become aware of needing to deal with unknowns 
concerning grey swan problems. Thus the Millennium Drought (realized black swan) 
provides guidance to understanding climate change (grey swan) and how decision makers 
may adapt to future ‘rare events’. However, climate change is not the only other threat to 
future water resources. 
 Climate Change impacts on water supply27 3.2.1
Water, is a crucial input to agricultural production. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (2007b) concludes that, for the world as a whole, the negative effects of 
climate change on freshwater systems outweigh its benefits. In addition to raising average 
global temperatures, climate change will affect the global water cycle. Globally, mean 
precipitation (rainfall and snowfall) is projected to increase due to climate change. 
However, this change will not be uniform, and projections are subject to substantial 
uncertainty, as discussed later. 
 
Climate change is projected to increase the variability of precipitation over both space and 
time. It is predicted that average precipitation will increase in high rainfall areas and 
decrease in most arid and semi-arid areas (Millet et al. 2005). Where precipitation 
increases there are likely to be more frequent events involving very high rainfall, such as 
monsoon rain associated with tropical cyclones (IPCC 2007a). Severe droughts are also 
likely to increase by multiples ranging from two to ten, depending on the measure (Burke 
et al 2006), particularly in the temperate zone between 30 and 60 degrees latitude. In 
addition, higher temperatures will lead to higher rates of evaporation and 
evapotranspiration, and therefore, to increased demand for water for given levels of crop 
production (Döll 2002). Water stress (the ratio of irrigation withdrawals to renewable water 
resources) is likely to increase in many parts of the world (Arnell 2004). 
                                            
27
 This section draws heavily from Quiggin et al. (2010, p. 534) 
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The evidence from 15 different climate change models suggests that the MDB will become 
hotter, drier and droughts may become more frequent (Chiew et al. 2011). The climate 
change scenarios used in this thesis are presented in Section 4.4. 
 Other Shocks 3.2.2
Climate change is not the only issue to confront future conjunctive water supply. Other 
unknowns include, but are not limited to: the continuing investment in on-farm water 
harvesting in the Northern Murray-Darling Basin (NMDB); other sources of landscape 
modification that interact with water supply; and the outcomes to the conjunctive water 
resource base from policy signals. For example, Schrobback, Adamson and Quiggin 
(2011) modeled an unintended and negative policy shock to water resources, from carbon 
farming. Here the mitigation or adaption response to a changing climate provided 
incentives for irrigators to invest in silviculture, creating a second round negative impact on 
future water resources. The arguments presented in that paper were28…[w]e assumed that 
for-harvest forestry is only economically viable on productive land rather than on less 
productive land in order to achieve high carbon and timber yields. 
 
Based on the assumptions, data sets for commodities and the model used in [that] study 
the simulation results demonstrate that a carbon emissions permit price of at least $100 
per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) will be required for land users in order to create a price 
incentive for large scale forest plantations to be established in the Basin’s south-eastern 
catchments. This result holds both for baseline climatic conditions and for a climate 
change scenario representing the implications for water availability of the stabilization of 
atmospheric CO2 levels at 550 [parts per million] ppm. For the climate change scenario we 
found that larger areas are turned into forestry compared to the baseline climate scenario. 
This is due to decreased runoff interception and changes in the irrigation water 
requirements of forests compared to perennial commodities. However, the assumptions 
made for runoff generation in the model are extensive, in particular the linear relationship 
between water-soil-biomass regimes. This bears some modeling uncertainties which may 
affect the results presented here. 
                                            
28
 The remained of this section is a quote from Schrobback, Adamson and Quiggin (2011, pp. 37-8). 
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Subsequent to changes in land use patterns towards forestry we found that water use and 
water quality decreased overall with an increasing carbon permit price. The water quality in 
the drought state of nature declined so extensively in both climate scenarios that 
Adelaide’s water quality target of 800 electrical conductivity (EC) was exceeded at a 
carbon permit price of $100. Furthermore, the environmental flows at the end of the 
system decreased so significantly with increasing carbon permit prices in the dry state of 
nature that the health of the Coorong was jeopardized. 
 
The results from this study suggested that the contribution of forestry establishments in the 
south-eastern catchments of the Basin to emission mitigation will remain modest even 
under high carbon permit prices. It is also to be noted that under current policy settings, a 
permit price of $100/ton is unlikely to be realized in the medium term. Although the 
establishment of plantations in the region examined in this study may be a profitable 
alternative to conventional agriculture in the medium term, it seems likely that carbon 
sequestration through forestry will be commercially viable in other parts of Australia at 
significantly lower prices (Harris-Adams & Kingwell 2009). 
 
However, in the light of uncertainties about carbon yields due to spatial and climatic 
characteristics and the future carbon price risks in a market that is subject to development, 
farmers may opt for more conservative agriculture land allocation decisions. 
 
Future research on the impact of a carbon price incentive on land use changes and 
associated water yield impacts may investigate water allocation regimes that do not 
account for the water interception of plantations as previously recommended by Young & 
McColl (2009). 
 
In such a setting, water could be extracted from foresters without purchasing water 
entitlements which could be an additional incentive for farmers to reallocate irrigated 
agricultural land to forestry. This would illustrate a situation where a national policy and 
regional water policy are not corresponding. Results of such a scenario are likely to reveal 
more severe negative social and economic externalities than reported in the present study. 
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In conclusion, the analysis reported here suggests that the option of carbon sequestration 
through forestry is unlikely to displace irrigated agricultural production of the Murray–
Darling Basin to a significant extent in the short or medium term. 
 Adapting to Future Water Supply Shocks 3.2.3
Australian agricultural producers have continuously engaged in the process of adaption 
since European settlement to deal with, or take advantage of, policy signals, the 
biophysical attributes, technological opportunities, market forces, and diversification 
strategies (Donald 1982; Henzell 2007; Powell 1982; Shaw 1982). One key biophysical 
driver of adaptation has been learning to deal with the alternative phases of El Niño 
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Section 2.4). Producers have leant to maximize their returns 
under climatic variability (Hayman et al. 2007) based on their experience, management 
skills and ability to use alternative information sources (Ash et al. 2007) to help guide their 
final decisions with varying degrees of success (Mallawaarachchi & Foster 2009).  
 
Producers are continually learning to adapt to the inherent variability in the system 
(Byerlee & Anderson 1982). However, a producer’s ability to respond to a future event may 
be limited by their prior relevant experience to the event (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002), 
their ability to recognize or predict the event (Lindner & Gibbs 1990; Makeham & Malcolm 
1981), their past management success in dealing with the event; any biophysical, financial 
and capital investment constraints on the farming enterprise; and factors outside of their 
control which constrain their choice sets (Mallawaarachchi et al. 2012).  
 
By reconsidering the above decision in a state-contingent approach (Section 5), a 
manager’s bounds (e.g. experience and management response) may reduce their 
awareness about all outcomes in states of nature (e.g. solutions to deal with a lack of 
water availability) and the description of each state (e.g. just how extreme can a drought 
be). Changes to the problem set (e.g. water availability in a drought or climate change) can 
result in resource misallocation occurring until new successful solutions are determined by 
the decision maker. As Grant and Quiggin (2013b) discuss, when decision makers’ 
experiences are ‘ecologically rational’ (Goldstein & Gigerenzer 2002) cognitive heuristics 
rapidly improve their awareness, which increases their welfare. To this end, once a 
decision maker has experienced a state of nature (i.e. drought), the decision maker is 
more likely to make a better decision next time. However, if the time period between the 
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adverse events occurring, can be classified as the long run, then changes to the irrigation 
property (e.g. new crops and new infrastructure) may decrease the value of past 
experiences to help guide solutions to the current adverse event.  
 
Irrigators will continue to adopt and adapt the risk mitigation strategies learnt during the 
Millennium Drought. These strategies included: strategically over irrigating commodities to 
manage salt (Connor et al. 2012); engaging in both the temporary allocation (Loch et al. 
2012; Loch et al. 2013) and permanent water trade markets (Mallawaarachchi & Foster 
2009) to either purchase more water or obtain funds; strategically purchase additional 
water rights in anticipation to counter, future changes to the security alternative water 
rights provide (Beare & Heaney 2002); utilizing water carryover strategies (Sanders, 
Goesch & Hughes 2010); increasing their reliance on groundwater (Jiang & Grafton 2012); 
and adapting to short and long run supply scarcity by altering the commodity produced, the 
total area irrigated, or their production system to align with the revealed climate to maintain 
or improve their economic viability (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2009). Adaption 
will continue in the future and as knowledge is gained, farmer’s responses to new and 
unforeseen problems will continue to exhibit non-linear characteristics (Barucci & Landi 
1998). 
 Using the Millennium Drought to expose the Grey Swan 3.3
The longevity and severity of the Millennium Drought surpassed all recorded water 
availability history in the MDB’s (Heberger 2011; Kirby et al. 2014). The drought started in 
the mid-1990s and lasted until 2010 (PC 2009; Leblanc et al. 2012). This drought exposed 
the short-run nature of supply management strategies; changed irrigators’ expectations 
about both the future reliability and the value of alternative water entitlements (Wheeler, 
Zuo & Bjornlund 2013); and it provided the emphasis to shift water resource policy 
development away from a state level focus to a national focus (Connell & Grafton 2011; 
Crase & O'Keefe 2009).  
 
This thesis divides the Millennium Drought into four stages: business as usual; the white 
swan; adapting to the black swan; and the recovery stage. It will be argued the first two 
stages of the drought could be modeled as a white swan as the reduction in water supply 
and the management response was known with some degree of certainty. However, the 
adapting to the black swan occurred as the longevity and severity of the drought exceeded 
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past experiences and resulted in new management responses. The recovery stage, is 
defined by the breaking of the drought in the Southern Murray-Darling Basin (SMDB). The 
discussion concerning the drought is primarily built upon the amount of water that was 
diverted for consumptive purposes (Chart 3-1), the area irrigated (Table 3-1), and volume 
of water provided to the environment which in simplistic terms is represented by the level 
of water in Lake Alexandrina29. 
 Business as Usual (Mid 1990’s till 2001-02) 3.4
Despite low rainfall from 1997 (Chiew et al. 2011), the Millennium Drought did not alter the 
quantity of water diverted in the MDB (Chart 3-1), with the exception of 1999-00 when 
diversions in Murrumbidgee and Murray were low. The early stage of the drought in 2000-
01 to 2001-02 had negligible impacts: with over 1.8 million Ha being irrigated (Table 3-1); 
and flows to Lake Alexandrina (Chart 3-2) show little variation, until October 2001.  
 
Chart 3-1 Total Water Diversions in the MDB (GL), By Territory, By Year 
 
Source MDBA (2009b, 2010d, 2011f, 2012d) and Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) (1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006b, 2007b, 2008) 
 
This decreased flow to Lake Alexandrina appears to be a consistent management strategy 
of penalizing and compensating environmental flows. The decreased flows are consistent 
                                            
29
 Lake Alexandrina is the largest lake in the Coorong wetland system. The Coorong is the terminal point in 
the river system before the Murray River flows into the sea and a series of barrages prevent the sea from 
intruding along the river system during periods of low, as illustrated in Figure 2-3.  
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with ensuring peak private demands for water in spring and summer demands and 
compensation flows being provided to Lake Alexandria during the 2002 winter period. The 
business as usual stage then suggests that the water storage infrastructure and water 
management rules were capable of dealing with this level of water scarcity.   
 
Table 3-1 Area Irrigated in the MDB by Commodity (‘000 Ha) 
Commodit
y group 
2000
-01 
2001
-02 
2002
-03 
2003
-04 
2004
-05 
2005
-06 
2006
-07 
2007
-08 
2008
-09 
2009
-10 
2010
-11 
Pasture for 
livestock  760 707 551 669 703 717 446 365 267 393 375 
Rice 178 145 44 65 51 102 20 2 7 19 74 
Cereals 
(excl. rice) 260 354 416 340 324 329 266 291 291 216 165 
Cotton 405 394 218 174 258 247 126 53 128 138 332 
Grapes 84 86 89 87 92 106 112 106 102 96 94 
Fruit (excl. 
grapes) 59 62 74 59 63 75 78 71 69 79 80 
Vegetables 37 35 31 40 35 32 26 28 25 25 32 
Other 41 34 43 67 62 46 26 35 35 8 3 
TOTAL 
Irrigation# 1,824 1,817 1,466 1,501 1,588 1,654 1,101 958 929 976 1,201 
#
totals vary due to rounding errors and double cropping. Double cropping is when the same area of land 
produces more than one crop during a year (e.g. a single hectare is used to produce both a summer and a 
winter crop). 
Source Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2008c, 2008d, 2009, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b) 
 
Chart 3-2 Water Level in Lake Alexandrina (meters (m)) 
 
Data Source from MDBA pers. comm., Aftab Ahmad August 2013 
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
J
u
l
D
e
c
M
a
y
O
c
t
M
a
r
A
u
g
J
a
n
J
u
n
N
o
v
A
p
r
S
e
p
F
e
b
J
u
l
D
e
c
M
a
y
O
c
t
M
a
r
A
u
g
J
a
n
J
u
n
N
o
v
A
p
r
S
e
p
F
e
b
J
u
l
D
e
c
M
a
y
O
c
t
M
a
r
A
u
g
J
a
n
20002001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20122013
M
e
a
n
 L
a
k
e
 L
e
v
e
l 
(m
) 
 60 
 
 The White Swan (2002-03 till 2005-06) 3.5
The second stage of the drought is marked by a decrease in average diversions, from the 
1996-97 to 2001-02 period, of 11,267GL decreasing to 8,474GL over the 2002-03 to 2005-
06 period (Chart 3-1). This 25% decrease in the water diversions only reduced the area 
dedicated to irrigation by 15% (Table 3-1). 
 
Between 2001-02 and 2002-03: the quantity of water diverted in New South Wales (NSW) 
fell by 2,505GL (a 38% reduction); 23% less water was diverted in Victoria (VIC) (909GL); 
diversions in Queensland (QLD) contracted by 128GL (38% less); and in South Australia 
(SA) increased diversions by 145GL (a 24% increase). On a regional scale diversions in 
the SMDB and NMDB reduced by 2508GL and 883GL, respectively (Chart 3-3). As a 
percentage these regional diversions reduced by 36% and 28% respectively in the NMDB 
and SMDB. Irrigators reduced the area allocated to pasture, rice and cotton and increased 
the area dedicated to perennials and cereals (Table 3-1). Unlike the ‘business as usual’ 
stage, the time taken to restore the water level in Lake Alexandrina began to increase 
(Chart 3-2). 
 
Chart 3-3 Water Diversions, NMDB Compared to SMDB (GL) 
 
Source MDBA (2009b, 2010d, 2011f, 2012d) and MDBC (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006b, 2007b, 
2008) 
 
Without understanding the system, the data for 2005-06 can be misleading as when 
compared to 2004-05, the total volume of water diverted increased, the area irrigated 
increased and flows to Lake Alexandria have improved, the real situation is different. By 
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2005-06, the continuing lack of rainfall resulted in the security of all entitlements being re-
evaluated. In the Goulburn Broken high security entitlements that had an historic reliability 
of receiving their entire allocation in 99 years out of 100 (MDBC 1995, p. 29) were only 
devalued by 70% (National Water Commission (NWC) 2011a)30 . The reality was, the 
system was approaching a crisis. 
 Adapting to the Black Swan (2006-07 to 2009-10) 3.6
In 2006-07 all known water management rules in the MDB ceased to apply when only 
5,270GL of water could be diverted. During this period (2006-07 to 2009-10) water 
diversions averaged only 4,852GL and this represents only 43% of diversions during the 
business as usual stage. It was within this period, that social preferences changed, forcing 
policy action in an attempt to deal with the on-going social, economic and environmental 
cost of the drought (see Section 4.2). 
 
Past investments in infrastructure (i.e. barrages, see Figure 2-2) prevented large scale salt 
water intrusion along the river system. However, protecting the river system from salt 
water intrusion, the barrages also allowed the prioritization of private rights to initially 
continue and the water level in Lake Alexandria fell to nearly one meter below sea level, 
from 2008 until July 2010 (Chart 3-2). The continuing penalization of environmental flows, 
nearly caused the total collapse of the marine and avian populations in the Coorong due to 
rising river salinity and the exposure of acid sulfate soil (Kingsford et al. 2011). The 
changes to water policy (Section 4.2) forced by the drought, did result in change. By late 
2009, arguably for the first time ever, iconic environmental assets along the MDB received 
water before irrigators to prevent total ecosystem collapse (Australian Government 
Department of Sustainability Environment Water Population and Communities (SEWPaC) 
2010; MDBA 2011d).  
 
By 2007-08 the lack of water combined with the opportunity costs associated with water 
sales (Wheeler et al. 2012), effectively ruled both rice (2,000Ha) and cotton (53,000Ha) 
out as a viable farming system. On-going water shortage continued to contract the area 
irrigated and by 2008-09 only 900,000 Ha was irrigated, which was half of the area 
                                            
30
 In other words for each ML of high security entitlement owned, irrigators only received 0.3ML. 
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irrigated in 2000-01 (Table 3-1). The single largest reduction in area was pasture where 
between 2000-01 to 2008-09, over 500,000Ha had transitioned out of irrigation.  
 
In December 2007, significant rainfall broke the drought in the northern MDB. This rainfall 
arrived too late for the cotton crop but producers were able to irrigate an additional 
300,000Ha of sorghum compared to the previous season (ABARES 2010). The NMDB 
continued to receive above average rainfall from 2007 to 2010 and as a proportion, 
diversions in the NMDB increased from 20% of MDB diversions to over 40% (Chart 3-3). 
The NMDB rainfall also provided critical flows for the entire river system (MDBA 2011f).  
 
The area dedicated to perennial horticulture (grapes and fruit) in the MDB continued 
increasing up until 2006-07. But in 2007-08, the area dedicated to perennials started 
contracting in response to: decreased water security; adoption of adaptive water 
management strategies including efficiency gains and timing (Connor et al. 2012); and 
responding to the water prices (Section 3.6.2). 
 Adapting with outputs and inputs 3.6.1
Despite the reduction in area, especially for annuals, a corresponding reduction in GVIAP 
is not evident, as illustrated in Table 3-2 and in Chart 3-6 where the GVIAP component of 
the GVAP is provided. This GVIAP data although informative, does not reflect how 
producers adapted, for four reasons. First, gross value is income and not profit and this 
prevents examining the changes to inputs and outputs. Second, it does not stipulate if the 
commodity was partly or fully irrigated. Third, homogenous prices and default rules are 
used for estimating production yield. Fourth, the processes of calculating GVIAP have 
changed through time (ABS 2008b).  
 
Attempts have been made to determine the impacts droughts have on output prices to 
correlate back to producer responses. For example, Kirby et al. (2014) used a formula that 
assumed all changes to price were derived from the drought. However, with 70% of 
Australian agricultural GVAP derived from export sales (ABARES 2013), a high Australian 
dollar (PC 2013b), an oversupply of produce in some sectors (e.g. process fruit (PC 
2013a)), locked in forward selling contracts (e.g. dairy), and efforts to preserve the capital 
investment in perennials, the use of a single relationship between output prices and 
drought may be misleading. Although Kirby et al. (2014) do identify that output per Ha did 
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increase, and this is likely to be due to less efficient producers selling water to more 
efficient producers.  
 
Table 3-2 Value of Irrigated in the MDB by Commodity ($’million Ha) 
Commodity group 2000-
01 
…* 2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
2010-
11 
Hay & silage 80 … 161 176 139 80 97 66 
Rice 349 … 274 55 7 34 89 171 
Cereals (excl. rice) 149 … 180 191 269 279 122 140 
Cotton 1,111 … 798 457 193 562 617 1,505 
Grapes 785 … 721 651 1,104 598 719 671 
Fruit (excl. grapes) 701 … 1,011 1,207 1,182 1,032 1,081 1,285 
Vegetables 468 … 555 556 718 564 539 615 
Dairy 804 … 901 763 961 791 624 836 
Other Livestock 
Production 508 … 736 723 258 234 340 505 
Other 90 … 150 129 247 119 139 151 
TOTAL Irrigation# 5,085 … 5,522 4,922 5,079 4,349 4,386 5,944 
#
totals vary due to rounding errors 
*data is not available from the ABS over the period of 2001-02 to 2004-05 
Source ABS (2008a, 2011a, 2012a) 
 
Arguably the preservation of MDB wide income was in part due to the changing net return 
per ML from alternative enterprises and the ability of irrigators to switch between inputs to 
produce alternative outputs in response to climatic and price signals. For example, Chart 
3-4 examines changes in water and feed input costs as a percentage of total costs for the 
horticulture, broadacre and dairy industries from 2006-07 till 2008-09.  
 
The data in Chart 3-4, suggests that for a horticulture producer water costs as a 
percentage of total costs increased in 2007-08, from less than 10% to 20%. The demand 
for water increased water prices in both the temporary (Chart 3-5) and permanent water 
market. These price signals then allowed dairy producers to adapt by selling their water 
and purchase fodder (Ashton & Oliver 2011; Ho et al. 2007). Chart 3-5, illustrates the dairy 
adoption, where the expenditure on water fell by about 5% and fodder costs increased by 
about 10% from 2006-07 to 2007-08. This adaption of responding to signals, by altering 
inputs is a key feature of the SCA model (Section 6). Irrigators then rapidly adjusted to 
water price signals by altering their water purchasing strategies and the water 
requirements of their production systems.  
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Chart 3-4 Water & Feed Costs as a % of Total Costs by Irrigation Farm  
 
Source Ashton & Oliver (2011) 
 
Adaption has proven to be influenced within regional economies, for example … 
“[t]he discussions with local industry in northern Victoria provided a contrast to the 
MIA region, in particular due to the significant adjustment taking place in the dairy 
industry, both in response to reduced water availability and reduced farm gate 
prices for milk. Evidence indicates that water trading has facilitated this adjustment, 
by allowing dairy farmers to substitute purchased feed for irrigation water, and 
allowing some dairy operators to switch over to producing feed (silage and hay) to 
supply the feed requirements of remaining dairy producers. Low rainfall and water 
allocations in 2008-09 have increased the dependence on bought-in supplementary 
feeds. Increasing feed costs and decreased income due to dairy price step downs 
have created cash flow pressures, forcing many producers to make significant 
changes to their operations. Uncertainty regarding their operations has increased 
and the seasonal conditions, irrigation water availability and grain prices have been 
the critical factors impacting on the viability of enterprises for most producers in the 
region. These observations are consistent with other available evidence (Khan et al. 
2010; Murray Dairy 2010).” (Mallawaarachchi et al. 2011, p. 23). 
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 Water Trade, Water Prices and Adaption 3.6.2
Singh, Bari and Flavel (2008), detail that the average price paid per ML for water on the 
allocation markets during 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07 in the Murrumbidgee was $80, 
$37 and $170/ML, respectively and in the Murray and Lower Murray-Darling it was $58, 
$42 and $187/ML respectively. However, the rapidly increasing prices during 2006/07 
were only a precursor of the price that irrigators were willing to pay for water. 
 
On July 2007, the average price paid for water on allocation market reached $600/ML in 
the SMDB (Chart 3-5) when only 9% of irrigator’s entitlements were allocated. The price 
paid for water continued to increase throughout the spring period when it nearly reached 
$1,200/ML in October 2007, when only 15% of allocations were provided. 
 
Irrigator’s were willing to pay this price for water to preserve their capital investment in 
perennial root stock (Wheeler et al. 2012). However, despite the allocation 
announcements in 2008/09 almost mirroring the 2007/08 season and the initial allocation 
announcements in 2009/10 being lower than 2007/08, the average price paid for water on 
the allocation market fell (NWC 2009, 2010).  
 
Chart 3-5 The Average Monthly Price of Water on the Allocation Market in the SMDB 
($/ML) 
 
Source Loch (2011) 
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The 2007-08 price signals forced a response in producer behavior. Both water purchasers 
and water sellers, rapidly adjusted and adopted intra- and inter-seasonal strategies (Loch 
et al. 2012). As Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) discussed, once decision makers have 
experienced new extremes, their use of differential learning allowed them to rapidly adapt 
and improve their welfare (Grant & Quiggin 2013b). In this case, high water prices 
encouraged irrigators with annual commodities to maximize their welfare from water use 
by selling water to other irrigators. By increasing the supply of water in the allocation 
market, downward pressure was placed on the price paid for water (NWC 2011a). 
Secondly to maintain long run viability irrigators engaged in a variety of alternative 
management options including: decreasing their demand for water by either reducing the 
area of perennial crops; or adopting alternative irrigation strategies (Mallawaarachchi & 
Foster 2009); or lowering their expected irrigation costs by purchasing water and carrying 
it over for the 2008-09 season (Loch et al. 2013). Consequently by October 2008 the price 
of water was only $387/ML, a decrease of nearly $780/ML compared to the previous year.  
 
As farmers continuously adapted to the black swan, their experiences changed the swan’s 
color to grey. This transformation was evident as by 2009-10, despite initial allocations 
being less than both previous years, the opening price in the allocation market was $200 
less (Chart 3-5). Water trade and the removal of water trade barriers (Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 2008; NWC 2011a) provided the 
capacity for irrigators to adapt to the Millennium Drought and the clear price signals within 
the market allowed decision makers to rapidly adapt (Grafton, Libecap, et al. 2011). The 
price for water continued to fall throughout 2009/10. In December 2010, the drought finally 
broke in the SMDB and it was correlated to a La Niña phase (BOM 2012). 
 The recovery 3.7
The breaking of the drought is evident in Chart 3-6, where in 2010-11 both the income 
obtained from dryland and irrigated activity increased by over $5 billion when compared to 
2009-10. Farmer adaption is still continuing in the recovery phase. For example, in the 
dairy industry as.. 
…[i]t seems likely that the system is now facing significant challenges. Increased 
water allocations in the 2010-11 season has virtually dried up water allocation 
trades thus denying dairy farmers access to a supplementary income. While on the 
other hand, improved seasonal conditions have greatly improved the feed supply 
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situation, and the price of fodder has collapsed leaving reduced income prospects 
for feed growers. Moreover, those who took advantage of the seasonal conditions 
to grow grain crops are also facing prospects of grain quality downgrades or crop 
losses due to continuing rain (Mallawaarachchi et al. 2011, p. 23). 
 
Chart 3-6 MDB GVIAP Component of GVAP ($ million) 
 
Source ABS (2008a, 2011a, 2012a) 
Adaption will continue in the MDB. Initial adaption may not provide a feasible solution and 
short term failure to identify the threats exists, the rapid nature at which managers alter 
their response to on-going problems has proven to be swift. 
 Summary 3.8
The over allocation of water is exposed once resource shares are allocated and water 
cannot be supplied. Water resources in the MDB are highly variable and their future supply 
is uncertain. When the total volume of rights exceeds the capacity of the system to deliver 
water, a non-convex response occurs, creating irreversible economic, social and 
environment losses. Irrigators, society and the environment can adapt up to a point when 
water scarcity occurs, but when facing continuing and increasing pressure individuals must 
transform existing strategies (i.e. learning to adapt to the black swan, makes it a grey 
swan). By dealing with the risks and uncertainty associated with conjunctive water 
resources, the adverse consequences from non-convexity and irreversibility may be 
reduced. 
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The Millennium Drought highlighted that in the mature stage of water resource 
development, irrigation production systems and river management strategies are tuned to 
expected or known variability of water. Consequently under prolonged drought periods 
water resource scarcity causes significant economic loss via irrigation capital exposure, 
environmental degradation and reduction in water quality. This fragility is exposed when 
both the mean and variance of water supply change (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & 
Quiggin 2009).  
 
Risk (Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011) and uncertainty (Carey & Zilberman 2002; Randall 
1981) associated with future temporal and spatial water resource scarcity (Ditwiler 1975) 
will continue to pose resource allocation problems for all water uses. Knowledge about the 
future climate is incomplete, but it is expected that there will be less water and droughts 
may become more frequent. Therefore how irrigators adapted to the Millennium drought 
may provide guidance on future adaption strategies. The information presented above 
revealed that irrigators actively adopt strategies to deal with water scarcity. It is 
acknowledged that the authors own subjectivity and heuristic bounds (Sections 4 to 7) will 
prevent the full range of possible adaption strategies to the grey swan from emerging. 
These bounds then constrain the value of the analysis in Sections 8 to 10. 
 
The constrained welfare optimization model then has to incorporate how a redistribution of 
property rights alters the behavior of individuals to aggregate reduction in supply and how 
those individuals reallocate resources to deal with variability in the known supply and 
shocks to future water supply. The analysis also needs to consider if the reallocation of 
water rights can meet the policy objectives (i.e. contestants) and determine if future 
climate events alter the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to achieve these 
objectives. 
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4. THE CONTRACTION STAGE OF WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
AND HYPOTHESES INVESTIGATED IN THE PHD  
 Background  4.1
The conception of the contraction stage of water reform was initiated within the maturity 
stage of water resource development (Section 2.3.3) and The Living Murray Initiative 
(Table 2-2) heralds the first policy attempt at returning water to the environment. However, 
it was the Federal Government’s response to the Millennium Drought, the 2007 Water Act 
that is the major policy platform of the contraction stage of water resource development. 
As the 1914-15 drought provided the impetus for the River Murray Agreement, the 
Millennium Drought provided the opportunity for the Federal Government to take over the 
responsibility for developing a national approach to water reform in the Murray-Darling 
Basin (MDB). 
 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the contraction state of water resource 
development and discuss the economic theory behind the approach used. This section 
also provides a discussion of the idealistic characteristics the contraction stage should 
have. These idealistic characteristics help frame a series of hypotheses used to test if the 
Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan) utilizes public funding efficiently and effectively to 
provide long term welfare improvements. 
 Changing Social Preferences, Policy Steps and Millennium Drought31 4.2
In April 2002, the Living Murray Initiative was introduced to restore the environmental 
health of the river system. This initially involved transferring two key Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission (MDBC) programs to the Living Murray First Step, the Salinity Interception 
Scheme (SIS) and the Native Fish Strategy. The aim of the Native Fish strategy was to 
restore the population of native fish to 60% of pre-European levels by developing 
fishways32 and by returning snags into the river (Craik & Cleaver 2008). Additionally the 
aim of the Living Murray was to increase environmental flows and scientific advice 
                                            
31
 This section extensively draws from work published in Loch, Adamson and Mallawaarachchi (2014). 
 
32
 Fishways are designed to allow fish to by-pass the dams, locks and barrages are designed to regulate 
river flow. 
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suggested that to have a ‘high’ probability of success, 3,350GL of water was needed to 
restore the rivers health (Connell & Grafton 2011). These return flow recommendations 
were not accepted by the government but in 2003, $500 million was allocated to provide 
water for six icon sites along the Murray River (Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) 
2011b). However, as Cummins and Watson (2012) argue, the Living Murray is more akin 
to a transition process between the third and fourth stage of water resource reform. As the 
Living Murray provided greater rationality in its debates concerning the environment and 
the value of water-trade, the process for restoring environmental flows concentrated on 
subsidizing on and off-farm water use efficiency, rather than market based instruments 
(Cummins & Watson 2012).  
 
As the drought progressed, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) water reform 
agenda was extended when the National Water Initiative (NWI) was established in 2004. 
The NWI was developed to promote market based systems to improve water security. This 
included redefining the legal definitions of alternative property rights structures, providing 
the framework to help unbundling water and land property rights, removing other policy 
and regulation impediments to water trading (Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) 2008), and promoting the development of comprehensive water 
plans to protect all water users and hydrological systems (Connell & Grafton 2008). The 
COAG approach incentivized State jurisdictions to work co-operatively towards a national 
framework by using Federal funding (Crase & O'Keefe 2009).  
 
However, by 2006 Basin environmental conditions had deteriorated rapidly, and media 
attention increased public awareness about over-allocation problems, leading the Federal 
Government to act. Fuelled by environmentalist claims and severe drought effects, a 
National Plan for Water Security was formulated with limited economic or scientific 
analysis. Essentially, perceived changes in social preferences communicated through 
mass media and collective action of interest groups brought about policy change aimed at 
maximizing net social welfare.33 Initial reaction from the beneficiaries of the status quo was 
to oppose government redistribution of rights to water resources, and the government‘s 
challenge was to communicate to the public that the change was, in fact, welfare 
                                            
33
 Net social welfare occurs via maximizing private rents subject to environmental and social standards. 
Notably, this policy change both strengthened consumptive (irrigation) property rights and increased their 
relative value due to a reduction in future supply uncertainty from continued over-allocation. This created 
private welfare gains. Consumptive water users would also be expected to benefit from further private 
welfare gains from enhanced environmental public good values and sustainability.  
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increasing, taking all benefits and costs into account. This challenge was complicated by 
difficulties in identifying and implementing appropriate instruments to achieve this policy 
change, such that the total implementation costs did not exceed the perceived benefits, 
and that the original policy intent remained intact. However, as noted, heightened public 
concerns spurred the Australian government to enact a national Water Act (2007) which, 
among others, provided for the creation of the Basin Plan to achieve large-scale water 
reallocation and implement sustainable levels of extraction. A target figure of 3,200GL of 
surface water will eventually be reallocated to the environment—although access to an 
additional 929GL of groundwater resources (Table 7-5) will be provided by way of 
economic and social compensation. 
 The Basin Plan & the Contractionary Stage of Water Resource Development 4.3
In 2008 the Water Act was renamed Water for the Future (Crase & O'Keefe 2009). This 
initiative provided the framework to establish the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), 
which was given the responsibility of determining the quantity of the water the environment 
needed, and the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office (CEWO)34, which was given 
the responsibility of managing this environmental water. 
 
Key to restoring the balance was that the MDBA had to improve water security for all water 
users in the MDB by determining a Sustainable Diversion Limit (SDL) to replace the 
existing CAP. As the reform process is designed “to promote the use and management of 
the Basin water resources in a way that optimises economic, social and environmental 
outcomes” (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, p. 3), it had overcome a key impediment to 
the decision making process experienced in the Living Murray Initiative, a lack of reliable 
data (Connell 2007).  
 
The Water Act legislated the roles of: the ACCC to monitor and report on water charges 
and water trading rules (ACCC 2008); the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) to develop a set 
of National Water Accounts (BOM 2011); and the National Water Commission (NWC) to 
audit the progress of reform and the state of water markets (NWC 2009, 2011b, 2011c). 
The MDBA was allowed to commission external parties to fill knowledge gaps. A principal 
knowledge gap was undertaken by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
                                            
34
 The CEWO was originally known as the Commonwealth Entitlement Water Holder (CEWH). 
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Organisation (CSIRO), who were given the responsibility for determining the MDB’s 
sustainable water yields, and quantifying the risks climate change posed to the SDL 
(CSIRO 2008). 
 
The separation of the CEWO and MDBA, allowed the CEWO to actively engage in 
restoring environmental flows in the absence of the Basin Plan. The institutional 
opportunities and limitations are not a focus of this thesis. However, articles by Crase and 
O'Keefe (2009), Connell and Grafton (2011) and Crase, Dollery and O’Keefe (2011) 
examine the implications from separation of the design of the Basin Plan and the 
implementation of the Basin Plan, and provide detailed discussion concerning the 
development of institutions and regulations associated with the contractionary state of 
water resource reform. This thesis explores how uncertainty about future water supplies 
could alter the effectiveness of the Basin Plan and the tools for implementing the Basin 
Plan to improve welfare. 
 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Basin Plan  4.3.1
The Basin Plan aims to purchase 3,200GL of water from irrigators and give it to the CEWO 
in order to ‘restore the balance’ between all water users in the MDB. The Basin Plan 
provides an example of the common property approach to deal with the externalities 
associated with over allocation of natural resources (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975; 
Ostrom 1990; Ostrom & Ostrom 1972). The development of common property (i.e. 
3,200GL), counters natural resource exploitation problems created by private individuals 
who have high discount rates. By transferring water property rights away from private 
individuals and providing those water rights to organizations who operate with a ‘public 
trusts doctrine’ (i.e. CEWO), less water is consumed. With more water within the river 
system and potentially less salt returning via irrigation return flows, the ‘quality’ (i.e. 
salinity) of the resource base improves, which provides benefits for the wider public. This 
3,200GL of common property or pool of common water resources will also be used by the 
CEWO to manage environmental flows… 
“… for the purpose of protecting or restoring the environmental assets of the Basin 
so as to give effect to relevant international agreements. The Commonwealth’s aim 
in using environmental water is to maximise environmental outcomes for the Basin” 
(CEWO 2013). 
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 Obtaining Water Rights from Irrigators 4.3.2
Two contrasting approaches have been designed to obtain the 3,200GL of water required 
for the CEWO, a…  
“…(i) market purchase of agricultural water rights through an AUD$3.1 billion 
programme known as Restoring the Balance (RtB); and (ii) off-farm storage/delivery 
infrastructure upgrades and on-farm irrigation technical efficiency improvements 
through an AUD$5.8 billion programme known as Sustainable Rural Water Use and 
Infrastructure [Program (SRWUIP)] (Crase & O'Keefe 2009)35 A target reallocation 
figure of 2750GL from these intervention programmes by 2019 was established 
through a Basin-wide Plan, inclusive of a minimum 650GL/pa total flow to the River 
Murray mouth at the Coorong (MDBA 2012c).36 Recently, a further AUD$1.7 billion 
was committed to purchasing additional water rights and addressing water delivery 
constraints in the MDB (Department of Sustainability Environment Water Population 
and Communities (DSEWPC) 2013). Consequently, reallocation targets for 
environmental outcomes have increased by 450GL to 3200GL and the completion 
timeframe by five years to 2024” (Adamson & Loch 2014). 
 
When evaluating the Basin Plan the contrast between the theoretical foundation of the 
Basin Plan and the contrasting strategies employed to implement the Basin Plan must be 
noted. As although the Basin Plan may be rational and have solid theoretical foundations, 
the success of the Basin Plan is also dependent on both the institutions supporting the 
Basin Plan and how the Basin Plan is implemented. A common risk to the design, the 
institutions and the implementation of the Basin Plan is uncertainty associated with future 
water supply and the determination of the environments share. 
                                            
35
 For the purposes of this paper, we apply a definition of water use efficiency consistent with Perry (2011), 
which differentiates between total water use efficiency (i.e. production yield per unit of total water used) and 
irrigation water use efficiency (i.e. production yield per unit of irrigation water applied). Herein, the concept of 
technical efficiency is consistent with the total water use efficiency definition above. 
 
36
The Coorong, located near the mouth of the River Murray in South Australia, is an iconic National Park and 
wetland environmental area which has been identified as a key bird-breeding and species habitat 
management site in the Basin Plan. 
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 Complexities in Modeling SDLs for the Basin Plan37 4.3.1
Effective water management principally entails adequate comprehension of the variability 
inherent in each component of the connected supply system. Arguably, one of the highest 
stake responsibilities of the hydrologist-economist is to provide a number that goes into 
policy formulation. The complexity of any conjunctive water use system, which draws on 
surface and groundwater and relies on return-flows from irrigation and other uses, means 
that the inherent variability around target numbers is quite often lost once leaving the 
hands of the analyst. Simplicity requirements for mass communication usually demand a 
single number, whereas complexity [suggests that the use of single number is] often 
meaningless. Yet, single values, drawn from seemingly unrelated distributions, then 
become the building-block upon which further analysis is conducted and public opinion 
gauged; regardless of its reliability or whether limiting assumptions are clearly (and most 
discouragingly, especially when such limitations are emphatically) acknowledged. The 
MDB example provides ample evidence for this practical aspect of public policy-making. 
 
Despite a century of water reform, the necessity of obtaining coherent and consistent data 
was a central part of the Water Act (2007) to overcome shortcomings in MDB information 
sets. As individual states or territories retain responsibility for the management and 
collection of data for the river sections within their political boundaries, significant water 
resource data fragmentation, disparate calibration techniques and varied modeling 
approaches prevented an understanding of available water resources, how data was used, 
and how the possible implications of climate variability and climate change were assessed 
(Horne 2012; Sandeman 2008).  
 
Inconsistent data sets across state/territory agencies often provided a key barrier to 
transparency in the formation of policy decisions at a federal scale. For example, state and 
territory political boundaries are subdivided into surface water management areas and 
groundwater management areas that do not align. Meanwhile, the management of these 
areas was based on models, from which allocation and delivery decisions were 
subsequently drawn, as well as final audits to ensure compliance with objectives were 
conducted. In some unique cases the modeling methodologies, data standards, reporting 
errors and inherent model biases created difficult issues to resolve. In an attempt to 
                                            
37
 This section has been published in Loch, Adamson and Mallawaarachchi (2014) 
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address such issues, the (CSIRO) sustainable yields project had the unenviable task of 
merging available data into a consistent framework, using hydrological boundaries to 
define their catchments. Despite their best efforts, inevitable limitations in the data 
occurred. They can be attributed to: misconstrued complexity of the issues; unreliability in 
the underlying data sets; and the timeframe set to achieve requisite outcomes (Young et. 
al. 2011). Fundamental improvements in the data and estimation of the sustainable water 
yield occurred. But an original emphasis on the complexity, variability and uncertainty 
associated with the water recovery recommendation (range) was lost once it was 
compressed to a single recovery target number (i.e. 3,200GL).38 
 
The estimation of future MDB sustainable diversion limit (SDL) figures is not simply 
dependent on available data and how that data is collected, but also on the modeling 
methodologies used to estimate water supply and water requirements (Penton & Gilmore 
2009). If SDL estimates are optimized for efficiency, then redundancy and flexibility must 
also be encapsulated in both the estimations of supply and the demand for alternative 
uses to accommodate future unknowns. As Young and McColl (2009) discuss, when 
institutions are incompatible with a highly variable hydrological system, decision makers 
must continually reform policy. Future water supply is not a fixed number, nor has it been 
in the past. ‘Machine-learning’ directed (modeled) historic Basin water use figures, provide 
comfort to policy-makers and (some) confidence to modelers.  
 
But the complex association between rainfall, run-off and groundwater recharge cannot be 
described within a single variable (Chiew et al. 2011). In addition, landscape changes such 
as forestry (Schrobback, Adamson & Quiggin 2011) water harvesting (MDBA 2012b), and 
adaptation measures by all water users including the natural environment, in response to 
known and unknown triggers, will vary beyond grasp. Infiltration rates, ecosystem 
requirements and the ability of water to reach river systems, as acknowledged in the 
models, are only one of many possible representations equally probable in an unknown 
distribution. Despite these realities, an often-adopted approach is to separate target 
figures from system variability and uncertainty in order to parameterize secondary models 
following a hierarchy of aggregation. In given cases, a simple normal distribution will be 
attributed to the final catchment level numbers, thereby exposing the solution to ‘black 
                                            
38
 Jones et. al. (2002) provide an earlier MDB example for the dangers associated with recommendations on 
recovery target ranges, despite clear communication of their variability. Once again, target figures were 
typically used as ‘sound-bites’ for different purposes by varying stakeholder groups, including governments. 
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swan events’ (Taleb 2007) where modeled outcomes fail to deal with the distribution tails 
(Chichilnisky 2010). Inevitable failure to perceive new lows and highs, results in 
(inaccurate) ‘dumb farmer’ model responses to the data provided (Chugh & Bazerman 
2007). In fact, MDB irrigators adapted quite readily to environmental, political and 
economic incentives during the Millennium drought (Wheeler & Cheesman 2013) providing 
further evidence of the need to structure modeling approaches carefully and accurately. 
 
A secondary fragile aspect of the MDB recovery target was driven by the separation of 
several conjunctive management issues. The separate treatment of surface and 
groundwater resources allowed the MDBA to present future increases to groundwater 
access without wider public discussion or debate. However, this separation has significant 
hydrological and economic consequences. Not only are MDB water managers failing to 
recognize non-linear relationships between surface and groundwater resources (Chiew, 
McMahon & O'Neill 1992), but differential influences of climate change on surface and 
groundwater systems are also being ignored (Pulido-Velazquez et al. 2011). Failure to 
recognize the hydrological complexity of this target and the separation of interconnected 
resources also creates problems when implementing policy solutions, in particular future 
water management plans. Not only does the Basin Plan assume all water-users are 
passive to new information but it assumes that individuals are incapable of adopting 
appropriate management solutions to accommodate new policy settings. This violates the 
fundamental principles of adaptation. 
 
In this case, failing to understand the hydrological, economic, environmental and social 
implications of alternative policy tools—as well as their sensitivity to risk and uncertainty—
not only creates a second best solution, but may potentially compromise the efficiency of 
MDB irrigators to adapt. Such outcomes are exacerbated by uncertainty about future 
climate states, which have a strong influence on all system characteristics. The greater the 
complexity of a given water resource system, the higher the probability that fatal policy 
constraints towards achieving effective, efficient and socially acceptable water policy 
solutions will be realized. Where this occurs, an inevitable cycle between policy design, 
social opinion and rigorous analysis can occur as political ambitions transition from one 
policy reform process to another. 
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 Climate Change and the Basin Plan 4.4
The Millennium Drought (Section 3.3) provided an insight into the possible adverse climate 
future and raised awareness that the posed social and environmental benefits from the 
Basin Plan may be short lived, if climate change was ignored. For example, Crase and 
Gawne (2011) noted that if the CEWO failed to anticipate climate change impacts on the 
water security provided by alternative water property rights, then it may be left with a 
portfolio of water rights (i.e. ‘common property’) that is unable to provide sufficient water to 
achieve the Basin Plan’s objectives. This concern was picked up by other authors 
including Hone et al. (2010) and Loch, Bjornlund and McIver (2011) who discussed the 
potential and strategy required for the CEWO to either offset any reductions in the water 
supplied by ‘common property’ by engaging in water trade, and to develop an 
environmental watering prioritization process to maximize ecosystem assets. 
 
In response to the uncertainty associated with climate change, the Basin Plan introduced 
four strategies for minimizing water supply risk: identify the impact climate change could 
have on water resources (MDBA 2012c, pp. 21-2); ensure the resilience of the 
environmental outcomes (MDBA 2012c, p. 52); continue to remove water market 
impediments to trade (MDBA 2012c, p. 26); and ensure that reviews of the process…  
“…must be undertaken having regard to the management of climate change 
risks and include an up-to-date assessment of those risks, and consider all 
relevant knowledge about the connectivity of surface and groundwater, the 
outcomes of environmental watering and the effectiveness of environmental 
works and measures” (MDBA 2012c, p. 31). 
 
Evaluating these risks to the Basin Plan, are then central to this thesis and to simplify the 
discussion, the impacts of climate change on future water resources in the MDB have 
been defined in the next section. 
 Climate Change Policy  4.4.1
The Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut 2008, 2011) provides the most 
comprehensive set of policy recommendations and economic arguments for Australia’s 
transition towards a low carbon economy. The Garnaut Climate Change Review also 
provided a set of carbon-emission scenarios and corresponding impacts on rainfall to 
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runoff for the MDB that are documented in Quiggin et al. (2008) and it is from that source 
that the climate change scenarios are derived. The Basin Plan is evaluated against a 
mitigation scenario as… 
“…[a]daptation is beneficial in every case. For the simulations presented here, 
adaptation and mitigation are complements. That is, the benefits of adaptation are 
higher in the simulations with mitigation than in the “adaptation only” simulation. 
 
The complementarity relationship between mitigation and adaptation reflects 
several features of the projections and simulations considered here. First, in the 
absence of mitigation, the supply of water is so limited by 2100 that there is little 
scope for adaptation. This point is potentially applicable to a wide range of 
ecological and agricultural systems affected by climate change. 
 
Adaptation is a useful response to moderate rates of climate change. However, 
where climate change produces a rapid and radical change in conditions, 
adaptation of existing ecosystems and human activities may not be feasible. 
Instead, the systems in question will be unsustainable. New systems will ultimately 
emerge, but stable adaptation may not be feasible until the climate itself has 
stabilized at a new equilibrium. 
 
For the more moderate climate changes projected for 2050, the complementarity 
between adaptation and mitigation reflects more specific features of the projections. 
In the “adaptation only” simulation, the increased frequency of drought reduces the 
set of adaptation options, and precludes most high-value horticultural activities and 
opportunity cropping based on irrigation in wet states only. By contrast, in the 
simulations where both adaptation and mitigation take place, the effects of reduced 
water availability in all states of nature are less severe and leave open a wide range 
of adaptation opportunities” (Quiggin et al. 2010, pp. 546-7). 
 
For this thesis, the 450 scenario from the Garnaut Climate Change Review has been used 
to define the future climate. The 450 Scenario is described as the strong mitigation 
scenario, in which CO2 equivalents are stabilized at 450 parts per million (ppm) by 2100. 
At this level, mean global temperatures are expected to increase by ~1.5°C and the 
rainfall, relative humidity and surface temperatures across Australia, have been set to the 
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50th percentile projections (Garnaut Climate Change Review 2008). This thesis examines 
the outcomes for water resources in two time periods, 2050 and 2100, which equates to 
approximately an average decline in water resources of 10% and 20% respectively. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.1, climate change will alter both the problem and solution set for 
water. In this thesis, the future climate change problem set is defined by the 450 scenario 
and the solution set is expected to be similar to those exhibited by all water users during 
the Millennium Drought. By maintaining the existing water security provided by the set of 
water rights, the impact climate change has on: producer’s strategic transformation and 
management adaption to maximize wealth; the benefit the CEWO water resources provide 
to the environmental and society; the net change to the residual environmental share; and 
their correlated impacts on water flows and salinity throughout the MDB have on the Basin 
Plan’s objectives can be examined. 
 The Desired Characteristics for the Fourth Stage of Water Development  4.5
The MDBA was given an objective to develop a Basin Plan which included defining a SDL 
that is socially acceptable and will continue to provide welfare benefits despite any future 
adverse climate impacts on water supply (Connell & Grafton 2011). For the Basin Plan to 
provide social and economic benefits, it is anticipated that the welfare reducing 
characteristics evident in the mature stage of water resource development, are either no 
longer evident or reduced where possible. Subsequently Table 4-1 places these desirable 
characteristics from contraction stage against the characteristics of the prior three stages 
of water reform. 
 
In the absence of new low-cost technology or the discovering of favorable sites, the costs 
of building dams in the contraction stage should have the same inelastic tendencies as the 
maturity stage. Additionally, despite the development of a SDL that provides a new upper 
bound on private water diversions, the private demand for water will have similar 
characteristics as the maturity stage (Section 2.2). However, as the SDL decreases the 
number of water rights owned by irrigators, the value of water rights should increase in the 
market. The combined effect from the increased market price for water and irrigators 
adaption to the Millennium Drought (Section 3.6), should then prevent the price paid for 
water in a future drought, not to have the same inelastic tendencies as in the maturity 
stage (Section 2.2). 
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Table 4-1 The Four Stages of Water Resource Development, Examining the Contraction Stage 
Market characteristic Exploration Expansion Maturity Contraction 
Long run supply of 
impounded water 
Elastic Elastic to Inelastic Inelastic Inelastic 
     
Demand for delivered 
water 
 
Minimal, Often no or minimal 
charge to access water. 
Elastic at low prices, inelastic 
at high prices. 
Low but growing demand. 
Demand is elastic at low prices 
and inelastic at high prices. 
High and increasing 
demand. Elastic at low 
prices; inelastic at high 
prices. 
High but stable demand. 
Elastic at low prices; 
inelastic (but not perfectly) 
at high prices. 
     
Physical condition of 
impounded and 
delivery system 
Little to no infrastructure. All 
infrastructure new. 
Infrastructure is in good to new 
condition. 
Aging infrastructure in 
need of expensive 
upgrading or repair. 
Infrastructure maintained by 
user. 
     
Competition for water 
between all users 
Nil, only during extreme 
droughts. 
Increasing but minimal. Can 
occur during droughts creating 
a new round of investment in 
long run supply. 
Intense apart from during 
floods. 
Reallocation reduces 
competition between all 
users. 
     
Non-Convexity  No No Yes Yes (decreasing frequency 
of occurring) 
     
Externalities Nil Minimal Extensive externalities Reduction in externalities 
     
Social cost of 
subsiding increased 
water use 
Zero to very low  Fairly Low High and rising  Nil 
     
Sustainable in the 
long run 
No No No Yes 
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By encouraging the removal of trade impediments, the Basin Plan should also facilitate the 
water market price to approach the true price of water (Randall 1981). In the absence of 
subsidies, as the gap between the market and true price for water closes, irrigators would 
maintain their own infrastructure to maximize water-use efficiency 
 
As the SDL reallocates water rights between users, the CEWO gains a portfolio of 
entitlements that should provide the environment with a secured minimum flow. In this 
case the competition between water users should be reduced. However, the SDL does not 
alter the existing pressure on the unsecured or residual environmental allocation. 
Consequently, it is assumed that this residual flow will still be penalized in the future, to 
preserve the water security of entitlement owners (i.e. CEWO and private individuals)39. 
Additionally, the peak demand for environmental versus irrigation supplies may be different 
and this may create some tension between users as changes to the river systems 
conveyance losses may occur.  
 
The defined environmental water rights should reduce the irreversible consequences that 
derived from non-convex responses to water insecurity. Non-convex responses within 
each water-user group may still occur but the frequency in which non-convex events and 
irreversible losses occur should be reduced. By managing the defined environmental 
supply for the national benefit, externalities should be reduced, increasing welfare. 
 
If trade between the CEWO and irrigators is allowed, then additional flexibility to manage 
droughts would further dampen the irreversible impacts that were evident in the maturity 
stage of water resource development. If the price paid on the allocation market is inclusive 
of the cost of any negative externalities associated with the use of that water, then 
additional welfare gains are possible. Provided that the defined upper bound of water 
consumption is correct, then to prevent any backsliding in the political policy process, 
permanent trade should only occur away from irrigation. 
                                            
39 Climate change may alter the security of alternative water rights in the future.  
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 Evaluating the Basin Plan (Contraction Phase)40 4.6
To maximize welfare, externalities must be internalized within the decision making 
process. By knowing the urban demand for water and treating the environment as a social 
production choice, we can then model the water requirements of ecosystems along the 
MDB in identical fashion as an irrigator’s production system and/or as a flow constraint 
and/or a fixed input requirement. This constrained welfare optimization approach then can 
provide guidance to help determine the least cost solution (i.e. to irrigated production) to 
achieve the current socially acceptable levels of pollution (Rostow 1959). 
 
Let us consider a graphical representation of this social choice problem (Figure 4-1). 
Suppose social wellbeing from water use can be summarized by the net output from its 
use in irrigation and environmental services. Given available technologies (knowledge) 
that allow substitution between these services, the shaded area under the curve 𝐸𝑤𝐼𝑤 , 
[then bounds the attainable and efficient social opportunity set], represents potentially 
available benefits from different combinations of water use. Before the policy change was 
introduced, water was mainly directed to irrigation and the environment was the residual 
claimant, a position depicted by 𝑄. 
 
In this case, under prolonged drought conditions water use would gradually approach a 
situation corresponding with 𝐼𝑤 at the lower right corner. At 𝐼𝑤, irrigation receives all water 
at the expense of the environment, and consequently irreversible losses to society (social, 
economic and environment) would occur. To prevent irreversible losses the share of water 
resources between all water users needs to be considered (Krutilla, 1967). This can be 
shown by a shift in water use from 𝑄 to 𝑄∗ reflecting a change in social indifference curves. 
In Figure 4-1, 𝐼 and 𝐼∗ represent changed social preferences communicating the need for 
this shift in policy. This shift in policy results in an economic reallocation to attain a new 
socially efficient output bundle. Moreover, changes in the relative value of inputs and 
outputs under new social preferences will also influence the way water is used in future 
production systems, creating a spiral of policy-induced technological change leading to an 
outward shift in the social opportunity set 𝐸𝑤𝐼𝑤. However, complexity in natural resource 
systems, social and individual preferences, and the manner in which policy changes affect 
choices and patterns of behavior have the potential to create multiple equilibria, because 
                                            
40
 This section draws heavily from (Loch, Adamson & Mallawaarachchi 2014) 
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such behavior is sensitive to random events (Marshall, 2013). Well-designed public policy 
needs to reflect not only the objectives of society, but also any trade-offs associated with 
constraining the hydrologic and economic dimensions of a system across scope, scale, 
time and space dimensions41. A single policy can create unintended consequences in 
social, economic and environmental domains outside its design brief on a local, regional, 
national and international scale. 
 
One such policy problem is derived from incentives and subsidies which distort the price of 
water and water delivery infrastructure downwards allowing inefficient producers to remain 
within the industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Welfare Effects in Water Allocation 
 Changes to Economic Welfare  4.6.1
Water policy is the outcome of a political game between rent seekers (Boyce 1998; 
Epstein & Nitzan 2002). This transfer of water from private to public ownership will create 
winners, losers and encourage rent seeking behavior as individuals and groups attempt to 
access as much compensation (money and groundwater) as possible. The formulation and 
implementation of the Basin Plan changes welfare by: internalizing externalities; allocating 
                                            
41
 Scope describes the number of issues that are impacted by a policy, scale defines the institutional level at 
which those impacts occur and/or are managed, time sets the period over which the policy lasts, and space 
is the area over which the policy is enacted. 
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public funding to institutions and the commissioning of data, monitoring and enforcement 
of regulations, having $10 billion to purchase water from irrigators; and by increasing the 
groundwater SDL. Consequently, economic justification of the Basin Plan’s implementation 
strategy is required to ensure that: the Basin Plan will increase net social welfare; public 
funds are used efficiently and effectively; and that the risks to welfare gains from a 
changing climate are minimized. If these criteria for economic justification are achieved 
then the Basin Plan should provide intergenerational benefits to society. 
 
This analysis utilizes a “constrained utility maximization to predict individual and aggregate 
responses to existing and alternative structures of incentives” (Randall 1975, p. 731). 
Utility maximization will be defined as the economic return from using irrigation water on 
farm, and the institutional constraints are the SDL and the Basin Plan twin goals for 
environmental flows and salinity improvements. By examining the Basin Plan in this way, 
the trade-offs between consumptive and non-consumptive uses of water can be 
determined, which can then highlight “potential synergies and opportunities to maximize 
social returns from the government investment” (Mallawaarachchi et al., 2010).  
 
The thesis doesn’t explore welfare changes from alterations to transaction costs, or from 
public expenditure on institutions and the commissioning of data. 
 
Ho: By internalizing externalities social welfare will increase. 
 Is the Implementation of the Basin Plan Cost-Effective? 4.6.2
Public expenditure requires justification. By stating that compensation must occur it 
negates the ethical questions associated with rewarding the polluter (Randall 1975). The 
Basin Plan’s direct compensation or adjustment package has two elements. First there is 
$10 billion to obtain 3,200GL of surface water for the CEWO and secondly groundwater 
extractions have been increased and each element needs to be examined to determine its 
cost effectiveness and determine the net welfare change in the MDB. 
 
By shifting private demand and supply of goods and services towards the socially 
desirable levels of supply and consumption, externalities are reduced. To facilitate the 
development of common water property rights for the CEWO two alternative approaches 
(RtB and SRWUIP) will be used. However, the relative effectiveness of each program and 
 85 
 
the funding allocated to each program has been questioned (Crase & O'Keefe 2009; 
Grafton 2010; PC 2010).  
 
The RtB is a direct market transaction of property rights between irrigator and the common 
property manager (i.e. CEWO). As the CEWO purchases water the supply curve shifts to 
the left from S0 to S1, reducing the quantity of water inputs used by 𝑥0 − 𝑥1, in Figure 4-2, 
RtB. The second approach aims to obtain water by sharing the water saved via increases 
in water use efficiency and subsidizing the cost of this transformation. By shifting the 
production function to the left 𝑃𝐹0 to 𝑃𝐹1, less inputs are used to produce the same level of 
output 𝑍. In this case, the environment gets (𝑥0 − 𝑥1) × 𝐸, where 𝐸 equals the percentage 
share that the environment receives from the efficiency gain, where 0 < 𝐸 < 1. Current 
policy has set 𝐸 = 50%. 
 
The comparative cost of each program in obtaining water for the environments can be 
expressed as  
∑𝐶𝑅𝑡𝐵(𝑥0 − 𝑥1) =  ∑𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑊𝑈𝐼𝑃(𝑥0 − 𝑥1) 𝐸 . Equation 4-1 
 
If the cost 𝐶  of achieving the program objectives (i.e. water for the environment) is 
represented as 𝑥0 − 𝑥1 is identical under both the RtB ∑𝐶𝑅𝑡𝐵 as the SRWUIP ∑𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑊𝑈𝐼𝑃 
approaches then it does not matter which project gets funded, when only examining the 
first round impacts. Examining this relationship, as 𝐸  approaches zero the SRWUIP 
program has to obtain more water than the RtB or alternatively the cost to obtain each unit 
of 𝑥 must fall. This has three implications for the findings of these analyses to justify public 
expenditure. 
 
First, to maximize the return from public expenditure a pre-selection bias towards existing 
and highly inefficient irrigation systems can exist. Such policy outcomes send signals that 
existing irrigation systems are correctly located within the river system but the pre-section 
bias fails to consider questions as to why irrigators are not taking advantage of the 
opportunities to act on their own. Randall (1975) argues that this bias is created when 
policy analysis uses the prices derived from existing property rights allocation. As irrigation 
development has been highly subsidized in the past, it then locks in the infant industry 
problems and ultimately prevents resources being used by those who can obtain rents 
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without subsidies. The failure to consider the reallocation of rights then reinforces 
producers to remain inefficient, lowering net national welfare42.  
 
Second, when compared to the RtB, the SRWUIP is funded at a ratio of over $2.4:1. This 
then implies that for the SRWUIP to be of equal value when compared to the RtB, it must 
be responsible for upgrading infrastructure to obtain a total of over 4,500GL in savings, 
50% of which is retained by irrigators (i.e. 2,250GL). 
 
 
Figure 4-2 How Basin Plan Obtains Water 
 
Third, as discussed in Section 2, if irrigation systems are already calibrated to the natural 
system, what are the implications to the agricultural, ecological and social systems from 
both the RtB and SRWUIP? These questions need to be asked in context of the demand 
for the conjunctive water supply which alternates between elastic and inelastic depending 
on current and future scarcity. 
 
Ho: The RtB provides the most efficient way to return water to the 
environment. 
 
                                            
42
 The development of irrigation areas has been mixed. Some irrigation areas failed to consider soil quality 
(Davidson 1969) and other areas took advantage of favorable areas. However, as only 2% of MDB 
agricultural land is dedicated to irrigation, soils are not considered a binding constraint in this thesis. 
Consequently it has been assumed that returns by commodity in each region are derived from being 
allocated on ideal soils and that based on each region’s comparative advantage expansion can increase up 
to a predetermined level as discussed in Section 6.7.1. 
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The second component of the Basin Plan compensation package consists of increasing 
the groundwater SDL, especially in the Northern Murray-Darling Basin (NMDB) (Table 
7-5). As the groundwater SDL has increased and the Basin Plan has four strategies to 
deal with the risks from climate change (Section 4.4) it has been assumed that 
groundwater is a highly reliable entitlement. With the NMDB primarily having general and 
supplementary water entitlements, the Basin Plan’s net change on conjunctive water 
availability needs to be examined.  
 
Ho: The change in conjunctive water resources creates wealth. 
 Solutions Resilience to Climate Change 4.6.3
If the policy signals designed to obtain water for the Basin Plan fail to adequately address 
the risk climate change poses on future water resources then the non-convexity, 
irreversibility and uncertainty that has hindered applied water policy will continue. 
Adamson, Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2009) illustrated that the SCA model can be 
used to determine if a proposed reallocation of resources (i.e. derived from the optimized 
solution) can be resilient to a changing climate. By adapting those findings, this thesis will 
examine the implications from: a decision maker being aware (ex-post) or unaware (ex-
ante) about climate change; and examine two alternative approaches to model how 
climate change could alter water supply. First, examine how a climate change scenarios 
alters mean rainfall patterns. Second, examine what may occur if the frequency of El Niño 
events increases.. 
 
The ex-ante simulation is used to test if the current climate’s optimal allocation of 
resources is still feasible, if the climate changed. This is tested by fixing resource 
allocations and altering the water inflow data to the new climate change parameters. If the 
river flow constraints (Section 6.7.2) and Basin Plan objectives are still satisficed, then the 
current allocation of resources would be able to survive a climate change event according 
to the model. However, if the river flow constraints do not hold (i.e. river flow < 0). then 
there would be insufficient water within the river system to meet irrigators demands and 
this would expose private capital to unacceptable risk. Correspondingly if the objectives of 
the Basin Plan do not hold then society and the environment may be worse off under a 
changing climate. This then represents an individual who adapts to the Basin Plan without 
considering the implications of climate change. In this approach, the implications of 
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attempting to utilize the same resources in a new climate, then identifies both the invested 
capital at risk and examines if the Basin Plan’s institutional goals could still be achieved. 
Note an ex-ante analysis of the increasing drought state is not required as the generated 
results have full knowledge about a drought state of nature. In this case an ex-ante 
analysis of a drought will reduce economic returns only.  
 
In the ex-post optimization, decision makers have complete information about climate 
change and the constrained welfare maximization model uses the data from either 
approach for modeling climate change. The ex-post or aware decision maker then 
optimizes resource use so that investments will now be optimal once the climate change 
event occurs. This approach then ensures that the Basin Plan’s twin institutional goals of 
water flowing to the Coorong and the salinity targets for Adelaide are achieved via a new 
redistribution of private capital throughout the MDB. 
 
These contrasting approaches then help examine how future water scarcity may impede 
the objective of the Basin Plan and identify risks to all water users. Information concerning 
the RtB and SRUIP ability to provide water under alternative climatic events for the 
institutional requirements can then be determined. By using the SCA model to examine the 
alternative strategies for purchasing water, and using the ex-ante and ex-post approach to 
determine resilience to climate change, long term impacts on welfare can be explored. 
Modeling alternative levels of awareness helps identify policy makers’ attitudes towards 
future risk. If policy makers provide greater incentives to adopt one mitigation strategy over 
another and incentives misallocate resources towards private and public risk, then welfare 
losses should be expected (Arrow & Fisher 1974). 
 
Ho: The failure to incorporate climate change risks into the Basin Plan solution 
will reduce long run economic welfare gains. 
 Is the Basin Plan a Contractionary Phase of Water Development? 4.6.4
In order for the Basin Plan to be considered a true reflection of a contractionary phase of 
water resource development, it must have features consistent with the desired 
characteristics of the fourth stage (Table 4-1). However as Cummins and Watson (2012) 
commented, the Basin Plan has to counter over a 130 years of policy built upon 
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‘romanticism and recklessness’ that has left a legacy of obstacles that will inhibit swift 
reform. They argue that… 
“[g]iven the uncertainties confronting environmental policymakers, it is unlikely that 
we will ever ‘get it right’, but we can, and should, keep getting better. The hundred-
year experiment will continue for many years yet” (Cummins & Watson 2012, p. 32) 
 
This thesis reviews the three key signals that are evident within the contraction stage of 
water reform. First, the RtB is willing to use markets to purchase water from irrigators. 
Second, the SRWUIP is willing to subsidize the cost of water-use efficiency technology. 
Third, the groundwater SDL has been increased. Each incentive mechanism will be 
examined to determine if it achieves the prerequisites of a contractionary phase of water 
resource development. 
 
Ho: The Basin Plan has some, but not all, characteristics of the contractionary 
phase of water resource development. 
 Summary 4.7
Well-designed public policy, reflects both the social preferences and the trade-offs society 
is willing to accept. The Basin Plan is reflective of changed social preferences and it uses 
the economic concepts of common property to overcome the externalities derived from an 
over-allocation of private property rights. The CEWO will act as the ‘public trustee’ by 
managing 3,200GL of surface water in the national interest, which in this thesis is defined 
as achieving a minimum flow target and a maximum allowable salinity target (i.e. quality). 
The CEWO’s 3,200GL of water is to be obtained from irrigators and there are two 
mechanisms (RtB & SRWUIP) designed to facilitate this transfer of property rights. The 
RtB and the SRWUIP provide different incentives for producers and different outcomes for 
water resources in the MDB. With $10 billion set aside to obtain water for the CEWO, rent 
seeking is to be expected. Additionally the net change in the conjunctive SDL has the 
potential to create wealth for some catchments.  
 
By representing climate variability and climate change as biophysical constraints, 
comments can be provided on irreversible decisions associated with: institutional 
strategies for purchasing alternative bundles of property rights structures; private 
outcomes from subsidizing capital to invest in water efficiency; and outcomes for the Basin 
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Plan’s objectives. It is however, the fundamental complexity and uncertainty associated 
with the conjunctive water resources that will determine the long run success of the Basin 
Plan.  
 
Critical to understanding the solution is the use of an appropriate methodology in 
examining the nature of decision making under increasing risk and uncertainty and this is 
explored in the following Section. 
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5. A STATE-CONTINGENT APPROACH TO PRODUCTION 
 Introduction 5.1
If the true outcome of alternatives choices and the decision maker’s preferences are 
known, then decision making is a relatively straight forward procedure. With complete 
information about all possible outcomes obtained from alternative levels of input use and 
knowing the decision maker’s utility function, the optimal allocation of resources can be 
determined with certainty (Anderson, Dillon & Hardaker 1977). Certainty provides clarity to 
the economic debate as it removes ambiguity to illustrate concepts, providing opportunities 
to explore existing bounds of knowledge and facilitate communication.  
 
However, risk and uncertainty abound in decision making. Despite seminal work by Just & 
Pope where in 1978 they highlighted how the stochastic production function approach can 
be used. In 1979 Just & Pope then demonstrated why the stochastic production function 
can provide misleading results. However, the use of stochastic production functions still 
dominates the literature of risk and uncertainty when allocating resources. By 2003, Just 
and Pope in a review of modeling and production risk lamented that…. 
“[w]e conclude that understanding of why risk response occurs is very limited. As a 
result, after decades of research, the profession remains in a weak position to offer 
definitive policy analyses in matters related to risk” (Just & Pope 2003, p. 1255). 
 
This ‘weak position’ for policy analysis, in part, stems from attempting to oversimplify 
complex trade-offs: that include non-stochastic processes (Young et al. 1996); that 
represent passive decision makers; or attempt to smooth out discontinuous functions 
(Doole & Marsh 2014). Therefore, if we create abstractions and “…tools developed in this 
abstract world [that] don’t even approximately apply in the real world, then one must 
question the value of this abstraction” (Chambers & Quiggin 2000, p. 3). The state-
contingent approach proposed by Chambers and Quiggin attempts to explain the decision 
making dilemma under risk and uncertainty. 
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 What are States of Nature? 5.2
Nature is the term used to describe the state-space 𝑆 ∈ Ω of uncertainty. Nature is an 
exhaustive set of mutually exclusive events (a state of nature 𝑠) that describe all salient 
features of the uncertainty in question. So when 𝑠 is revealed, all ambiguity is removed 
allowing for the traditional approaches used to solve certainty to be applied.  
 
Critically, the decision maker has no ability to control which state of nature is realized. 
Once 𝑠 occurs the decision maker adopts specific 𝑠 based strategies to maximize their 
objective function. Alternatively, reinforcing this point, no matter the action undertaken by 
the decision maker in a preceding state of nature, the next realized state is independent of 
their action. However, the decision maker’s action in a prior state may leave a legacy 
(negative or positive) to which they need to adapt once the state is realized. 
 
As the state-contingent approach deals with production under uncertainty, the total size of 
the state-space can be kept small, as similar states with identical management actions can 
be condensed. Therefore, yields, prices and costs are an outcome of the state of nature 
and are not states themselves (Rasmussen 2006). This then allows for both output 𝑧 and 
decision maker uncertainty to be treated separately, removing the ambiguity found in other 
decision support systems where production and management inefficiency cannot be 
separated (O’Donnell & Griffiths 2006). 
 
The state-space approach was initially examined by Arrow (1953), Arrow and Debreu 
(1954) and Debreu (1959) where they provided the approach of transcribing all possible 
outcomes (𝑠𝜖Ω) from uncertain events across alternative states 𝑠. They discussed how 
decision makers actively responded to states of nature, by changing their inputs 𝑥  to 
influence the final 𝑧 , based on past experiences and knowledge to manage risk. The 
foundation for this approach is derived from the notion that “in the real world the allocation 
of risk-bearing [for a decision maker] is accomplished by claims payable in money, not 
commodities” (Arrow 1953, p. 91). Arrow’s insight suggest that the objective function of the 
producer does not solely concentrate on the production of a single commodity but rather 
the net return 𝑦 from all commodities contingent upon both the commodities payout by 
state of nature and the probability 𝜋 of the states occurring (𝑠𝜖Ω).  
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 State-Contingent Approach to Risk and Uncertainty 5.2.1
The real advancement into decision making under uncertainty provided by Chambers and 
Quiggin was that they merged Arrow and Debreu’s work on the state-contingent approach 
with dual optimization (Rasmussen 2003). This insight then provided the capacity to 
determine the optimal conditions for resource usage to be derived “by type, place, and 
date, but also by a fourth dimension, the state of nature at the (future) time when the good 
will become available” (Rasmussen 2003, p. 449). 
 
SCA then provides the capacity to model an active decision maker who responds to 
traditional economic and policy signals of price and quantity but also reallocates inputs to 
produce outputs in response to the state space (e.g. environmental signals). This provides 
insight into why traditional approaches that model production and uncertainty can provide 
misleading results as they assume that the decision maker remains passive to state 
signals. Section 3 highlighted that water resource scarcity during the Millennium Drought 
transformed the demand for water from elastic to inelastic and created a management 
response by producers to alter inputs and outputs in response to water availability and 
water price.  
 
To illustrate the divergence in approaches Chambers and Quiggin (2000) compare the 
conventional stochastic production approach to a state-contingent approach to highlight 
the misrepresentation of risk and response by decision makers. 
 Production: Conventional Versus State-Contingent  5.3
Output from a traditional production technology is a function of input and can be written as 
𝑧 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝜀)  
Equation 5-1 
where 𝜀 ∈ ℜ𝑠  is a random variable describing alternative states of rainfall, where 1= 
drought, 2 is good rainfall (Figure 5-1, Part A). Here a combination of inputs 𝑥∗ is allocated 
before the state of nature is realised and in the absence of any additional inputs or 
management, obtains output 𝑓(𝑥∗, 1) in state 1 and 𝑓(𝑥∗, 2) in state 2. In this approach 
uncertainty impacts on technology are then disembodied so that a shift from A to B 
represents a transition to a new production function and represents an efficiency gain, 
rather than the presence of soil moisture. When a shift from B to A occurs, it is considered 
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technical inefficiency, or management failure, rather than a lack of soil moisture. In this 
case a rainfall event which is outside the control of the decision manager can be either 
perceived as technological adjustment or management ability but not a state of nature 
being realized. In a stochastic representation B and A are then the expected upper and 
low bounds of output subject to the allocation of 𝑥∗ inputs. 
 
The state-contingent representation of output derived from the same 2 states of nature is 
provided by the dot (●) on Part B of Figure 5-1. As before, the combination of inputs 𝑥∗ is 
allocated before the state of nature is realised and output (𝑓(𝑥∗, 1), 𝑓(𝑥∗, 2)) is obtained 
and (𝑓(𝑥∗, 2) > 𝑓(𝑥∗, 1)). This dot represents the state-contingent output set given by 𝑥∗: 
and in this case technical inefficiency does not exist. This separation of output by state of 
nature then prevents the problems associated with traditional stochastic approaches 
dealing with events that create change like a prolonged El Niño cycle or climate change 
(Doole & Marsh 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The state-contingent production possibility frontier (or transformation curve) is the dotted 
line, Part B of Figure 5-1, and represents alternative outcomes in each state of nature 
dependent on the quantity of 𝑥  allocated. By relaxing the efficiency assumption then 
𝑓(𝑥∗, 2)  provides the upper bound of production in state 2 given 𝑥∗  inputs. Free 
                                            
43
 Adapted Chambers and Quiggin (2000, p. 35 and 8) 
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disposability of output is then the producer’s rational choice to produce less than the upper 
bound once 𝑥∗ is committed. Likewise in state 1 once 𝑥∗ is committed then 𝑓(𝑥∗, 1) is the 
upper limit of production. Therefore everything within the rectangle defines the production 
possibility set once 𝑥∗ is committed and the producer only operates on the frontier line 
when it is advantageous. The rectangle then represents the stochastic output set for 𝑥∗ 
inputs. State-contingent production is defined as 
zS ≤ 𝑓s(x , ε) s ∈ Ω = {1, … , S} . Equation 5-2 
 
The bisector line, Part B of Figure 5-1, is the riskless outcome where output in state1 and 
state 2 are identical (i.e.  (𝑓(𝑥∗, 2) = 𝑓(𝑥∗, 1)) , which is the certainty equivalence (CE) 
between these 2 states of nature. Any point above the bisector line represents where 
(𝑓(𝑥∗, 2) > 𝑓(𝑥∗, 1))  and any point below the bisector line (𝑓(𝑥∗, 2) < 𝑓(𝑥∗, 1)) . If the 
decision maker decides to operate on the bisector, they do so at the choice of producing 
less output in state 2. As states are separate, any choice to lower production in one state 
will have no impact on the other state of nature. This is then the basis for state-contingent 
technology. 
 State-Contingent Technology 5.4
State-contingent technology can be represented by a “continuous input correspondence, 
𝑋: ℜ+
𝑆 → ℜ+
𝑁 , which maps state-contingent outputs into input sets that are capable of 
producing that state-contingent output vector” (Chambers & Quiggin 2002) 
𝑋(𝐳) = {𝑥 ∈  ℜ+
𝑁: 𝐱 can produce 𝐳} . 
Equation 5-3 
 
The properties of these state-contingent output and inputs sets are listed below.  
 Properties of Output Sets 5.4.1
There are four key features of state-contingent technology. 
1. 𝑋(𝑧) is closed for all ℜ+
𝑆  . 
Logically production of 𝑧 from 𝑥 is not finite and there are defined upper and lower 
bounds to the output set. The use of output-cubical technology is used to illustrate this 
in Figure 5-2 and explained. 𝑋(𝑧) is convex for all 𝑧. 
2. 𝑋(0𝑠) = ℜ+
𝑁 (no fixed costs), and 0𝑁 ∉ 𝑋(𝑧) for 𝑧 ≥ 0𝑠 and 𝑧 ≠ 0𝑠 (no free lunch). 
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In this case the decision maker has a real option of not undertaking an action but if they 
decide not to respond, costs are still incurred in order to obtain a positive output. 
3. 𝑧′ ≤ 𝑧 ⟹ 𝑋(𝑧) ⊂ 𝑋(𝑧′). 
There is free disposability of state-contingent outputs. In this case, a state-contingent 
set of inputs can always be used to produce a smaller set of state-contingent outputs 
than the specific set is designed to produce. 
4. 𝑥′ ≥ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋(𝑧) ⟹ 𝑥′ ∈ 𝑋(𝑧). 
Inputs have non-negative marginal productivity. Shankar (2012) determined that these 
input sets are weakly disposable when 
𝑥 ∈  𝑋(𝑧) ⟹ ∀𝜆 ≥ 1, 𝜆𝑥 ∈  𝑋(𝑧) 
and strongly disposable if  
 𝑥 ∈  𝑋(𝑧) and 𝑥∗ > 𝑥 ⟹ 𝑥∗  ∈  𝑋(𝑧) . 
 Properties of Input Sets 5.4.2
The dual to the input correspondence is the cost function where the cost of input is w, so 
𝑐(𝐰, 𝐳) = min
𝑥
{𝐰𝐱: 𝐱 ∈ 𝐗(𝒛)}  𝐰 ∈ ℜ++
 𝑵  . Equation 5-4 
 
When the input correspondence satisfies properties X, then the cost function satisfies the 
following 6 conditions: 
1. 𝑐(𝐰, 𝐳)  is continuous on 𝕽+
𝑺  and positively linear homogeneous, non-decreasing, 
concave and continuous on 𝕽++
𝑵  . 
2. Shephard’s lemma applies so that indifference curves are convex allowing for a unique 
cost minimization point. 
3. 𝑐(𝐰, 𝐳) ≥ 0, 𝑐(𝐰, 0𝑠) = 0 and (𝐰, 𝐳) > for 𝐳 ≥ 0𝑠 , 𝐳 ≠ 0𝑠 . 
4. 𝐳0 ≥ 𝐳 ⟹ 𝑐(𝐰, 𝐳0) ≥ c(𝐰, 𝐳) . 
Both 3 and 4 provide a complete representation of the cost function. 
5. 𝑋(𝐳) is closed for all 𝐳 ∈ 𝕽+
𝑴. 
Which prevents production systems from using unlimited inputs. 
6. Standard duality theorems apply so that 
𝑋(𝐳) = ⋂ {𝐱:𝐰𝐱 ≥ 𝑐(𝐰, 𝐱)}𝐰>0  . Equation 5-5 
 
The state-contingent approach details three alternative forms of inputs to prevent the free 
disposability of output representing inefficiency: state allocable (redefined as state flexible 
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by Rasmussen (2011a)), state general and state specific. Dependent on their specification, 
inputs can increase output, have no impact on output, or in given situations be a 
transaction cost between states of nature. The transaction cost may be incurred if inputs 
like technology are purchased, and treated like a fixed cost, to maximize output in given 
states of nature (normal or wet) and the inaction of technology in drought states reduces 
the income from output in that state. 
 Output-Cubical Technology 5.4.3
The output-cubical technology is described by Equation 5-2, illustrated in Figure 5-2, and 
“it is a special but restrictive type of state-contingent technology as it does not allow 
substitution between outputs realized in different states of nature” (Shankar 2012, p. 603), 
 
Figure 5-2 Output-Cubical Output Set 44 
 
The state-space below is a representation of where we have both inputs managed by a 
producer and 𝜀𝑠 being a random outcome beyond the control of the producer to describe 
uncertain production processes. When the random vector is ∈= (∈1, … , ∈𝑠) ∈ ℝ+
𝑠  then the 
following describes the stochastic functions relationship between input and output 
                                            
44
 Adapted from Chambers and Quiggin (2000)  
𝑧3 
𝑧2 
𝑧1 
𝑓1(𝑥) 
𝑓2(𝑥) 
 𝑓1(𝑥),𝑓2(𝑥),𝑓3(𝑥)  
𝑓3(𝑥) 
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𝑧𝑠 ≤ 𝑓(𝑥, ∈𝑠),where 𝑓: ℝ+ × ℝ+  → ℝ+ . Equation 5-6 
 
The output-cubical input correspondence associated is 
𝑋(𝐳) = {𝐱: 𝑧 ≤ 𝑓(𝐱, 𝜀𝑠), 𝑠 ∈ Ω}  
= ⋂{𝐱: 𝑧𝑠 ≤ 𝑓(𝐱, 𝜀𝑠)}
𝑠∈Ω
  
= ⋂{?̅?(𝑧𝑠; 𝜀𝑠)}
𝑠∈Ω
 
 
Equation 5-7 
 
where ?̅?(𝑧𝑠; 𝜀𝑠)  is interpreted as the ex post input set associated with the production 
function for a given realization of the random variable (Chambers & Quiggin 2002, p. 515) 
 
The stochastic production function specification of the dual cost structure is then 
𝑐(𝐰, 𝐳) = Min {𝐰𝐱: 𝐱 ∈ ⋂{?̅?(𝑧𝑠; 𝜀𝑠)}
𝑠∈Ω
} Equation 5-8 
which satisfies 
𝑐(𝐰, 𝐳) ≥ 𝑀𝑎𝑥{𝑐̅(𝐰, 𝑧1;𝜀1),… , 𝑐̅(𝐰, 𝑧𝑠;𝜀𝑠)} Equation 5-9 
where 𝑐̅(𝐰, 𝑧𝑠;𝜀𝑠) is the ex post function dual to ?̅?(𝑧𝑠; 𝜀𝑠). 
 State-Contingent Decision Making 5.5
Following Rasmussen (2003) the state-contingent terminology and concepts are defined 
as:  
States of nature: Ω = {1, 2, … , 𝑠, … , 𝑆}  Equation 5-10 
Probabilities: (𝜋1, . . , 𝜋𝑠 … , 𝜋𝑆)  Equation 5-11 
Cost: 𝑐 = 𝐰𝐱  Equation 5-12 
Technology: 𝑻(𝐱, 𝒛) = 0  Equation 5-13 
Output: 𝑧𝑠 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑧𝑠: 𝑻(𝐱, 𝒛) ≤ 0}  ∀𝑠∈ Ω Equation 5-14 
Revenue: 𝑟𝑠 = 𝑧𝑠𝑝𝑠 ∀𝑠∈ Ω Equation 5-15 
Net Return: 𝑦𝑠 = 𝑟𝑠 − 𝑐 ∀𝑠∈ Ω Equation 5-16 
Preferences: 𝑊 = 𝑊(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑠)  Equation 5-17 
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The producer’s choice can be described as a two period game against nature. In this case 
the producer in period 1 allocates 𝐱, a vector of inputs 𝐱 = (𝑥1, . . , 𝑥𝑁), with corresponding 
input prices of 𝐰 = (𝑤1, . . , 𝑤𝑁), ex-ante the state being revealed which provides a cost of 
𝑐 = 𝐰𝐱. The decision maker’s subjective belief about the subsequent states of nature is 𝝅 
a vector described by (𝝅 = 𝜋1, … , 𝜋𝑠). When the state is revealed in period 2 then all 
ambiguity is removed and output from allocated inputs and costs is derived from the 
transformation function of 𝑇(𝑥, 𝒛)  where 𝐳 = (𝑧1, . . , 𝑧𝑠) . With prices 𝐳  being a vector 
of 𝐩 = (𝑝1, . . , 𝑝𝑠), so revenue is described as r = (𝑧1𝑝1, . . , 𝑧𝑠𝑝𝑠) allowing for net return to be 
𝐲 = (𝑦1, … 𝑦𝑠) = (𝑧1𝑝1 − 𝑤𝑥, . . , 𝑧𝑠𝑝𝑠 − 𝑤𝑥) = (𝐫 − 𝐜). To maximize their utility W, a producer 
then selects the input bundle 𝐱 so that 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑊 𝑌  =  ∑𝜋 (𝐫 − 𝐜)
𝑠∈Ω
 . Equation 5-18 
 
The closure of input and output sets by state of nature then allows for the complete 
description of inputs and outputs by mutually exclusive states of nature. The benefit of this 
approach is illustrated in Figure 5-3, where the relationship between two states of nature, 
the frequency of the states occurring, the income derived in each state and the decision 
maker’s preferences are provided. In this case the production system 𝑥, when produced in 
state 1 is 𝑦1, and when produced in state 2 is 𝑦2 and they provide an income of 𝑦𝑠1 and 
𝑦𝑠2, respectively when that state of nature occurs. 𝑦 = (𝑦1, 𝑦2) is the income derived when 
a state of nature occurs and the indifference curve is illustrated by the convex utility 
derived from production 𝑊(𝑥).  
 
As per the discussion above, the bisector line (or certainty equivalence (CE) (Hirshleifer & 
Riley 1992)) is where income is independent of the state of nature, i.e. 𝑦𝑠1 = 𝑦𝑠2. All points 
along the fair-odds line, slope of − (𝜋1 𝜋2⁄ ) , describe when returns have the same 
expected value. So only when the Fair-odds and the bisector line cross is the decision 
maker operating in a riskless environment. In this case then a risk adverse producer 
operates at ?̅? = (𝜋1𝑦𝑠1 + 𝜋2𝑦𝑠2). 
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Figure 5-3 Key Concepts in SCA45  
 State General Input 5.6
The formal presentation of a state-general input 𝑥𝑛 is 
𝜕𝑓𝑠(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
≠ 0 for one or more states 𝑠 ∈ Ω  for some level of 𝑥𝑛 
A state general input increases outputs in all states of nature. Assume there is one input of 
water allocated at the start of a season 𝑥1 or 𝑥2or 𝑥3. This water must be allocated before 
the state of nature is known, and water trade does not exist and the yield is 𝑧. In this case 
the production of citrus in the wet state 𝑠3 is 𝑧3 = 𝑓3(𝑥) and the production in the drought 
state 𝑠2 is 𝑧2 = 𝑓2(𝑥). In order for maximum possible yield to be obtained both rainfall and 
irrigation are required to obtain the optimal level of soil moisture. In this case, despite the 
quantity of inputs 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 being equal in each state 𝑧3 > 𝑧2 , 𝑆 ∈ Ω. The transformation 
curves for the 2 different states of nature production functions and their input use are 
illustrated in the third chart in Figure 5-4. Here production point 𝑂 occurs when there is no 
water applied to the crop and yield is derived from residual soil moisture only. The 
application of 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 provides a joint production 𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3 respectively. The slope of the 
                                            
45
 Adapted from Rasmussen (2003) 
𝑦2 
𝑦1 
𝑊 
?̅? 
𝑦 = (𝑦1,𝑦2) 
Fair-Odds Line: Slope = − (𝜋1 𝜋2⁄ ) 
?̅? 
CE 
CE 
45o 
Bisector 
Indifference Curve 
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𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 
𝑧3 “wet” year 𝑠3  
𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 
𝑧2 “drought” year 𝑠2  
𝑧3 
𝑧2 Transformation curves  
𝑂 
𝑧1 
𝑧2 
𝑧3 
transformation curve for points 0, 𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3 can be calculated by determining the quantity of 
𝑧3 that could be produced by producing one less unit of 𝑧2. Thus maximum efficiency from 
using 𝑧3 water inputs in: drought state of nature is 𝑧2
3 and there is no more water available; 
and a wet state of nature is 𝑧3
3  and in this case the addition of more water does not 
increase yields. Therefore the production transformation curves … 
“…are lines at right angles with the corner point which corresponds to the state-
contingent outputs associated with the chosen input volume in question. And, in 
fact, it is only such corner points that are interesting to the producer” (Rasmussen 
2011a, p. 38). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4 The Transformation Curve for State-General Inputs46 
 Representation of State General Inputs 5.6.1
Output written as a function of inputs is then 
zS =  𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑆, 𝜀𝑠) s ∈ Ω =  {1, … , S} Equation 5-19 
and the output correspondence is 
𝑍(𝑥𝑛) = 𝑧 = (𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑠): 𝑥 ∑ 𝑋𝑠
𝑠∈Ω
 Equation 5-20 
where each 𝑋𝑠 ⊆ ℝ+ state-allocable input technology can also be expressed by the output 
correspondence as  
𝑍(𝑥𝑛) = {𝐳 = (𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑠):∑𝑥𝑠 ≤ 𝑥
𝑠∈Ω
} . Equation 5-21 
                                            
46
 Adapted from Rasmussen (2011a)  
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For each 𝑧𝑠 ⊆ ℝ+, the state general input 𝑥𝑛 increases output in more than one state of 
nature 𝑧𝑠. 
 Criteria for Optimizing State-General Inputs 5.6.2
Optimizing problem for a state-general input is: 
Max
𝑥
𝑊(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑠) Equation 5-22 
where 
𝑦𝑠 = 𝑓𝑠(𝐱)𝑝𝑠 − 𝐰𝐱  𝑠𝜖Ω Equation 5-23 
by setting the first derivative of Equation 5-22 to zero the optimal use of input 𝑥𝑛is then 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑥𝑛
= ∑𝑊𝑠(𝐲) (𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝑓𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝑛
− 𝑤𝑛) = 0  (𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁)
𝑆
𝑠=1
 . 
Equation 5-24 
For a risk neutral producer this can be reduced to  
∑𝜋𝑠𝑝𝑠 (
𝜕𝑓𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝑛
) = 𝐸 (𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝑓(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
) = 𝑤𝑛  (𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁) 
𝑆
𝑠=1
 
Equation 5-25 
and Rasmussen (2011a) defines E as the ‘expectation operator’. This implies that a risk 
neutral producer increases the application of 𝑥𝑛 as long as the input price is less than the 
expected value of the marginal product. The expected value of the marginal product is 
important here as by acknowledging that the production function and price are state 
specific, then the marginal rate of return in state s and state t are different and are 
expressed as 
(𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝑓𝑠(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
− 𝑤𝑛) ≠ (𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑓𝑡(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
− 𝑤𝑛)  (𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ Ω) . Equation 5-26 
Therefore by reexamining Equation 5-24 and Equation 5-25 in given states, the application 
of input 𝑥𝑛 can be greater than or less than optimal but overall it will be optimal
47.  
 State Allocable (Flexible) Inputs 5.7
The formal presentation of a state-allocable input is 𝑥𝑛 is 
𝜕𝑓𝑠(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛𝑠
> 0  for two or more states 𝑠 ∈ Ω  for some level of 𝑥𝑛𝑠 
 
                                            
47
 See Rasmussen (2011a) pages 464-467 for a discussion concerning the allocation of inputs between a 
risk adverse and risk neutral producers. 
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Chambers and Quiggin (2000) use the example of allocating labor inputs (effort) 𝑥 
between two alternative activities, flood mitigation and repairing an irrigation system. By 
redefining the output in state 2 as dependent upon the labor inputs invested in flood 
mitigation works 𝑥2 and output in state 1 dependent on the effort placed in repairing the 
irrigation system 𝑥1, then 𝑥 =  𝑥1 + 𝑥2. In this case, the decision maker has to determine 
how to allocate inputs between these 2 options (i.e. state allocable inputs). This choice is 
represented by Chambers and Quiggin’s (2000) “breaker” diagram, Part A in Figure 5-5, 
where the left vertical axis represents output produced in 𝑠1 and the right vertical axis is 
output obtained in 𝑠2. Effort is the horizontal axis. As effort moves right to left, increased 
labor inputs towards fixing the irrigation system have diminish marginal productivity. When 
effort moves left to right, more labor is allocated towards flood mitigation work with 
diminishing marginal productivity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If 𝑥1∗  effort is allocated to flood mitigation, then residual effort is utilised to repair the 
irrigation system. If state 1 occurs then output is 𝑓(𝑥1∗, 1) and if state 2 occurs then output 
is 𝑓(𝑥∗ − 𝑥1∗, 2) and this provides the corresponding state space of A in Part B of Figure 
5-5. The shift from A to B then indicates increased effort towards flood mitigation and a 
shift from A to C represents a greater allocation of effort towards fixing the irrigation 
system. 
 
Figure 5-5 Effort Allocable Across States and the Production Transformation Curve 
Effort  
Flood 𝑧2 No Flood 𝑧1 
 
Flood 𝑧2 
𝑓(𝑥∗2, 2) 
𝑥∗ 
Part A Part B 
A 
𝑥1∗ 
𝑓(𝑥1∗, 1) 
𝑓(𝑥, 1) 
𝑓(𝑥∗ − 𝑥1∗, 2) 
No Flood 
𝑧1 
B 
C 
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All points on the curve in Part B can be considered as the state-contingent product-
transformation curve which identifies the state-contingent marginal rate of transformation. 
The negative slope is concave to the origin and reflects that, in order to increase 
production in one state of nature, output in the second state of nature is lost. All points of 
production below this line represent technical inefficiency. 
 Representation of State-Allocable Inputs 5.7.1
Output written as a function of inputs is then 
zS ≤  𝑓(𝑥𝑠, 𝜀𝑠) s ∈ Ω =  {1, … , S} Equation 5-27 
with an input correspondence of  
𝑋(𝑧) = ∑ 𝑋𝑠(𝑧𝑠)
𝑠∈Ω
 . Equation 5-28 
Here each 𝑋𝑠(𝑧𝑠) ⊆ ℝ+  state-allocable input technology can also be expressed by the 
output correspondence as  
𝑍(𝑥) = {𝐳 = (𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑠):∑𝑥𝑠 ≤ 𝑥
𝑠∈Ω
} Equation 5-29 
where each 𝑧𝑠 ⊆ ℝ+.  
 
The output produced with output-cubical technology (Figure 5-2) is dependent on the total 
inputs used  𝑥, the output produced by a state allocable technology 𝑧𝑠 is determined by the 
quantity of inputs used in that state 𝑥𝑠. 
 Criteria for Optimizing State-Allocable Inputs 5.7.2
The optimizing problem of the state-allocable input technology is  
max
𝑥𝑛1,…,𝑥𝑛𝑠
𝑊(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑠) Equation 5-30 
where 
𝑦𝑠 = 𝑓(𝐱)𝑝𝑠 − 𝑤𝑛(𝑥𝑛1 + ⋯+ 𝑥𝑛𝑠) − 𝐰
′𝐱′ (𝑠 ∈ Ω) . 
Equation 5-31 
𝑥𝑛𝑠 ≥ 0 is use of input 𝑥𝑛 designed to increase output in state 𝑠. 𝐰
′𝐱′ are the fixed costs of 
purchasing the remaining inputs is 𝑁 − 1. By assuming that 𝑥𝑛 is unique by state of nature 
(i.e. 𝑥𝑛𝑡 is state specific input for state t), the optimal application of 𝑥𝑛𝑡 is identical to state-
specific inputs (Section 5.8) and is represented by 
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𝑊𝑡𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑓𝑡(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛𝑡
= 𝑤𝑛 ∑𝑊𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
   (𝑡 ∈ Ω) 
Equation 5-32 
and Rasmussen (2011a) reduces this to 
𝜋𝑡 (𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑓𝑡(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛𝑡
) = 𝑤𝑛   (𝑡 ∈ Ω) . Equation 5-33 
This implies that a risk neutral producer will keep increasing the application of 𝑥𝑛𝑡 provided 
that the input price 𝑤𝑛 remains less than the marginal product multiplied by the probability 
of state t occurring. 
 State Specific Inputs 5.8
The formal presentation of a state specific input is 𝑥𝑛 is 
𝜕𝑓𝑠(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑓𝑠(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
= 0 for 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 for some level of 𝑥𝑛 (𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ Ω), 
thereby making state-specific inputs a special form of the state general input set, as in this 
case, the use of inputs only increases outputs in a specified state of nature (i.e. only 1 
state of nature). By returning to the state-general example and relaxing the need for both 
rainfall and irrigation to achieve optimum soil moisture, we can then argue irrigation 
provides no additional production in ‘wet’ states but irrigation is a vital input for production 
during ‘drought’ states. So if a producer has to allocate irrigation inputs before the ‘wet’ 
state of nature is realized, inputs of irrigation 0, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 results in production of 0, 𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3, 
as illustrated in Figure 5-6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Transformation Curve for State-Specific Inputs48 
                                            
48
 Adapted from Rasmussen (2011a) 
𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑎𝑥3 
𝑧2 “drought” year 𝑠3  
𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 
𝑧3 “wet” year 𝑠2  Transformation curves  
𝑂 𝑧1 𝑧2 𝑧3 
𝑧2 
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 Representation of a State-Specific Input 5.8.1
As the state-specific inputs are a special case of the state allocable inputs they can be 
represented by Equation 5-27 to Equation 5-29, Shankar (2012). 
 Criteria for Optimizing a State-Specific Input 5.8.2
The optimizing problem for a state-specific input is different to that of state-allocable inputs 
and can be expressed as: 
Max
𝑥
𝑊(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑠) Equation 5-34 
where 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓𝑡(𝐱)𝑝𝑡 − 𝐰𝐱 Equation 5-35 
𝑦𝑠 = 𝑘𝑠 − 𝐰𝐱 for 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 Equation 5-36 
and 𝑘𝑠 is a constant. 
 
By setting the first derivative of Equation 5-34 with respect to 𝑥𝑛 (𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁) to zero the 
optimal use of input 𝐱 is  
𝑊𝑡𝑝𝑡
𝜕𝑓𝑡(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
= 𝑤𝑛 ∑𝑊𝑠  (𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁)
𝑆
𝑠=1
 . 
Equation 5-37 
For a risk-neutral decision maker this can be simplified to  
𝜋𝑡𝑝𝑡 (
𝜕𝑓𝑡(𝐱)
𝜕𝑥𝑛
) = 𝑤𝑛 (𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁) . Equation 5-38 
Which implies that a risk neutral producer increases the application of 𝑥𝑛 provided that the 
input price 𝑤𝑛 remains less than the marginal product gained in that state multiplied by the 
probability of state t occurring. Note, that as 𝜕𝑓𝑠(𝐱) 𝜕𝑥𝑛⁄ = 0 for 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡, Equation 5-38 is 
equivalent to Equation 5-33. 
 Optimal Production of Output 5.9
The objective function of a producer who maximizes output is  
Max
𝑧1,…,𝑧𝑠
𝑊(𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑠) Equation 5-39 
and to maximize the income generated in a state of nature, production costs must be 
minimized  
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𝑦𝑠 = 𝑝𝑠𝑧𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠(𝐰, 𝑧𝑠) . Equation 5-40 
Adapting Equation 5-4, the cost function objective to minimize the cost of production can 
be determined. By using the output-cubical technology, output and inputs in each state of 
nature are independent of other states of nature. Therefore, the costs function has the 
simple additive form of  
𝑐(𝐰, 𝐳) = ∑𝑐𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
(𝐰𝑠, 𝑧𝑠) 
Equation 5-41 
where 𝐰𝑠  is the sub vector of prices corresponding to the production of 𝑧𝑠.  By 
differentiating with respect to each element in the vector 𝐳 (i.e.(𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑠) and setting each 
derivate equal to zero the following optimal conditions for 𝑆 are 
𝑊𝑠𝑝𝑠 − ∑𝑊𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑠 = 0
𝑆
𝑠=1
 ∀𝑠∈ Ω 
Equation 5-42 
“…where 𝑀𝐶𝑠 is the marginal cost with respect to 𝑧𝑠; that is the derivative of the 
cost function 𝑐  in [Equation 5-41] with respect to 𝑧𝑠 … [W]eighting 𝑀𝐶𝑠  by the 
marginal utility in all states of nature is a result of the fact that the cost of producing 
a marginal unit of output in state 𝑠 is the same, no matter what state of nature 
occurs. However, the marginal income(𝑝𝑠) only occurs in state 𝑠. For a risk-neutral 
decision-maker [Equation 5-42] reduces to…”(Rasmussen 2003, p. 472).  
𝜋𝑠𝑝𝑠 = 𝑀𝐶𝑠 ∀𝑠∈ Ω Equation 5-43 
implying that, provided the marginal cost of production is less than or equal to the product 
price in state 𝑠 multiplied by the frequency of state 𝑠 occurring, a risk neutral producer will 
continue to increase production in state 𝑠. The conditions for increasing production across 
all states of nature are defined by  
∑𝜋𝑠𝑝𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
= ∑𝑀𝐶𝑠(𝐰
𝒔, 𝑧𝑠)
𝑆
𝑠=1
= 𝐸(𝑝) . 
Equation 5-44 
So a risk-neutral decision maker will increase output provided that the cost of producing 
that output is less than or equal to the expected product price 𝐸(𝑝) across all states of 
nature. 
 
By using the assumption that there is no price uncertainty and only production uncertainty 
(the relationship between output in state 𝑠 and state 𝑡), the optimal production can be 
derived from Equation 5-42  
 108 
 
𝑊𝑠
𝑊𝑡
=
𝑀𝐶𝑠
𝑀𝐶𝑡
 Equation 5-45 
where the slope of the indifference curve, illustrated in Figure 5-3, is equal to the ratio 
defined by the marginal cost of production in state 𝑠 and state 𝑡.  
 
Equation 5-45, then highlights why the state-contingent model can illustrate how decision 
makers change production systems in response to climate change where droughts 
become more frequent. In this case as the decision maker’s perceptions about future 
states occurring change, the slope of the indifference curve alters, which encourages 
resource (input) reallocation between states of nature in an effort to maximize future profit. 
This aligns with Arrow’s (1953) arguments that for a decision maker “risk-bearing is 
guaranteed to be viable only if individuals have attitudes of risk-aversion” (Arrow 1953, p. 
91) thus the switching of resources to maximize rent as the frequency of states is an 
optimal risk minimization strategy. 
 Summary 5.10
By considering the output of technology and the inputs required to produce that output as 
closed sets in each state of nature, the optimal use of capital by type, place, date, and by 
state of nature can then be derived. This separation between states then overcomes the 
limitations of stochastic representation of production under uncertainty, as the tails of the 
distribution are now directly examined as states of nature, this preventing the development 
of black swans in models (Chichilnisky 2010). 
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6. THE RSMG MURRAY-DARLING BASIN MODEL 
 Introduction 6.1
The RSMG Murray-Darling Basin model was developed by Adamson, Mallawaarachchi 
and Quiggin (2007, 2009) to provide a partial equilibrium example of the state-contingent 
approach (SCA). By integrating a river flow network that incorporates salinity, the model 
can then track how alternative spatial irrigation practices respond to alternative states of 
water availability (drought, flood and normal) and subsequently change both the quantity 
and quality of water available for downstream users. By altering the model’s biophysical 
and economic constraints, the model can then be used to examine the optimal consumer 
behavioral (i.e. irrigator) response to maximize economic rent from water use at either a 
catchment or national level.  
 
The RSMG model was the first economic simulation model of the entire Murray-Darling 
Basin (MDB) since the retirement of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource 
Economics (ABARE) ‘SALSA Model’ (Beare & Heaney 2002). All other models had 
constrained the economic irrigation landscape to either, examine a single catchment or 
multiple catchments but only the Southern Murray-Darling Basin (SMDB) (Hall, Poulter & 
Curtotti 1994; Heaney & Beare 2001) had used alternative partial and general equilibrium 
techniques with a varying degree of success (Griffith 2012).  
 
The model presented in this section has been formulated to reflect the constrained welfare 
optimization evaluation strategy. In summary, this evaluation is based on Randall’s (1975) 
arguments, that to understand net changes in property rights, a constrained welfare 
optimization approach is required. By optimizing economic rent derived from irrigation at a 
national level, the trade-offs between economic returns, water quality and water flow 
targets pre and post Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan) implementation can be 
determined.  
 
Figure 6-1 provides a flow diagram of the model. The state of nature provides certainty by 
revealing the total volume of water to be traded-off between consumptive use and 
institutional goals. Irrigators maximize income by allocating resources across three states 
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of nature (temporal aspects). The opportunity cost between irrigators in the MDB is 
determined by the spatial consumption of water and net changes to salinity from its use 
(i.e. reduced rivers flows and return flows transporting salt back into the river system) and 
subject to the institutional goals which seek to prevent irreversible harm in the MDB. Note, 
variables have been redefined in this section so that 𝑤 is related to issues with water 
rather than input costs and state-contingent production systems are defined as 𝑥. 
 
 Background to the Model 6.2
Quiggin (1988) provided the genesis for the model developed by Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2007, 2009). The 1988 model was developed to evaluate 
policy options for salinity managing in the SMDB. The model optimized economic returns 
Figure 6-1 The RSMG Model of the MDB 
State of Nature 
 (𝑆 ∈ Ω) 
Net social Welfare =  
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 111 
 
from allocating four production inputs (land, water, operator labor and other) between four 
crops (stone fruit, citrus, grapes and pasture) across six catchments. Salinity impacts on 
production output were derived by using a negative linear relationship. This relationship 
was discontinuous in nature as salinity did not reduce output until a threshold salinity level 
had been reached. The model included a directed water and salt flow network that allowed 
for policy mitigation of salt and downstream impacts from water-use to be incorporated.  
 
Figure 6-2 illustrates the critical difference between the expected value (EV) approach 
used by Quiggin (1988), (Part A in Figure 6-2), and the SCA approach used by Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2007), (Part B Figure 6-2). By separating water variability 
into states of nature, the SCA approach can allow for management response to adapt to 
alternative levels of water security that can create non-convex demand responses. In Part 
A only a single water supply of 620GL is expected to occur all the time and the decision 
maker always applies the identical management solution. Whereas in Part B, the decision 
maker is modeled as being aware that: for 50% of the time, only 620GL of water available; 
for 20% of the time, droughts provide only 358GL of water; and for 30% of the time inflows 
will provide 803GL of water.  
 
 
Figure 6-2 Outcome of Flow Variability49 
 
By modeling the probability of alternative states and having complete information about 
each state of nature, decision makers can then maximize their returns across all state of 
nature. So the design of the SCA model then prevents land allocations from attempting to 
over utilize water in a drought and allows for the area irrigated in a wet state of nature to 
                                            
49
 The data represented here is the conjunctive water resources for the Condamine from Table 7-1. 
  
A B 
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increase. While the EV model choses only a single land allocation, consequently the 
decision maker is exposed to increased risk in a drought and fails to maximize economic 
returns in a wet state of nature. 
 
If the modeler’s heuristics (Section 4.3.1) suggested that the problem of allocating water in 
the MDB could be framed within the EV approach, then the narrow bounds of a discrete 
representation of water supply quickly limit the value of the model for dealing with 
scenarios outside the initial specifications (Chugh & Bazerman 2007; Grant & Quiggin 
2013a). Even if a stochastic production function (Chavas, Chambers & Pope 2010; Just & 
Pope 2003) is used to incorporate risk and uncertainty about future water supply, then the 
role that droughts and floods play in the decision making process for allocation production 
inputs is ignored (Mendelsohn & Dinar 2003).  
 
This heuristic approach is evident in Quiggin (1988) where the results could create a Black 
Swan outcome. Quiggin’s (1988) suggested that the optimum strategy to deal with climate 
risk in irrigation, was to allocate all water towards perennial horticulture. However, in 
Section 3.3 it was argued that the area irrigated in the MDB expands and contracts in 
direct response to La Niña and El Niño climatic events (Table 3-1) and that capital 
invested in perennials is compromised under increasing variability in water supply. 
Consequently, Quiggin (1988), although technically correct in the economic theory of the 
solution to deal with salinity externalities, has suggested a production mix that is inflexible 
once water supply variability is taken into account. Quiggin (1988, 1991) acknowledged 
this limitation when dealing with risk and uncertainty.   
 Formal Model Description 6.3
The model is used to examine the problems of allocating water resources between all 
water users. Private individuals are represented by irrigators and the institutions are 
responsible for ensuring social and environmental goals (i.e. provide the constraints on 
private choice). Uncertainty or nature in this case is the volume (supply) of water available 
to share between both groups. The state-space is divided into 3 states of nature (𝑆 = 3). 
Where: 
 𝑠1, normal state where the quantity of water is the expected value 𝜃; 
 𝑠2, drought state is a period of water scarcity, 0.6𝜃; and 
 𝑠3, surplus (wet) state where water supply exceeds the expected value by 1.2𝜃. 
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By adapting Figure 2-1, to obtain Figure 6-3, we can simply represent that alternative 
water states of nature (i.e. 0.6𝜃, 𝜃, 1.2𝜃) can then align with producers adapting to those 
state signals by using output-cubical technology (Section 5.4.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3 State of Nature and Management Response to Water Supply 
 
Therefore, when the normal state of nature occurs, producers utilize the appropriate 
technology for that state of nature. When the drought state occurs, producers reallocate 
inputs and management strategies knowing that their demand for water is inelastic. In the 
wet state of nature, the abundant water relaxes supply constraints experienced in the 
normal state so that the demand curve becomes elastic. The wet state then defines all 
reallocation of inputs and management opportunities to take advantage of extra water 
supply. The probability 𝜋 of each state occurring is: 𝑠1 = 0.5; 𝑠2 = 0.2; and 𝑠3 = 0.3, “and 
the associated inflow levels are calibrated to match the observed historical mean and 
variance of inflow levels” (Quiggin et al. 2010, p. 542). 
 
Unlike Quiggin (1991) and papers based on the approach described in Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2007) this model has deactivated the binding operator’s 
labor constraint for three reasons. First, on review it was identified that the operator’s labor 
constraint was too restrictive, for some 𝑘, and the area irrigated was well below known 
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historic allocations, even in wet years. Second, it prevented new individuals from entering 
into irrigation to take advantage of economic opportunities that may emerge. Third, 
agriculture in the MDB continues to adopt by investing in labor saving technology or 
purchasing contract labor, allowing for individuals to increase their farm size (Boserup 
1965; Keogh 2011). 
 The Objective Function 6.4
To maximize net social welfare, the model is solved as though a single benevolent 
individual, with prefect knowledge, is acting in the national interest. This is the “global 
optimization for the system as a whole (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2007, p. 
272). In this case the individual maximizes social welfare 𝑌 (Equation 6-1) from allocating 
resources, throughout all 𝐾 in the MDB, between alternative state-contingent production 
systems 𝑥 which are subject to a series of production (Equation 6-5 and Equation 6-6), bio-
physical (Equation 6-7) and institutional policy (Equation 6-8 to Equation 6-11) constraints.  
The objective function is 
 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐸 𝑌  =  ∑∑𝜋𝑠 (𝑅𝑠,𝑘 − 𝐶𝑠,𝑘)
𝑠∈Ω𝐾
 
where 
Equation 6-1  
Revenue 𝑟𝑠,𝑘 = 𝑧𝑠,𝑘𝑝𝑠,𝑘 Equation 6-2 
Costs 𝑐𝑠,𝑘  = 𝒂𝑠,𝑘𝒙𝑠,𝑘 Equation 6-3 
Output 𝑧𝑠,𝑘  = 𝑓(𝒙𝑘) Equation 6-4 
Subject to   
 𝒃𝑠,𝑘𝒙𝑠,𝑘 ≤ 𝐵𝑠,𝑘 Equation 6-5 
 𝒙𝑠  ≥ 0 Equation 6-6 
 𝑤𝑠,𝑘  ≤ 𝑤𝑓𝑠,𝑘 Equation 6-7 
 
∑𝑊𝜋𝑠
𝐾
 ≤  𝐶𝑎𝑝 
Equation 6-8 
 𝑤𝑓𝑠,21 ≥ 650𝐺𝐿 Equation 6-9 
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 σ𝑠,20 0.64⁄  ≤ 800EC Equation 6-10 
 𝑤𝑘20 = 206𝐺𝐿 Equation 6-11 
 
The description of the variables used in Equation 6-1 to Equation 6-11 are provided in 
Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6-1 Description of Variables 
Symbol Definition 
𝐸 𝑌  Expected [Income] 
𝐾 Catchments in the MDB (𝐾 = 1…21) 
𝑆 States of Nature (𝑆 = 1 . . .  3)  
𝜋 Probability of state occurrence 
𝑅 Revenue 
C Costs 
𝑍 Output  
𝑃 Price per unit of output 
𝒙 Vector of state-contingent production systems 
𝒂 Vector of input costs (land, fixed costs, variable costs, water)/Ha  
𝒃 Vector of input requirements (land (𝑙) , fixed costs, variable costs, 
water)/Ha 
𝐵 Input constraints (land (𝐿), water) 
𝑤 Volume of water used derived from 𝑏𝑠,𝑘𝑥𝑠,𝑘  
𝑤𝑓 Volume of water flowing in the catchment 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 The total constraint on the water use. Depending on run ether based on 
Current Diversion Limits (CDL) or Sustainable Diversion Limit (SDL) 
data, see Section 4.3.1. 
σ Salinity level in EC units 
 The Model Design 6.5
The MDB is divided into catchments 𝑘 = 1…𝐾  and the river system is modeled as a 
directed flow network (Table 6-2). The decision maker allocates alternative bundles of 
inputs 𝒃 (one hectare of land, a unit of fixed costs, a unit of variable costs and a specified 
volume of water in megalitres (MLs) between alternative production systems 𝑥  by 𝑘  to 
maximize income subject to a series of land and water constraints. As inputs are used 
along the river system, irrigation return flows provide a point source of pollution by 
transporting salt back into the river system, degrading the quality of water for downstream 
users. The decision maker must then allocate water resources so that their consumption 
does not prevent the social and environmental goals from being violated. As the 
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relationships between water flow, water use, salt and salinity are non-linear the model as a 
whole is non-linear.  
 
Table 6-2 The Directed Flow Network 
𝑲 Catchment Name Cumulative Flow Structure 
𝑘1 Condamine  +Condamine 
𝑘2 Border Rivers QLD +Border Rivers QLD  
𝑘3 Warrego-Paroo +Warrego-Paroo 
𝑘4 Namoi +Namoi 
𝑘5 Central West +Central West 
𝑘6 Maranoa-Balonne +Maranoa-Balonne + Condamine(Net) 
𝑘7 Border Rivers Gwydir +Border Rivers Gwydir + Border Rivers QLD(Net) 
𝑘8 Western +Western + Warrego-Paroo(Net) + Namoi(Net) + Central 
West(Net) + Maranoa-Balonne(Net) + Border Rivers 
Gwydir(Net) 
𝑘9 Lachlan +Lachlan 
𝑘10 Murrumbidgee +Murrumbidgee 
𝑘11 North East +North East 
𝑘12 Murray 1 +Murray 1 
𝑘13 Goulburn Broken  +Goulburn Broken + ½(North East(Net) + Murray 1(Net)) 
𝑘14 Murray 2 +Murray 2 + ½(North East(Net) + Murray 1(Net)) 
𝑘15 North Central + North Central + ½(Goulburn Broken(Net) + Murray 
2(Net)) 
𝑘16 Murray 3 + Murray 3 + ½(Goulburn Broken(Net) + Murray 2(Net)) 
𝑘17 Mallee  +Mallee + ½(North Central(Net) +Murray 3(Net) + 
Lachlan(Net) + Murrumbidgee(Net)) 
𝑘18 Lower Murray-Darling + Lower Murray Darling + ½(North Central(Net) + Murray 
3(Net)) + Lachlan(Net) + Murrumbidgee(Net)) 
+Western(Net) 
𝑘19 SA MDB +SA MDB + Lower Murray-Darling(Net) 
𝑘20 Adelaide +SA MDB(Net) 
𝑘21 Coorong +SA MDB(Net) – Adelaide Extractions 
 
The model is solved on an annual basis, and examines what happens on each Ha of land 
in each 𝑘. To model the producer’s investment choice, capital costs are treated as an 
annuity representing the amortized value of the capital over the lifespan of the 
development activity. The per Ha capital costs are derived from estimates of both the 
establishment costs and the equipment costs required to develop an irrigation farm 
producing a specified production system, (see Table 7-11), and then divided by the 
average farm size of that production system in each 𝑘 , (see Table 7-12). The model 
therefore provides the flexibility to model a range of alternative pricing rules for capital and 
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by incorporating capital costs it overcomes the limitations associated with using only gross 
margin budgets to determine the economic value of water.50 
 
The state-contingent production systems highlight the nature of irrigator response to a 
given state of nature for a single Ha of land in each 𝑘. In given cases the production 
systems are a representation of an amalgamation of enterprises (i.e. oil seeds refers to a 
spatial mix of canola and sunflowers dependent on what is produced in each 𝑘) and not a 
specific commodity.51 Only the production systems 𝑥 relevant to 𝑘 can be produced in 𝑘. 
For example, cotton cannot be produced in South Australia (SA) and rice is not grown in 
QLD. All data for production systems were derived from a series of regional enterprise 
budgets that are documented in Appendix B. 
 
These production systems have two major rules pertaining to how the land is used and 
capital costs. First, as the production system defines what happens on a single Ha over 
time, the ability to change what commodity is produced by state of nature is limited to 
annuals. For example, if the cotton/chickpea production system is selected, then on that 
single Ha the irrigator produces a cotton crop in the normal and wet states of nature, and 
chickpeas in the drought (see Section 7.7.2 and Table 6-4). In this case the choice to 
produce annuals is not dependent on what is produced in a prior or subsequent state of 
nature. This highlights the producer ability to adapt to environmental signals by 
reallocating resources between production choices.  
 
Unlike an annual system a perennial production system must always produce the identified 
perennial commodity on that given Ha. As perennials are a long term investment and take 
time to reach production maturity, they cannot be removed from that Ha as the state of 
nature changes. For example, for a given Ha of a production system the model does not 
allow a decision maker to produce citrus in the normal and wet states of nature and then 
replace it with a dryland crop, nor does it allow for substitution between perennial crops by 
state of nature, for example a citrus crop cannot be replaced by viticulture on the same Ha 
in the same model run. Only the specified perennial can be produced on a given Ha and it 
must always be produced in each state of nature. This then allows for the risk of capital 
                                            
50
 See Section 1.3 and this debate provided by Brennan (2006). 
 
51
 See Table 6-4 and Section 7.6.4 for a detailed description of the SCA production systems within the 
model. 
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investment in each Ha to be determined and illustrates how management strategies differ 
between perennial and annual production systems. 
 
Second, for the annual state-contingent production systems that specify that producers 
can swap production choices by state of nature, the production choice with the highest 
capital cost is used to define capital costs in all states of nature. For example, for the state-
contingent production systems cotton/chickpea, described above, the capital costs 
required to produce cotton is greater than chickpeas. In this case, the opportunity cost of 
having cotton machinery idle must be taken into account when allocating resources and 
therefore, in this production system the capital cost to produce chickpeas is based on the 
per Ha capital cost from cotton. Capital is then a state-general input (Section 5.6).  
 Income 6.6
The maximum 𝑌 in the MDB is derived from allocating resources between all 𝑘, where 
irrigation occurs (𝑘1..19) subject to biophysical constraints (water flow, Equation 6-7) and 𝑏 
limitations in each 𝑘 (land, water) and the policy setting for: Adelaide (𝑘20); the Coorong 
(𝑘21) ; and water use (𝐶𝑎𝑝) . Revenue/Ha (𝑟 = 𝑧 × 𝑝) , where output (𝑧) /Ha has a 
dimension of (𝑘 × 𝑥 × 𝑆) , price (𝑃)  has a dimension of (𝑀 × 𝑆) , where (𝑀)  is a 
commodity. The transformation of (𝑀 = 18), Table 6-3, into (𝑋 = 23), Table 6-4, occurs 
by: the use of alternative irrigation technology; the management response to alternative 
states of nature by reallocating inputs between commodities; and or utilizing different 
bundles of inputs to produce a state specified output for that commodity.  
 
Table 6-3 Commodities Used in the Model, 𝑴 = (𝟏…𝟏𝟖) 
𝑀 Commodity Name 𝑀 Commodity Name 
𝑚1 Citrus 𝑚10 Rice 
𝑚2 Grapes 𝑚11 Wheat 
𝑚3 Stone-Fruit 𝑚12 Legumes 
𝑚4 Pome Fruit 𝑚13 Sorghum 
𝑚5 Vegetables 𝑚14 Oilseeds 
𝑚6 Melons 𝑚15 Sheep 
𝑚7 Fresh Tomatoes 𝑚16 Dairy 
𝑚8 Cotton 𝑚17 Dryland 
𝑚9 Chickpea 𝑚18 Adelaide 
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The two alternative technologies for irrigation are: high irrigation technology (suffix -H) 
referring to intensive capital investment to reduce water use per Ha (e.g. drip lines); and 
low irrigation technology (suffix -L) referring to inexpensive capital investment (e.g. furrow 
irrigation). The data and description of the state-contingent production systems for 
converting bundles of inputs between commodities and for a given commodity are 
provided in Section 7.6. The matrix of total SCA production systems is 𝑋 × 𝐾 × 𝑆. Where 
𝑥 = 22 is a default dryland commodity to account for area permanently transitioning out of 
irrigation. 𝑥 = 23 is the SCA production system required to ensure that the city of Adelaide 
receives its water. 𝑥 = 23 has special 𝑏 characteristics of requiring (0 units of land, 0 units 
of fixed costs, 0 units of variable costs and it needs 1 ML of water) so that allocating water 
to Adelaide does not interfere with production activities. 
 
Table 6-4 State-Contingent Production Systems 𝑿 = (𝟏…𝟐𝟑) 
𝑿 Production 
System Name 
State-Contingent Crop 
Drought Normal  Wet 
𝑥1 Citrus-H Citrus-H Citrus-H Citrus-H 
𝑥2 Citrus-L Citrus-L Citrus-L Citrus-L 
𝑥3 Grapes Grapes Grapes Grapes 
𝑥4 Stone Fruit-H Stone Fruit-H Stone Fruit-H Stone Fruit-H 
𝑥5 Stone Fruit-L Stone Fruit-L Stone Fruit-L Stone Fruit-L 
𝑥6 Pome Fruit Pome Fruit Pome Fruit Pome Fruit 
𝑥7 Vegetables Melons Vegetables Fresh Tomatoes 
𝑥8 Cotton Flex Dryland Cotton Cotton Flex Cotton 
𝑥9 Cotton Fixed Cotton Fixed Cotton Fixed Cotton Fixed 
𝑥10 Cotton/Chickpea Chickpea Cotton Flex Cotton 
𝑥11 Cotton Wet Dryland Cotton Dryland Cotton Cotton 
𝑥12 Rice PSN Rice PSD Rice PSN Rice PSW 
𝑥13 Rice Flex Dryland Wheat Rice PSN Rice PSW 
𝑥14 Rice Wet Dryland Wheat Dryland Wheat Rice PSW 
𝑥15 Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat 
𝑥16 Wheat Legume Wheat Legume Dry Wheat Legume Wheat Legume Wet 
𝑥17 Sorghum Sorghum Sorghum Sorghum 
𝑥18 Oilseeds Oilseeds Oilseeds Oilseeds 
𝑥19 Sheep Wheat Sheep Wheat Dry Sheep Wheat Sheep Wheat Wet 
𝑥20 Dairy-H Dairy-H Dairy-H Dairy-H 
𝑥21 Dairy-L Dairy-L Dairy-L Dairy-L 
𝑥22 Dryland Dryland Dryland Dryland 
𝑥23 Adelaide Water Adelaide Water Adelaide Water Adelaide Water 
Notes: 
H = intensive irrigation capital (e.g. drip lines) 
L = low irrigation capital (e.g. furrows) 
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 Revenue 6.6.1
Revenue is (𝑟 = 𝑧 × 𝑝) and for simplicity 𝑃 is held constant in each state of nature, except 
for (𝑥22)  where the price paid in 𝑠1  = $50, 𝑠2 = $0, 𝑠3 = $65  which reflects the default 
income generated from a default dryland production system52. Output 𝑧𝑠 is the yield/ha and 
is derived from the regional gross margin budgets and the production rules stipulated in 
Table 7-15 and Appendix B.  
 Costs 6.6.2
Cost (𝑐) /Ha has dimensions of (𝑘 × 𝑥 × 𝑆) . Costs are based on a vector of input 
requirements 𝐛 and a vector of input prices 𝐚 to produce each unit of 𝑥/Ha. As discussed 
𝐛 has four inputs: land; fixed costs; variable costs; and water, and they all have 
dimensions of (𝐾 ×  𝑋 ×  𝑆). All 𝑥 requires 1 Ha of land, 1 unit of fixed costs, 1 unit of 
variable costs and the volume of ML (water) required to produce one Ha in each 𝑠. For 
simplicity, there is no cost to purchase land. Fixed costs are constant in every state of 
nature and cover the per hectare annuity repayment on capital, with dimensions of 
(𝐾 × 𝑋 × 𝑆). Fixed costs can be considered as ex-ante costs before the state is realized. 
Variable costs are the costs of producing 𝑥/Ha which include all traditional enterprise costs 
(i.e. seed, machinery, chemicals, casual labor, contractor costs, other costs, etc.) plus a 
payment for operator labor, dependent upon the time required for each SCA production 
system.  
 
The cost of water is derived from the number of ML required in each state and all water is 
charged at $25/ML. Cost to produce 𝑧𝑘𝑠(𝑥) is then the sum of fixed costs plus variable 
costs plus water costs. All data for 𝑌 and water use for dimensions of (𝐾 × 𝑋 × 𝑆) are 
presented in Appendix A. 
 Constraints  6.7
The use of the dual optimization approach provides the ability to determine the economic 
implications of binding resource constraints. However, The nature of partial equilibrium 
models, prevents changes to investment from having endogenous dynamic responses on 
                                            
52
 By assuming the small country assumption for Australia holds prices output prices are assumed 
independent of the state of nature. 
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prices of inputs and outputs, which may result in unrealistic investment patterns when 
compared to general equilibrium models (Janvry & Sadoulet 1987; Rothenberg & Smith 
1971).  
The constraints listed within this Section, attempt to place bounds on resource use so that 
the model approximates some form of reality by adhering to known parameters for realized 
land and water use (Erdem et al. 2005).  
 Resource Endowments 6.7.1
Equation 6-5, ensures that the total land and water resources used by the production 
systems do not exceed the resource endowments The model diverts land use between 
two types of SCA production systems, horticulture and broadacre. This diversion occurs to 
prevent unrealistic expansion in horticultural activities. The total area dedicated to irrigation 
commodity (𝑚)  in (𝑘)  is based on data from the 2000-01 production year (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2004) as at the time of model development that was considered 
the last ‘normal’ year in the MDB, see Chart 3-1. Area (𝐿) in (𝑘) is allowed to expand as 
follows: the total area dedicated to horticulture in a catchment is allowed to expand by 
50%, with the exception of 𝑘1, 𝑘6 and 𝑘11 where the total area dedicated to irrigation has 
been allowed to increase by 150%, 200% and 100% respectively to bring data into line 
with known capacities, Equation 6-12. The total area dedicated to all irrigated activities, 
inclusive of area that does not enter irrigation (𝑥 = 22), can increase by 100%, Equation 
6-13. No irrigation activity takes place in Adelaide (𝑥 = 23). This then allows the broadacre 
area to expand into horticulture area if required but the expansion of both irrigation and 
horticulture is capped. Any land not allocated to irrigated area is assumed to either remain 
or return to a default dryland enterprise, thus the model can represent irrigation expansion 
or contraction by catchment (𝑘) based on opportunities for irrigators or responses to policy 
and biophysical stimulus. 
 𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑥(1..7) ≤ 1.5𝐿𝑘𝑚(1..7) Equation 6-12 
 𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑥(1..22) = 2𝐿𝑘𝑚(1…16) Equation 6-13 
As decision variables, SCA production systems, can be any real number. Equation 6-6 
ensures that the optimization algorithm does not allocate a negative area into production. 
In this case 0 ≥ 𝑥𝑘 ≤ 𝑙𝑘. 
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The second part of the resource endowments constraints ensures that the water used for 
irrigation does not exceed the resource allocated and CAP (either CDL or SDL dependent 
on run). Water resource endowments are also constrained by the biophysical constraints 
on water flow to ensure that water used is not greater than the flow in the river system. 
 Biophysical Constraints of Water Flow  6.7.2
The model has a single biophysical constraint (Equation 6-7) to ensure that the volume of 
water used for production does not exceed the capacity of the system to deliver supply. 
Figure 6-4 provides an illustration of the flow network and Table 6-2 provides the 
mathematical representation of the network.  
 
 
Figure 6-4 Representation of the Flow Model 
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The states of nature are defined by the available conjunctive exogenous water 
resources (θ): surface flows; groundwater extractions; and net inter-basin transfers. The 
flow leaving each catchment 𝑤𝑓𝑠,𝑘 is obtained from Equation 6-14, where flow is 
determined by the impact that conveyance losses (𝑤𝑐) have on water resources θ, minus 
water used (𝑤)  to irrigate less return flows (𝑤𝑟)  from irrigation use. When this water 
reaches the next catchment it forms part of θ and conveyance losses are then applied. 
Equation 6-14 then allows for the trade-offs between spatial use of irrigation supplies and 
the environmental and social benefits to be determined. 
𝑤𝑓𝑘,𝑠 = (𝜃𝑠,𝑘  ×  𝑤𝑐𝑠,𝑘) – (𝑤𝑠,𝑘 − 𝑤𝑟𝑠,𝑘)  Equation 6-14 
 
Each production system (𝑥𝑠,𝑘) then has a defined water use (ML/Ha) and reflow variable 
dependent on technology, -L or –H, which determines (𝑤𝑟) in each 𝑠. 
 Policy Constraints 6.7.3
There are three policy constraints in the model to describe the role of institutions on private 
use: total water use; environmental targets; and Adelaide’s potable water supply. 
Extractions are determined endogenously by land use decisions as described above, 
subject to limits imposed by the availability of both surface and groundwater. This structure 
allows for the determination of total irrigation use, the flow to the Coorong and water 
quality arriving at Adelaide.  
 Total Water Used 6.7.4
The model defines the CAP as diversions for irrigation purposes, see Section 2. This then 
accounts for both water used for irrigation and the water used for transporting irrigation 
supplies. This assumption then allows for grains from trade to be quickly examined. The 
volume of water used in the basin must be less than the CAP53 on average. This average 
then allows for carry over provisions to be modeled and in given cases it allows irrigators 
to use a volume of water greater than the CAP if profitable to do so. The model assumes 
that irrigators can access 100% of their entitlements on average (Equation 6-8) thus 
providing a basic modeling approach for carryover management response. 
                                            
53
 CAP as in the limit on long term diversions. Here the term CAP is interchangeable with CDL or SDL 
depending on which scenario is run as demonstrated in Section 5. 
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Apart from Adelaide, which has a guaranteed water supply by Equation 6-9, all other 
potable supplies and estimations of livestock use defined under the CAP are subtracted 
from 𝜃 before the model is optimized. This approach ensures that these water shares are 
provided in all 𝑆𝜖Ω.54  
 Ecological Requirements 6.7.5
Without a detailed environmental plan in the Basin Plan, Equation 6-9 provides the only 
environmental target for this model. This simply ensures that 650GL of water arrives to the 
Coorong in all states of nature.  
 Salinity & Adelaide’s Potable Water Supply 6.7.6
There are two constraints dealing with water quality and Adelaide’s potable water supply. 
Water quality is simplified to reflect salinity (σ) as it is a binding policy constraint to ensure 
that the Basin Plan’s requirement for Adelaide’s water quality is achieved (Equation 6-10). 
This then allows salinity impacts on output to be modeled as a constraint on water 
consumption rather than a discontinuous function on yield.55  
 
Equation 6-15 illustrates that σ is a ratio of the total salt load (𝐺) and (𝑓) and this provides 
salinity in milligrams per liter (mg/L): 
𝜎𝑠,𝑘 = 𝐺𝑠,𝑘 𝑤𝑓𝑠,𝑘⁄  Equation 6-15 
 
The determination of the natural salt load utilizes the same framework as the directed river 
flow network. The total salt load 𝐺𝑠,𝑘 is a combination of the naturally mobilized tons of salt 
that enters run off less the exogenous tons of salt removed via the salinity mitigation 
program, plus the endogenous salt transported with reflow determined by 𝜃𝑠,𝑘𝑤𝑠,𝑘 . The 
natural salt load is represented in state-contingent terms reflecting salt immobilization in 
soil in drought times and mobilization during the wet states, where (𝑠1 = 1.0, 𝑠2 = 0.5, 𝑠3 =
1.3, ). 𝜎 is converted into EC by dividing it by 0.64.  
                                            
54
 If a defined indigenous cultural supply of water was to be allocated (Section 2.6.1), it could be modeled in 
one of three ways. First, the indigenous allocation could be removed from 𝜃 as per urban use in the MDB as 
assumed above. Second, as a defined volumetric constraint, as consistent with the way Adelaide’s water 
supply is modeled (Equation 6-11). Third, as a portfolio of water property rights and this approach is 
illustrated in Section 8, for the CEWO. 
 
55
 Adamson et al. (2007) did use discontinuous functions to model salinity impacts on output. 
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 Model Platform 6.8
The version of the model here was built in Microsoft Excel 2010 and uses the Risk Solver 
Platform V12.5.1.0 built by Frontline Solvers. The ‘Large-Scale SQP Solver Engine’ is 
used to deal with the non-linearity nature of the optimization problem (Frontline Solvers 
2013). 
 Summary 6.9
By modeling water and salt interaction the externalities derived from its use can be tracked 
through spatial and temporal (states of nature only) terms. The direct representation of 
producer behavior towards alternative states is modeled via the adoption of a range of 
state-contingent production systems. Subsequent sections describes the data sources 
used in the model and then Section 8 and Section 9 define the changes to the model 
presented here to model both the Restoring the Balance (RtB) and the Sustainable Rural 
Water Use and Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP) approaches for returning the flow. 
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7. MODEL DATA & ASSUMPTIONS 
The model described in Section 6 requires large amounts of specific data and assumptions 
that define the model’s bounds. The data and assumptions presented in this section have 
been continually collected and modified since 2004 to reflect the availability of new data 
and refinements in the model. As discussed (Section 4.3), a key outcome from the 
contraction stage of water resource development has been the commissioning and 
collection of data to aid in determining the optimal allocation of water resources between 
all users in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) (Commonwealth of Australia 2008). Where 
possible, the data used in this thesis has been aligned to these new publically available 
data sets. However, some data has been provided by third parties during commissioned 
studies. All data and assumptions concerning the final Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin 
Plan), the Restoring the Balance (RtB) and the Sustainable Rural Water Use and 
Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP) have expressly been collected during this thesis.  
 Catchment Management Regions 7.1
To engage in the policy debate, The RSMG Murray-Darling Basin model (Section 6) 
disaggregates the MDB into catchments utilizing the Catchment Management Regions 
(CMR) classification system (represented by Part A in Figure 7-1). The CMR classification 
was chosen as it aligns with political boundaries but these boundaries can be at odds with 
the biophysical boundaries or hydrological realities. For example, the CSIRO Sustainable 
Yields Project (CSIRO 2008) (represented by Part B in Figure 7-1) clearly illustrates that 
hydrological and political boundaries may not harmonize.  
 
Consequently all raw biophysical data sets have been modified to fit the CMR boundaries 
to engage in policy debate. Additionally, to enable greater accuracy in the directed water 
flow network and determine the opportunity cost between regional water users, the CMR 
boundaries were modified as follows. Due to a lack of surface and groundwater 
connectivity the Wimmera is not modeled 56 . The ACT is considered as part of the 
Murrumbidgee CMR. To provide clarity when determining the opportunity costs of utilizing 
                                            
56
 Although the Basin Plan considers the Lachlan CMR as unconnected to the rest of the Basin, the model 
treats the Lachlan CMR as connected. This decision was made as the confluence of Lachlan Rivers is the 
Murrumbidgee River (Kemp 2010) and flows do connect in wet years and unlike the Wimmera CMR, the 
Lachlan CMR recharges groundwater reserves that can be used by the other CMRs in the MDB (Figure 2-5). 
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water resources along the Murray River, the New South Wales (NSW) Murray CMR was 
split into three sub catchments. As illustrated in Figure 6-4 and detailed in Table 6-2, 
Murray 1, Murray 2 and Murray 3 now correspond with the North East CMR, Goulburn-
Broken CMR and North Central CMR.57  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Data for the Directed Flow Network 7.2
This section describes data sets for the exogenous variables required for the flow network: 
water resources 𝜃, the conveyance losses 𝑤𝑐 and the natural salt load 𝐺. This data is also 
used in Equation 6-14 and Equation 6-15 to track the endogenous outcomes for water flow 
between catchments and salinity. 
 Conjunctive Water Resources in the Current Climate 7.2.1
Section 2.4 discussed that the MDB conjunctive water resources are derived from surface 
inflows, groundwater resources and inter-basin transfers and the data for each 𝑘  is 
presented in Table 7-1. Under current climate settings, the MDB has a total of 22,925GL of 
runoff, 2,373GL of groundwater and 1,118GL of water transferred in from the Snowy River, 
providing a total of 26,418GL of conjunctive water resources. For any given catchment the 
total conjunctive water resources is the summation of the runoff, the groundwater 
                                            
57
 For the remainder of the thesis the CMR definition is not used to describe catchments 
Figure 7-1 Difference in Data Gathering & Representation 
 
 
A 
B 
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resources available and any inter-basin transfers. For example, 𝑘1 has a total of 986GL in 
conjunctive water resources of which, 854GL is derived from runoff, 132GL of groundwater 
resources and there are no inter-basin transfers. 
 
Table 7-1 The Basin's Conjunctive Water Resources (GL) 
𝑲 Catchment Runoff1 Groundwater2 Inter-Basin Transfers3 TOTAL 
𝑘1 Condamine  854 132 0 986 
𝑘2 Border Rivers QLD 634 24 0 658 
𝑘3 Warrego Paroo 874 2 0 876 
𝑘4 Namoi 990 224 0 1,214 
𝑘5 Central West 1,536 99 0 1,635 
𝑘6 Maranoa Balonne 482 88 0 570 
𝑘7 Border Rivers Gwydir 1,442 108 0 1,550 
𝑘8 Western 205 79 0 284 
𝑘9 Lachlan 1,114 393 0 1,507 
𝑘10 Murrumbidgee 4,304 355 550 5,209 
𝑘11 North East 4,051 0 284 4,335 
𝑘12 Murray 1 1,626 6 284 1,916 
𝑘13 Goulburn Broken 3,368 486 0 3,854 
𝑘14 Murray 2 465 96 0 561 
𝑘15 North Central 501 0 0 501 
𝑘16 Murray 3 232 87 0 319 
𝑘17 Mallee 100 70 0 170 
𝑘18 Lower Murray-Darling 100 4 0 104 
𝑘19 SA MDB 49 120 0 169 
𝑘20 Adelaide 0 0 0 0 
𝑘21 Coorong     
 TOTAL 22,925 2,373 1,118 26,418 
1 Data obtained from Mallawaarachchi, Adamson, Chambers, et al. (2010) 
2 Data obtained from MDBA (MDBA 2012c) 
3 Total transfers from MDBC (2006a), split by CMR from Wagner, Quiggin and Adamson (2008). 
 
The runoff data is based on the CSIRO Sustainable Yields analysis and was modified to 
align to CMR’s by Mallawaarachchi, Adamson, Chambers, et al. (2010). The groundwater 
extraction levels are based on the Basin Plan’s Sustainable Diversion Limit (SDL) for 
groundwater (Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) 2012c). The Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission (MDBC) (2006a) provided the data for total quantity of inter-basin transfers, 
the assumption that these transfers into the MDB are evenly split between Murrumbidgee 
River and Murray River (North East and Murray1) was set by Wagner, Quiggin and 
Adamson (2008). Climate change impacts on water resources can then be modeled as a 
change to any or all of water conjunctive sources (Section 0), depending on the evaluation 
context. 
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 Conveyance Data 7.2.2
As water flows along the MDB’s river channels, a proportion of the water is lost to the 
ecosystem in the form of infiltration, evaporation, over-banking, dead-end gullies and 
billabongs (Grafton, Chu, et al. 2011; Lester et al. 2011; McMahon & Finlayson 1991; 
Smakhtin 2001). This conveyance loss 𝑤𝑟 is used in Equation 6-14 to alter 𝜃 as water 
flows between catchments. This adjustment defines the ‘Net’ flow (Table 6-2) and 
represents the maximum volume of water available to all users. The data provided in Table 
2-1 was obtained from the CSIRO  
 
Table 7-2 Assumptions Made About Conveyance Loss (%) 
 Conveyance Loss (%)3 
𝑲 Normal Drought Wet 
𝑘1 0.35 0.37 0.30 
𝑘2 0.45 0.47 0.40 
𝑘3 0.83 0.85 0.78 
𝑘4 0.30 0.32 0.25 
𝑘5 0.59 0.61 0.54 
𝑘6 0.43 0.45 0.38 
𝑘7 0.08 0.10 0.03 
𝑘8 0.48 0.50 0.43 
𝑘9 0.30 0.32 0.25 
𝑘10 0.34 0.36 0.29 
𝑘11 0.10 0.12 0.05 
𝑘12 0.10 0.12 0.05 
𝑘13 0.08 0.10 0.03 
𝑘14 0.10 0.12 0.05 
𝑘15 0.25 0.27 0.20 
𝑘16 0.10 0.12 0.05 
𝑘17 0.02 0.04 0.01 
𝑘18 0.01 0.03 0.01 
𝑘19 0.07 0.09 0.02 
𝑘20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
𝑘21 0.03 0.05 0.01 
MDBA data sets provided for Mallawaarachchi, Adamson, Chambers, et al. (2010) 
 
Sustainable Yields project and converted by Mallawaarachchi, Adamson, Chambers, et al. 
(2010) during consultancy work on the Basin-Plan. The data presented illustrates the 
conveyance loss by 𝑆 ∈ Ω by 𝑘 and can be used as follows. In 𝑘1 in the normal state has a 
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𝜃 of 986GL (Table 7-1) and if no irrigation occurred then the volume of water arriving into 
𝑘6 from 𝑘158 would be (1 − .35) × 𝜃 = 640.9𝐺𝐿. 
 
Compared to the normal state of nature conveyance losses increase in the drought state 
and reduce in the wet state of nature to reflect hydrological realities (Lester et al. 2011; 
McMahon & Finlayson 1991). As Adelaide (𝑘20) is modeled as a termination point in the 
model (Table 6-2), its impact on the Coorong’s (𝑘21) water supply is modeled as a direct 
loss from the system (Table 6-2). 
 Salinity 7.2.3
The natural salt load, in tons (T) in the model is a combination of the naturally mobilized 
salt (Austin et al. 2010; Yaron & Bresler 1970), less the salt removed from the MDB via the 
SIS (Section 2.5.2). The term, ‘natural salt load’, is the quantity of salt in the river system 
before irrigation activities alter water quality (Equation 6-15). For simplicity, the model 
assumes that the SIS always chooses to extract 480,000T of salt in all states of nature 
(Table 7-2). 
 
The quantity of mobilized salt has state-contingent properties to reflect the natural and 
management relationships between water and salinity. First, there is a natural and positive 
relationship between the quantity of rainfall and the amount of salt mobilized into the river 
system (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2007; Connor et al. 2012). Second, this 
approach recognizes that managers respond to the relationship between water and salt. 
For example: in drought periods irrigators can engage in deficit irrigation practices 
designed to use less water and maintain salt just below the root zones; and in wet states 
over irrigate to flush salt down the soil profile (Connor et al. 2012; Mallawaarachchi & 
Foster 2009). The model maintains constant endogenous variables for the rate at which 
salt returns to the river system (Section 6.7.6), by state of nature, to prevent salinity being 
double counted. 
 
When compared to the normal state of nature, it was assumed that 50% of the salt 
remains immobilized within the soil in the drought state of nature and in the wet state of 
nature an extra 30% of salt is flushed into the river system (Table 7-2). The data then 
                                            
58 As Table 6-2 illustrates 𝑘1 (Condamine) flows into 𝑘1 (Maranoa-Balonne). 
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predicts that in a drought year over 450,000T of salt are mobilized; this increases to nearly 
919,000T of salt in a normal state of nature and nearly 1.2 million tons of salt being flushed 
into the river system in a wet year. 
 
Table 3 Data for the Natural Salt Load and Salinity Interception Scheme (T) 
 Natural Salt1 
Salinity Mitigation2 𝑲 Normal Drought Wet 
𝑘1 7,035 3,518 9,146 0 
𝑘2 7,818 3,909 10,163 0 
𝑘3 1,672 836 2,174 0 
𝑘4 67,452 33,726 87,688 0 
𝑘5 33,647 16,824 43,741 0 
𝑘6 7,035 3,518 9,146 0 
𝑘7 7,891 3,946 10,258 0 
𝑘8 0 0 0 0 
𝑘9 115,819 57,910 150,565 0 
𝑘10 160,000 80,000 208,000 0 
𝑘11 91,065 45,533 118,385 0 
𝑘12 20,000 10,000 26,000 0 
𝑘13 120,000 60,000 156,000 0 
𝑘14 35,000 17,500 45,500 0 
𝑘15 100,000 50,000 130,000 25,952 
𝑘16 45,000 22,500 58,500 0 
𝑘17 21,431 10,716 27,860 36,954 
𝑘18 20,091 10,046 26,118 188,203 
𝑘19 57,909 28,955 75,282 229,541 
𝑘20     
𝑘21     
TOTAL 918,865 459,433 1,194,525 480,650 
1 Source MDBC pers. comm. Andy Close August 2007 for the Normal State of Nature 
2 Data from MDBA (2011a) 
 CAP Data 7.3
The term CAP data is used to define the maximum volume of surface water and 
groundwater that can be used for consumptive purposes (i.e. the cap on extraction) in 
each 𝑘 and trading region. The CAP data will be used to model the Current Diversion 
Limits (CDL) or the Basin Plan’s SDL (Section 4.1) and the new trading rules stipulated in 
the Basin Plan’s.  
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 Current Diversion Limits (CDL) Data 7.3.1
The current diversions in the MDB by 𝑘 are presented in Table 7-4. 𝑘1 has a CDL surface 
CAP of 587GL, 132GL of groundwater providing a total CDL of 719GL to use on average. 
There is a total of 15,718GL of water diverted in the MDB. 
 
Table 7-4 CDL in the Basin (GL) 
 Current CAP (GL) 
𝑲 Surface Water  Groundwater TOTAL 
𝑘1 587 132 719 
𝑘2 404 24 428 
𝑘3 169 2 171 
𝑘4 508 224 732 
𝑘5 734 99 833 
𝑘6 391 88 479 
𝑘7 753 108 861 
𝑘8 198 79 277 
𝑘9 618 393 1,011 
𝑘10 2,554 355 2,909 
𝑘11 330 0 330 
𝑘12 54 6 60 
𝑘13 1,916 486 2,402 
𝑘14 906 96 1,002 
𝑘15 1,442 0 1,442 
𝑘16 815 87 902 
𝑘17 205 70 275 
𝑘18 97 4 101 
𝑘19 459 120 579 
𝑘20 206 0 206 
𝑘21    
TOTAL 13,345 2,373 15,718 
Data adapted from MDBA (2012c)  
 SDL Data 7.3.2
The SDL by surface water and groundwater and the progress towards achieving this 
reduction are detailed in Table 7-5. The Basin Plan specifies changes to consumptive 
surface diversions by catchment (-1,613GL) and trading zone (-1,564GL) to obtain 
3,194GL for the environment. The MDBA has identified that groundwater in the MDB are 
underutilized and that an additional 929GL should be consumed. Once the Basin Plan is 
implemented, the net contraction in conjunctive water extractions is 2,265GL.  
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Table 7-5 The Net Change in Extractions by Catchment & Region (GL)59 
𝐾 
 
Trading Zone Net Change in Volume Volume 
Obtained 
SRWUIP 
data Groundwater Surface Water 
𝑘1 Northern 62.8 -60.0 16.8  
𝑘2 Northern 47.8 -8.0 5.0  
𝑘3 Northern 132.0 -9.0 9.0  
𝑘4 Northern 0.0 -10.0 10.0  
𝑘5 Northern 8.6 -65.0 65.0  
𝑘6 Northern 41.9 -40.0 11.2  
𝑘7 Northern 128.7 -49.0 5.0  
𝑘8 Northern 95.5 -6.0 0.0  
𝑘9 Unconnected 123.3 -48.0 #65.0  
𝑘10 Southern NSW 0.0 -320.0 173.0  
𝑘11 Southern VIC 0.0 -32.9 32.9  
𝑘12 Southern NSW 0.1 -7.9 7.9  
𝑘13 Southern VIC 32.3 -369.3 369.3  
𝑘14 Southern NSW 1.3 -131.0 131.0  
𝑘15 Southern VIC 0.0 -194.5 194.5  
𝑘16 Southern NSW 1.1 -117.9 117.9  
𝑘17 Southern VIC 142.7 -30.4 30.4  
𝑘18 Southern NSW 0.1 -13.2 13.2  
𝑘19 Southern SA 111.3 -101.0 101.0  
 TOTAL 929.2 -1,613.0 1,358.0  
Further Reduction Trading Zones    
Northern (k =  1 to 8) -143.0   
Southern NSW (k = 10,12, 14,16,18) -462.9  462.9 
Southern VIC (k = 11,13,15,17) -425.3  425.3 
Southern SA (k = 19) -82.8  82.8 
Southern All (k = 10 to 19) -450.0  450.0 
Reduction in the Trading Zones -1,564.0  1,421.0 
TOTAL Surface Reductions* -3,194.0   
TOTAL Net Change (Ground + Surface) -2,265.0   
#
Lachlan’s proposed SDL reduction is 48GL but already 65GL has been returned. 
*difference between Basin Plan and data set due to Wimmera not being modeled. 
Data adapted from MDBA (2012c) 
 
For a single catchment Table 7-5 can be interpreted as follows. 𝑘1 receives an increased 
groundwater SDL of 62.8GL and has a specified reduction in surface extractions of 60GL. 
However, due to the new trading rules the real reduction in 𝑘1 surface water may exceed 
60GL, as 𝑘1 lies within the Northern trading zone (𝑘 = 1 𝑡𝑜 8), that has an identified SDL 
reduction of 143GL. Therefore, 𝑘1 at a minimum must have a reduction in its surface 
diversions of at least 60GL and this may increase up to 203GL, dependent on: the 
opportunity costs for water used in production in 𝑘1. . 𝑘8; biophysical constraints; and the 
Basin Plan’s constraints. Ignoring trade reductions and by comparing Table 7-4 with Table 
                                            
59
The justification for not modeling the Wimmera CMR is presented in Section 7.1 
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7-5, the surface SDL for 𝑘1 is 424.2GL (i.e. 587 - 62.8), 𝑘1’s groundwater SDL is 192GL 
and 𝑘1 total SDL is 716.2.  
 
As of 2012, the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office (CEWO) had already obtained 
1,358GL of surface water for the environment. This leaves 1,836GL of surface water still to 
be obtained and the data suggests that this water will be predominately obtained from 
reductions in trading zones (1,564GL). Table 7-5 also provides assumptions concerning 
the SRWUIP analysis that is presented in Section 9. 
 Water Property Rights 7.4
It is identified in Table 7-6 that over 19,200GL of water rights have been allocated to 
private individuals in the MDB. This comprises of 2,371GL of groundwater entitlements 
and nearly 16,000GL of surface water rights. There are 3,582GL of high security rights, 
7,230GL of general security rights and 6,081GL of supplementary rights (Section 2.5.3). 
For a given catchment the data can be interpreted as follows, irrigators in 𝑘1 have 132GL 
of groundwater licenses, 0GL of high security surface rights, 0GL of general security 
surface rights and 1,398GL of supplementary security rights. 𝑘1 has a total of 1,530GL of 
water entitlements. The middle set of numbers in Table 7-6, summarizes the publically 
available data for the RtB program (see Section 8). This includes the CEWO’s willingness 
to pay for each alternative property right ($/Megalitre (ML)) by catchment The last set of 
numbers then transforms the RtB cost per ML into an annuity per ML to determine the 
annuity a producer would receive from the sale of surface entitlements by 𝑘 (see Section 
8.2.1). This data can be interpreted, as 𝑘1 no high or general security entitlements, the 
RtB could only purchase supplementary rights at a cost $860/ML (see Section 8.2 for 
greater discussion in regards to this data) and this would provide the irrigators with an 
annuity of $81 per ML. 
 
Table 7-7 provides the estimated reliability of each surface entitlement by 𝑠 and by 𝑘. This 
data was estimated against historic CAP diversions (Chart 3-1) and the assumption that 
high security water is 95% reliable on average, which is comparable to the 99% estimation 
provided in Section 2.5.3.  
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Table 7-6 Entitlements by Catchment, the Costs to Purchase Under the RtB and Their Annuity Value for Irrigators 
 Entitlement Security (GL)1  Cost to Purchase ($/ML)2 Annuity from Water Sale ($/ML) 
𝑲 Ground High General Supplementary High General Supplementary High General Supplementary 
𝑘1 132   1,398   $860   $81.14 
𝑘2 24   587   $860   $81.14 
𝑘3 2   125 $0 $0 $161   $15.20 
𝑘4 224 5 286 255 $2,050 $1,593 $161 $193.51 $150.39 $15.20 
𝑘5 99 18 632 143 $2,050 $1,268 $161 $193.51 $119.69 $15.20 
𝑘6 88   932   $161   $15.20 
𝑘7 108 16 773 375 $2,922 $860 $161 $275.80 $81.14 $15.20 
𝑘8 79   196   $161   $15.20 
𝑘9 393 31 615 68 $2,050 $683 $161 $193.51 $64.47 $15.20 
𝑘10 355 377 1,888 697 $1,704 $914 $218 $160.85 $86.28 $20.58 
𝑘11 0 196 79 61 $1,933 $1,133 $193 $182.46 $106.95 $18.22 
𝑘12 6 6 50 20 $1,967 $1,133 $193 $185.67 $106.95 $18.22 
𝑘13 486 1,221 706 139 $2,059 $1,122 $196 $194.33 $105.89 $18.46 
𝑘14 96 96 834 334 $1,967 $1,133 $196 $185.67 $106.95 $18.46 
𝑘15 0 913 432 161 $2,065 $1,133 $199 $194.93 $106.95 $18.80 
𝑘16 87 86 750 301 $1,967 $1,122 $199 $185.67 $105.89 $18.80 
𝑘17 70 156 73 12 $2,066 $1,133 $199 $195.02 $106.95 $18.78 
𝑘18 4 11 111 275 $1,967 $1,107 $161 $185.67 $104.49 $15.20 
𝑘19 120 449 0 0 $2,099   $198.13   
TOTAL 2,373 3,582 7,230 6,081       
1 Data adapted from Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) (2011) 
2 Data adapted from SEWPaC (2013) 
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Table 7-7 Estimated Reliability of Entitlements by Climate State (%) 
 Normal Drought Wet 
𝑲 High General Supplementary High General Supplementary High General Supplementary 
𝑘1   0.20   0.15   0.60 
𝑘2   0.40   0.30   0.60 
𝑘3   0.30   0.20   0.60 
𝑘4 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.75 0.40 0.20 1.00 0.90 0.60 
𝑘5 1.00 0.60 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.15 1.00 0.75 0.60 
𝑘6   0.20 0.75 0.20 0.15 1.00 0.80 0.60 
𝑘7 1.00 0.55 0.20 0.75 0.15 0.10 1.00 0.80 0.55 
𝑘8   0.50   0.20   0.60 
𝑘9 1.00 0.40 0.30 0.75 0.15 0.10 1.00 0.75 0.60 
𝑘10 1.00 0.80 0.35 0.75 0.40 0.20 1.00 0.90 0.80 
𝑘11 1.00 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.50 0.05 1.00 0.95 0.75 
𝑘12 1.00 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.50 0.05 1.00 0.95 0.75 
𝑘13 1.00 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.50 0.05 1.00 0.95 0.75 
𝑘14 1.00 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.50 0.05 1.00 0.95 0.75 
𝑘15 1.00 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.50 0.05 1.00 0.95 0.75 
𝑘16 1.00 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.50 0.05 1.00 0.95 0.75 
𝑘17 1.00 0.70 0.15 0.75 0.40 0.05 1.00 0.80 0.75 
𝑘18 1.00 0.50 0.10 0.75 0.20 0.05 1.00 0.80 0.60 
𝑘19 1.00   0.80   1.00   
Authors own estimate, data matched to existing CDL. 
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This deliberate strategy is used in Section 8 to highlight the value of water security 
provided by each alternative property right classes. 𝑘1 Illustrates that, in the absence of 
high and general rights, no allocation is given for those rights but supplementary water 
rights are estimated to have a reliability factor of 0.2, 0.15 and 0.6 in the normal, drought 
and wet states of nature for each ML of water owned by irrigators. When multiplying the 
data from Table 7-6 and Table 7-7, 𝑘1 irrigators would be allocated 210, 280 and 839GL of 
water in the drought, normal and wet states of nature60. 
 Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources 7.5
Section 4.4.1, discussed that The Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut 2008, 2011) 
provided the initial policy platform on which Australia’s response to climate change was 
founded (Quiggin, Adamson & Quiggin 2014). The data underpinning Table 7-8, was 
provided by The Garnaut Climate Change review and was first used by Quiggin et al. 
(2008). Despite advances in climate change forecasting and the determination of changes 
to runoff, the data has not been updated to provide a comparison to other papers (Quiggin 
et al. 2010) and reports (Adamson, Quiggin & Quiggin 2011)61.  
 
The data in Table 7-8 is based on The Garnaut Climate Change Review’s ‘450ppm 
average scenario’ (450 Avg)62 (Garnaut Climate Change Review 2008), which is a strong 
policy response to climate change and offers an optimistic vision for the future. Despite 
proactive worldwide action to curb carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2-e) emissions, it is 
anticipated that… 
[c]hanges in rainfall will lead to twice the percentage change in runoff for 
catchments in wet and temperate climates, while the changes in runoff are even 
greater for catchments in more arid regions” (Austin et al. 2010, p. 608). 
 
The data in Table 7-8, provide a weak representation of Austin et al. (2010) findings. The 
percentage reduction in runoff for arid catchments are generally less than or equal to 80% 
of current runoff levels and wetter catchments are expected to receive 80% or greater of 
                                            
60
Section 8.3.2 discusses the limitation associated with these values and approach to determine the 
availability of water resources and their inherent value to irrigators. 
61 The limitations associated with converting runoff to rainfall were discussed in Section 2.4 and extended in 
Section 3.2 in regards to climate change. 
 
62
 The 450 Avg Scenario was detailed in Section 4.3.1. 
 138 
 
their current runoff values. However, it is the spatial patterns of climate change that have 
the greatest influence on runoff as despite both 𝑘2  (Border Rivers-QLD) and  𝑘13 
(Goulburn-Broken) experiencing a 20% decline in runoff, the net loss in 𝑘13  (637GL) 
exceeds current runoff in 𝑘2 (6344GL). 
 
Table 7-8 Current Surface Runoff (GL) & Impact of Climate Scenarios (%) 
 Current Climate 450 Avg1 
𝑲 Runoff (GL) 2050 2100 
𝑘1 854 79% 78% 
𝑘2 634 80% 78% 
𝑘3 874 79% 78% 
𝑘4 990 83% 82% 
𝑘5 1,536 84% 83% 
𝑘6 482 79% 78% 
𝑘7 1,442 84% 83% 
𝑘8 205 82% 81% 
𝑘9 1,114 83% 82% 
𝑘10 4,304 84% 82% 
𝑘11 4,051 85% 84% 
𝑘12 1,626 82% 80% 
𝑘13 3,368 80% 78% 
𝑘14 465 82% 80% 
𝑘15 501 79% 77% 
𝑘16 232 82% 80% 
𝑘17 100 78% 77% 
𝑘18 100 81% 79% 
𝑘19 49 74% 72% 
TOTAL 22,925 18,858 18,590 
‘Snowy River Inflows’ 1,118 86% 85% 
MDB 24,043 19,818 19,543 
Reduction  18% 19% 
1 Data provided by Garnaut Climate Change Review, the conversion of rainfall to runoff detailed 
in Quiggin et al. (2010)  
 
Unlike Quiggin et al. (2010) which applied the climate change runoff reductions to all 
conjunctive water resources, this thesis assumes that groundwater extractions are resilient 
to climate change as the Basin Plan increases the groundwater SDL. As discussed, the 
Basin Plan was developed to rebalance the share of water resources and that climate 
change was a real threat to the success of the plan (Section 4.6.3). Thus the decision to 
increase groundwater SDL should not have been made without due diligence and it has 
been assumed that the new groundwater SDL should be resilient to a changing climate.  
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 Commodities 7.6
Section 6.6 identified the 18 commodities that the SCA model uses to develop the state-
contingent production systems. This section describes the datasets for these 18 
commodities, how they were developed, modified and the assumptions used. The data 
presented in the sub-sections of this section includes, regional input and output data, 
estimations on capital costs, production area, and average farm size. From this point of the 
thesis, the label Adelaide is used to ensure that Adelaide receives 206GL of water 
annually and the term dryland provides a mechanism to track land as it transitions 
between dryland and irrigated land use when alternative scenarios are examined. 
 Commodity Inputs and Outputs 7.6.1
Regional gross margin budgets (GMB) were collected at a catchment level and all prices 
are provided in 2009 values. The GMB’s were used to obtain estimates of yield (output), 
water used and input costs for each commodity (Table 7-9). The list of GMB collected is 
provided in Appendix B.63  
 
Table 7-9 GMB Data Collected for Each Commodity 
Column  Description  
Catchment  Catchment name 𝑘 
Yield Average yield per hectare of the commodity in 𝑘 
Price Average real price of the commodity in the 𝑘 
Labor  Average number of work hours per hectare for hired labor 
Lab. Chg. Average real hired labor costs per hour 
Tractor Hr Average number of machinery hours per hectare 
Water Average water volume (in ML) required per hectare 
Water Price Constant water price of $25/ML  
Chemicals Average real costs per hectare of total chemicals required 
Contractor Average real costs per hectare for contractors  
Machinery  Average real costs of machinery per hectare  
OVC Average real other variable costs per hectare 
VC Excl. Water Total variable costs per hectare excluding water costs 
 
Where GMB data was not available by 𝑘, a series of rules (Table 7-10) were established to 
fill data gaps and these rules were applied in descending order in an attempt to match the 
closest agronomic zones.  
                                            
63 The raw data for each 𝑚 × 𝑘 × 𝑠 is not provided in this thesis due to word limits but is available from 
http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/docs/2010_RSMG_Model_Documentation_11_Jan_2010.pdf 
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Table 7-10 Rules for Constructing Missing GMB Data 
State CMR Data to use Options 
Q
L
D
  All QLD  1. Condamine Data 
2. Average of NSW 
3. Average of VIC  
4. Average of SA  
N
S
W
 
 Namoi  
 Border Rivers Gwydir 
1. Equal to each other 
2. Average of NSW 
3. Average of QLD 
4. Average of VIC 
5. Average of SA 
 Western  1. Average of (Namoi+Central West) 
2. Average of NSW 
3. Average of QLD 
4. Average of VIC  
5. Average of SA 
 Lachlan  1. Average of (Central West+Murrumbidgee) 
2. Average of NSW 
3. Average of QLD 
4. Average of VIC 
5. Average of SA 
 Murrumbidgee Murray1 
 Murray2  
 Murray3 
1. Equal to each other 
2. Average of NSW 
3. Average of VIC 
4. Average of QLD 
5. Average of SA 
 Lower Murray-Darling 1. Average of (Murray/Murrumbidgee/Lachlan) 
2. Average of NSW 
3. Average of SA 
4. Average of VIC 
5. Average of QLD 
V
IC
 
 ALL VIC CMRs 1. Average of VIC 
2. Average of (Murray/Murrumbidgee) 
3. Average of NSW 
4. Average of SA 
5. Average of QLD 
S
A
 
 SA MDB 1. Average of (Murray/Murrumbidgee) 
2. Average NSW 
3. Average of VIC 
4. Average of QLD 
 
This created GMB data was calibrated against known area production data (summarized 
for the MDB in Table 3-1, Table 7-13 and Table 7-12) to ensure that each 𝑘 only produced 
crops that had a history of past production within that 𝑘 . This calibration assumption 
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prevents new commodities from being established but also prevents unrealistic expansion 
of cotton into SA and rice into Warrego-Paroo.64  
 Capital Costs 7.6.2
The capital cost required to operate one Ha of a given commodity is an annual repayment 
derived from the total cost to establish the commodity per Ha plus the total equipment 
capital required to run the farm divided by the total farm size (Table 7-11). It is assumed 
that all capital costs are repaid over a 20 year period at 7% interest. The sources of 
information used to determine average farm size in each 𝑘  by commodity group is 
provided in Table 7-12. 65 
 
Table 7-11 Capital Costs by Commodity ($) 
Commodity Name Establishment Cost/HA Equipment Required 
Citrus-H $23,056 $720,259 
Citrus-L $22,454 $720,259 
Grapes $16,125 $680,000 
Stone Fruit-H $34,184 $720,259 
Stone Fruit-L $34,184 $720,259 
Pome Fruit $34,184 $720,259 
Vegetables $2,765 $738,125 
Cotton $4,400 $3,083,000 
Rice $4,400 $999,500 
Wheat $2,000 $949,500 
Dairy-H $3,259 $2,445,496 
Dairy-L $3,259 $2,445,496 
Sheep/Wheat $2,630 $1,697,498 
Data adapted from Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) (2003), Falivene 
(2003), Hassalls & Associates (2000) Johnson (1998) and Queensland Department of Natural Resources 
Mines and Water (QDNRM&W) (2004a); (2004b, 2004c) 
 
Although, the use of constant figures for establishment and equipment for each commodity 
in all catchments is simplistic, it rewards irrigators who have economies of scale in the 
Northern Murray-Darling Basin (NMDB) (Table 7-12). The model then also assumes that 
all irrigators specialize in one state-contingent production system (see next Section 
section). 
                                            
64
 Past modeling experiments have allowed for the utilization of user-defined commodity datasets to reflect 
production opportunities associated with climate change. 
65
 The assumptions concerning interest rates and farm size have remained fixed since 2010, allowing for 
comparison with prior studies. As the interest rate increases, fixed costs rise decreasing the net profit per Ha 
(Appendix A). As the area of land increases fixed costs decrease increasing profit per Ha.  
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Table 7-12 Default Farm Size in Basin by Catchment (Ha) 
𝑲 Citrus-H & L1 Grapes Stone-Fruit-H&L Pome Fruit Vegetables Cotton Rice Wheat2 Dairy Sheep 
𝑘1 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 0 500 277 600 
𝑘2 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 0 500 277 600 
𝑘3 0 45 0 0 40 3,000 0 500 277 600 
𝑘4 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 0 500 277 600 
𝑘5 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 0 500 324 600 
𝑘6 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 0 500 277 600 
𝑘7 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 0 500 277 600 
𝑘8 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 0 500 277 600 
𝑘9 40 45 40 40 40 3,000 400 500 324 600 
𝑘10 20 45 20 20 20 500 400 500 342 600 
𝑘11 20 45 20 20 20 0 400 300 173 600 
𝑘12 20 45 20 20 20 500 400 500 215 600 
𝑘13 20 45 20 30 20 0 400 300 215 600 
𝑘14 20 45 20 20 20 500 400 500 215 600 
𝑘15 20 45 20 20 20 0 400 300 215 600 
𝑘16 20 45 20 20 20 500 400 500 215 600 
𝑘17 30 45 30 20 20 0 400 300 215 600 
𝑘18 20 45 20 20 20 300 0 300 215 600 
𝑘19 20 45 20 20 20 300 0 300 400 600 
Data adapted from ABARE (2003), Alexander and Kokic (2005), McGuckian (2002), PC (2002, 2005), Patton and Mullen (2001), Hardman and Strahan 
(2000), URS Sustainable Development (2004), Unknown (2006), Alexander & Heaney (2003),Gordon (2004), Appels, Douglas and Dwyer (2004) and 
Wimalasuriya, Hamilton and Goldsworthy (2002) Brennan, JP, Sykes and Scott (2005) 
1 Commodities cannot be produced in a catchment when they have a farm size of 0 Ha  
2 Note all other broadacre crops use are assumed to be identical in size to wheat farms 
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 Area of Production 7.6.3
Equation 6-12 and Equation 6-13 provided the upper bounds for structural irrigation 
investment patterns to change to horticultural production systems and the total area 
irrigated by 𝑘. The raw bounds for irrigation investment are detailed in Table 7-13 and 
Sections 8.2.2 and 9.3.3 describe how this data was altered to represent changes in 
investment patterns created by the alternative signals from policy. 
 
Table 7-13 Area Irrigated (Ha) 
𝑲 Horticulture TOTAL 
𝑘1 2,394 56,188 
𝑘2 4,394 58,335 
𝑘3 109 19,653 
𝑘4 423 94,152 
𝑘5 5,115 86,362 
𝑘6 214 29,709 
𝑘7 478 141,564 
𝑘8 715 34,930 
𝑘9 7,876 105,017 
𝑘10 25,577 305,212 
𝑘11 3,159 14,165 
𝑘12 616 12,269 
𝑘13 11,618 222,478 
𝑘14 1,688 152,286 
𝑘15 5,710 241,460 
𝑘16 1,189 111,740 
𝑘17 28,465 50,505 
𝑘18 8,394 18,477 
𝑘19 37,382 63,661 
TOTAL 145,517 1,818,162 
Adapted from Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2004) 
 Production Price Data 7.6.4
It has been assumed that due to the small country assumption that the price paid by state 
of nature remained constant for all irrigated commodities (Table 7-14). However, both 
Adelaide and dryland production systems use alternative prices by state of nature, as this 
then allows price to describe all salient features of those state-contingent production 
systems. 
 144 
 
Table 7-14 Price Received per Unit of production 
Commodity Name State of Nature Unit 
Normal Drought Wet 
Citrus $600 $600 $600 T 
Grapes $950 $950 $950 T 
Grapes $1,600 $1,600 $1,600 T 
Stone Fruit $1,300 $1,300 $1,300 T 
Pome Fruit $720 $720 $720 T 
Vegetables $620 $620 $620 Bale + seed 
Cotton $260 $260 $260 T 
Rice $210 $210 $210 T 
Wheat $350 $350 $350 T 
Grain Legumes $600 $600 $600 T 
Sorghum $185 $185 $185 T 
Oilseeds $380 $380 $380 T 
Chickpeas $300 $300 $300 T 
Dairy $0.35 $0.35 $0.35 Liter 
Fat Lambs $45 $45 $45 $/DSE 
Beef $60 $60 $60 $/DSE 
Adelaide $1,000 $1,500 $1,000 ML 
Coorong $50 $0 $65 HA 
Data based on past prices and data from the GMB datasets. 
 SCA Production Systems 7.7
The state-contingent approach examines how the state of nature (e.g. droughts and 
floods) influences the management strategy to alter the inputs used to produce state 
specific outputs. For example, shiraz grapes produced in periods of low water supply have 
more smaller berries than grapes produced with normal water supply. Smaller berries then 
increase the grape skin to moisture ratio and can produce a higher quality wine (Ojeda et 
al. 2002).  
 
The transformation of commodities into SCA production systems, allows for irrigation 
management practices to be reflected both within and between states of nature. As similar 
state of natures, with identical outcomes, can be combined to keep the state space small, 
the model has merged similar commodities with similar management strategies into 
generic production systems (see Citrus below) to reduce the model size.  
 
The description of each of the 23 state-contingent production systems 𝑥 is documented 
below and Table 7-15 illustrates how the state-contingent production systems alter the 
inputs used and outputs obtained by state of nature. In Table 7-15, the multiplier for 𝑍 
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alters output, the term ‘water’ is a multiple for the water used and the heading ‘VC’ either 
increases or decreases the variable costs per Ha by the described dollar value. The Citrus 
production system is used to illustrate, how the variables 𝑍, ‘water’ and ‘VC’ are used to 
transform the normal states production data to production data for the drought and wet 
state of nature. 
 The Horticultural State-Contingent Production Systems 7.7.1
Citrus 
The citrus production system is designed to reflect strategies used by grapefruit, lemon, 
lime, mandarin and orange producers to deal with changing states of water availability. 
Producers can utilize either –H or –L irrigation technology (Section 6.6) to produce citrus 
crops.  
 
When compared to the normal state of nature, a Citrus-H producer operating in a drought 
state of nature, will allocate the same volume of water but receive a 20% reduction in 
output and face increased variable costs of $20/Ha (Table 7-15). When the wet state of 
nature is experienced, the producer increases water consumption by 120%, in part to help 
flush salt away from the root zone. Yield is expected to increase by 20% per Ha in a wet 
state of nature and this then requires an additional expenditure of $20/Ha to manage and 
harvest the crop (Table 7-15).  
 
The paradox of water-use efficiency and management flexibility to deal with water scarcity 
was discussed in Section 9.6.2. The state-contingent production systems reflect this 
paradox via the reduction in output experienced in the drought state of nature. When 
compared to the normal state of nature, Citrus-L and Citrus-H output declines by 10% and 
20% respectively when compared to the normal sate of nature.  
 
Grapes  
The grape production system reflects the changes in output (i.e. tons of grapes), water 
used and variable costs experienced by table and wine grape producers as they adapt to 
alternative states of nature. 
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Table 7-15 Data for the State-Contingent Productions  
𝑋 Production 
System Name 
Normal Drought Multipliers and Costs Wet Multipliers and Costs 
 Commodity Commodity 𝒁 Water VC Commodity 𝒁 Water VC 
𝑥1 Citrus-H Citrus-H Citrus-H 0.8 1.0 $20 Citrus-H 1.2 1.2 $20 
𝑥2 Citrus-L Citrus-L Citrus-L 0.9 1.0 $0 Citrus-L 1.2 1.2 $100 
𝑥3 Grapes Grapes Grapes 0.9 1.0 $20 Grapes 1.2 1.2 $20 
𝑥4 Stone Fruit-H Stone Fruit-H Stone Fruit-H 0.8 1.0 $20 Stone Fruit-H 1.2 1.2 $20 
𝑥5 Stone Fruit-L Stone Fruit-L Stone Fruit-L 0.9 1.0 $0 Stone Fruit-L 1.2 1.2 $100 
𝑥6 Pome Fruit Pome Fruit Pome Fruit 0.9 1.0 $20 Pome Fruit 1.2 1.2 $20 
𝑥7 Vegetables Vegetables Melons 1.0 1.0 $0 Fresh Tomatoes 1.0 1.0 $0 
𝑥8 Cotton Flex Cotton  Dryland Cotton 1.0 1.0 $0 Cotton 1.0 1.0 $100 
𝑥9 Cotton Fixed Cotton Fixed Cotton Fixed 1.0 1.0 $0 Cotton Fixed 1.0 1.0 $0 
𝑥10 Cotton/Chickpea Cotton Chickpea 1.0 1.0 $0 Cotton 1.0 1.0 $100 
𝑥11 Cotton Wet Dryland Cotton Dryland Cotton 0.8 1.0 $0 Cotton 0.9 1.2 $100 
𝑥12 Rice PS Rice PSN Rice PSD 1.0 1.0 $0 Rice PSW 1.1 1.1 $0 
𝑥13 Rice Flex Rice PSB Dryland Wheat 1.0 1.0 $0 Rice PSW 1.0 1.2 $100 
𝑥14 Rice Wet Dryland Wheat Dryland Wheat 1.0 1.0 $0 Rice PSW 0.95 1.2 $100 
𝑥15 Wheat Wheat Wheat 0.8 1.0 $0 Wheat 1.1 1.2 $50 
𝑥16 Wheat Legume Wheat Legume Normal Wheat Legume Dry 1.0 1.0 $0 Wheat Legume Wet 1.0 1.0 $0 
𝑥17 Sorghum Sorghum Sorghum 0.8 1.0 $0 Sorghum 1.1 1.2 $100 
𝑥18 Oilseeds Oilseeds Oilseeds 0.8 1.0 $0 Oilseeds 1.1 1.0 $0 
𝑥19 Sheep Wheat Sheep Wheat Normal Sheep Wheat Dry 1.0 1.0 $50 Sheep Wheat Wet 1.0 1.0 $0 
𝑥20 Dairy-H Dairy-H Dairy-H 0.9 0.7 $300 Dairy-H 1.5 1.2 $0 
𝑥21 Dairy-L Dairy-L Dairy-L 0.8 0.6 $300 Dairy-L 1.2 1.2 $0 
𝑥22 Dryland Dryland Dryland 1.0 1.0 $0 Dryland 1.0 1.0 $0 
𝑥23 Adelaide Adelaide Adelaide 1.0 1.0 $0 Adelaide 1.0 1.0 $0 
H= intensive irrigation capital (e.g. drip lines). 
L = low irrigation capital (e.g. furrows). 
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Stone fruit 
Stone fruit production systems reflect the management systems used by apricot, cherry, 
nectarine, peach and plum producers as they alter their inputs by state of nature. 
 
Pome Fruit 
The pome fruit state-contingent production system detail changes in inputs and outputs by 
state of nature, for the apple and pear industry in the MDB. 
 
Vegetables 
The term vegetables is used to describe a range of regional irrigated vegetable production 
alternatives, including asparagus, beetroot, broccoli, cabbage, capsicum, carrot, 
cauliflower, eggplant, garlic, lettuce, onion, potato, pumpkin, rockmelon, sweet corn, 
tomato, watermelon and zucchini. 
 
“In the normal state, the vegetable production activity is represented by an average 
return from a range of alternative irrigated vegetable crops. In the drought state, 
water resources are conserved by planting only a dryland rockmelon crop. In the 
wet state, all resources are transferred to producing tomatoes for the fresh market” 
(Quiggin et al. 2010, p. 542). 
 The Broadacre State-Contingent Production Systems 7.7.2
Cotton (Fixed Rotation) or Cotton Fixed 
“To assist pest management, and sustain soil fertility, cotton is produced on a 
rotation system, represented here as allowing for two years of irrigated cotton 
production and one year of dryland agriculture over a three-year cycle. The simplest 
way of managing such a system is a three-field rotation, in which one-third of the 
land area is rotated out of irrigation each year” (Adamson, Mallawaarachchi & 
Quiggin 2007, p. 270). 
 
Cotton (Flexible Rotation) of Cotton Flex 
“We also model an alternative rotation system in which the entire land area is 
allocated to dryland agriculture in dry years, and to cotton production in wet years. 
Since this activity requires more active management it incurs a cost penalty relative 
to the Fixed Rotation activity which has the same average yield. However, if 
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producers face variable state-contingent prices for water (or variable shadow prices 
associated with constraints), they may choose to adopt this activity” (Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi & Quiggin 2007, p. 270). 
 
Cotton/Chickpea 
The cotton/chickpea state-contingent production system mimics the ‘Cotton Flex’ 
production option but instead of allocating resources to a dryland crop in the drought state 
of nature, inputs are allocated towards an irrigated chickpea crop. 
 
Cotton Wet 
The ‘cotton wet’ production system is designed to model opportunistic irrigation practices 
that occur in the NMDB when supplementary property rights are most secure in the wet 
state of nature (Section 7.4). For this production system… 
“[t]he producer produces an irrigated cotton crop only in the wet state of nature. In 
other states of nature, dryland grain cropping is undertaken.(Quiggin et al. 2010, p. 
542). 
 
Rice PSN 
The Rice PSN was designed to illustrate how rice is produced in the Southern Murray-
Darling Basin (SMDB) and is similar in design to the cotton fixed rotation. This production 
system divides each Ha of Rice PSN, into 1/3 of the area planted to rice and the remaining 
2/3 grows wheat, to reflect industry practices. In a normal state of nature, once the rice 
crop is harvested, farmers take advantage of residual soil moisture by producing a 
vegetable crop, and 10% of this production is assumed to be derived from the Rice PSN. 
In the drought state (Rice PSD) this vegetable crop cannot be produced and in the wet 
state of nature (Rice PSW), 15% of vegetable returns are due to the rice crop. 
 
Rice Flex  
The ‘Rice Flex’ production system was designed to mimic the ‘Cotton Flex’ system for the 
rice industry as it allows producers to allocate resources towards producing a dryland 
wheat crop in the drought state of nature. 
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Rice Wet 
The ‘Rice Wet’ provides the opportunity for the rice industry to respond to years when 
water is plentiful. Like the ‘Cotton Wet’ system, irrigation only occurs in the wet state of 
nature and in all other states of nature a dryland wheat crop is produced. To reflect this 
opportunistic behavior by non-specialist producers, a yield penalty of 5% has been applied 
(Table 7-15). 
 
Wheat  
The wheat system produces an irrigated crop of wheat in every state of nature.  
 
Wheat/Legume 
Rotation cropping practices provide output benefits and greater efficiency of input use 
(McNeill & Penfold 2009); as each crop in the rotation requires different bundles of inputs, 
adaption to a state can be inferred if resources are reallocated. To represent this 
management option the Wheat/Legumes production system was created and ‘Legume’ is 
a default commodity derived from the available legume crops each 𝑘 , which includes 
adzuki bean, chickpea, fava bean, mungbean, navy bean, peanut and soybean.  
 
The farmer’s adaption to water availability is represented by altering the percentage of 
land dedicated to the wheat and legume crop in each Ha and to reflect the benefits of 
investing in rotation wheat output is increased by 10% in each state of nature. Land 
allocation between wheat and legumes occurs at a rate of 50/50, 100/0 and 30/70 for the 
normal, drought and wet state of nature respectively. 
 
Oil Seeds 
The oil seed production system provides the opportunity for irrigators to invest in producing 
canola and/or sunflowers, depending on what can be produced in each 𝑘. 
 
Sheep/Wheat 
“This production activity represents a state-contingent production plan where 
producers allocate resources between sheep and wheat production in response to 
climatic conditions and market forces. The production mix between the two outputs 
is 50% wheat and 50% sheep in the normal state, 90% sheep and 10%wheat in the 
drought state, and 30% sheep and 70%wheat in the wet state. Effort is placed in 
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keeping the breeding stock alive during the drought state while in wet states there is 
plenty of fodder available on the non-irrigated pasture, and irrigated land can be 
allocated to wheat production”(Quiggin et al. 2010, p. 542). 
 
Dairy 
Section 3.6.1 outlined that during the Millennium drought, one adaption strategy employed 
by dairy producers was the trading of water to purchase feed. The ‘Dairy’ production 
system modeled here does not include the capacity to trade water in the drought state but 
rather assumes that all water is used on farm to reflect the ability of dairy producers to 
respond to water supplies by increasing or decreasing the total area irrigated within a 
property and compensating feed deficiencies by purchasing feed. The data used to 
construct Chart 7-1 to describe the changing area irrigated is for illustration purposes only.  
 
A dairy producer has the choice of producing dryland or irrigated pasture on their farm. To 
represent the decision maker’s response to the availability of water, the proportion of each 
Ha that is irrigated alters by state of nature. Using the data for Dairy- H (Table 7-15), the 
water multiplier for the drought and wet state of nature is 0.7 and 1.2, respectively. The 
impact of this state described water multiplier then means that in a drought state of nature 
only 40% of each Ha is irrigated, in the normal state of nature 80% of the Ha is irrigated 
and in the wet state of nature the entire Ha is irrigated (Chart 7-1). To compensate for the 
lack of feed in the drought state of nature, an additional $300 is spent per Ha purchasing 
supplements (Table 7-15) but despite feeding cattle, output decreases by 10%. But in a 
wet state of nature, no additional feed is required and output increases by 50%. 
 
Chart 7-1 Proportion of a Hectare Irrigated by State of Nature (%) 
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 Summary 7.8
This section has described the data and underlying assumptions used in this thesis and 
the RSMG Murray-Darling Basin model. To evaluate the net change in property rights, the 
RtB and the SRWUIP, some modification to the datasets and assumptions occurred and 
are documented in the subsequent sections.  
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8. OPTIONS FOR RESTORING THE BALANCE: PROPERTY RIGHTS 
On one hand the Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan) sends a strong signal that 
the Restore the Balance (RtB) program has $3.1 billion to purchase up to 3,200GL of 
water from irrigators for the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office (CEWO) 
and on the other hand the Basin Plan allows for an additional 929GL of groundwater 
to be used. This new conjunctive Sustainable Diversion Limits66 (SDL) then creates 
mixed signals about water use, as in some catchments the conjunctive SDL has 
increased (Table 7-5).  
 
To reinforce the Basin Plans’ mixed signals on water use, this thesis has assumed 
that all new groundwater is 100% secure in all states of nature. This simplifying 
assumption has been made as it would appear to counter the design of the final 
Basin Plan, which as discussed is designed to deal with over allocation problems 
and is aware about climatic risks (Section 4.4). This increased access to a highly 
secure entitlement creates a contrast as the three alternative surface water 
entitlements have unique water security properties, by type and location, ranging 
from being up to 95% reliable, to only being allocated in wet years (Section 2.5.3). 
As value of water entitlements is positively correlated with their security, the Basin 
Plan may create a wealth transfer for some irrigators.  
 
The spatial and temporal reliability of the alternative surface water rights will 
determine if the RtB can purchase an optimal bundle (a spatial mix of all three 
surface rights) or portfolio67 of entitlements that can achieve the Basin Plan’s social 
and environmental constraints, for $3.1 billion. However, the RtB was initiated before 
the Basin Plan was developed and its implementation created concern in both the 
wider rural community and the economics discipline (The Senate 2010). The 
objective of this section is to disentangle the mixed signals that are associated with 
the RtB purchasing surface rights from irrigators, yet increase the groundwater SDL.  
                                            
66
 Conjunctive SDL is the net change between the surface SDL and the groundwater SDL. 
 
67
 For simplicity, portfolio can be used as either the RtB strategy for purchasing water or as portfolio of 
rights (i.e. common property) owned by the CEWO .  
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This analysis will therefore separate the groundwater and surface water used by 
irrigators. This approach then allows for the examination of the optimal portfolio 
characteristics (i.e. the spatial distribution and entitlements purchased from 
irrigators) that the RtB will need to purchase for the CEWO and a determination of 
how climate change may alter the characteristics of the portfolio. By knowing the 
required portfolio characteristics the RtB then sends clear signals to irrigators about 
their opportunity cost of utilizing water for irrigation or selling their surface entitlement 
to the CEWO. The separation of groundwater then provides transparent water 
security signals from all entitlements to emerge and the value of having increased 
access to groundwater can be determined. 
 
To undertake the analysis, firstly a discussion concerning the irrigator’s acceptance 
and the public uncertainty of the RtB impacts on communities is examined. This 
discussion also includes defining how the RtB was implemented and the conditions 
required for its optimization. The section then details how the SCA model, described 
in Section 6, was altered, and the datasets and assumptions needed to undertake 
this study were developed. Seven scenarios have been developed to examine how 
and why the development of the CEWO portfolio needs to anticipate climate change. 
These scenarios can also be used to examine if the CEWO’s portfolio can provide 
the welfare gains that are anticipated from developing common property (Section 
4.3.1). The results also examine how the characteristics of CEWO portfolio may 
adapt in response to the climate, and how wealth alters from the conjunctive SDL. A 
wider discussion on the results is used to explore the outcomes and limitations of the 
analysis. Final comments about the RtB process and the mixed water security 
signals are then provided. 
 The RtB, Its Acceptance, Its Operation and the Necessary Conditions for 8.1
Optimality 
Wheeler and Cheesman (2013) provide a comprehensive review of the irrigator’s 
involvement in the RtB process. Their survey results suggested that, not only did 
irrigators actively engage in the RtB process but 80% of irrigators believed their 
decision to sell water to the CEWO, provided positive business outcomes. The 50% 
of irrigators who had been involved in the RtB process and who still had water to sell, 
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believed that they would consider engaging with the RtB in the future (Wheeler & 
Cheesman 2013).  
 
Concerns about the optimal allocation of public funding and the RtB process were 
raised when the CEWO announced that the RtB would have ‘no regrets’ in 
purchasing water (Adamson et al. 2010; Crase, Dollery & O’Keefe 2011). These 
concerns arose as: the RtB started purchasing water before work on the Basin Plan 
had commenced, raising concerns that the water rights purchased may not 
contribute to the environmental and social goals of the Basin Plan; and initial 
announcements about the buy-back process, were linked to examples where large 
sums of money were being used to purchase large corporate farms 68  along the 
drought affected Darling River. For example, $23.75 million was spent on purchasing 
Toorale Station, a 91,383ha property, which owned 14GL of low security water 
entitlements (Pittock, Finlayson & Howitt 2013). 
 
The combination of the RtB process, the Millennium Drought and the willingness of 
irrigators to sell water to the CEWO, sparked community fears. Some in the rural 
community suggested that, the RtB would destroy rural communities as the process 
could facilitate the opportunity for both water and water sellers to reallocate out of 
local areas (The Senate 2010). These community concerns quickly filtered into the 
political process and resulted in reviews by The Senate (2010), the House of 
Representatives (2011) and The Auditor-General (2011). Ultimately the fear of 
irreparable community harm was proven baseless: with at least 90% of retirees 
either remaining on their farm and/or district; and those remaining in agriculture 
using the funds to retire debt, refinance loans or transform their production systems 
(Cheesman & Wheeler 2012). 
 
Other fears raised in the political process included the: ‘Swiss cheese’ impact on 
infrastructure; the act of selling water would create social upheaval; and that banks 
were forcing debt ridden irrigators to sell water. In some irrigation systems the 
infrastructure is owned by irrigation infrastructure operators (IIO) and to prevent their 
                                            
68
 At this stage water rights had not been recouped from land rights along the Darling River and this is 
an on-going issue in some parts of the MDB.  
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monopolistic power in determining prices for access and maintenance, regulations 
on charges are introduced in an attempt to provide equitable charges between water 
users (Roper, Sayers & Smith 2006). As the number of infrastructure users 
decrease, the allowable charges are redistributed back to the remaining users in the 
form of higher prices (Heaney et al. 2006). The ‘Swiss cheese’ effect is anticipated to 
occur when a group of irrigators suddenly exit in a patchwork pattern. Once these 
irrigators leave, the IIO reevaluate the viability of distribution channels and increase 
both fixed and variable costs to access and use water. These higher prices then 
make irrigation unprofitable and other irrigators shut down, creating holes in the 
infrastructure (i.e. Swiss cheese) (Heaney et al. 2006). However, by preventing 
individuals from selling assets, limiting water trade volumes or using exit fees to lock 
resources into specific areas, it prevents net social welfare gains associated with 
reallocating resources (Adamson, Quiggin & Quiggin 2011). The House of 
Representatives (2011) recommended that the RtB should be optimized to prevent 
number of ‘Swiss cheese’ incidents  
 
The social upheaval argument was based on the notion that once irrigators sold 
water to the RtB, that all irrigation farms would become dryland enterprises. It was 
predicted that as the dryland transformation occurred, farmers would reduce their off-
farm demand for production inputs and off-farm labor, which would contract regional 
economic activity and force people to leave the region. However, these suggestions 
of impending regional calamity from selling water are identical to any faming decision 
that alters the existing enterprise mix. For example, investing in labor-saving capital 
equipment, or acquiring additional land from neighbors to expand operations. As 
Wheeler and Cheesman (2013) found, the RtB provided a mechanism for irrigators 
to realize on-farm efficiencies and gain benefits from selling underutilized or surplus 
entitlements. Additionally what many public submissions ignored was that irrigators 
could always re-enter the water market and purchase water on their terms, which 
included purchasing water at lower prices (Wheeler & Cheesman 2013). 
 
Other arguments raised in the political reviews, such as irrigator’s being under undue 
pressure from banks to sell water entitlements are ignored in this thesis, purely as 
the pressure was from banks to adjust business activities and the RtB provided the 
best available price. Many submissions could simply be interpreted as, an effort to 
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introduce some form of regional trade barrier to prevent perceived potential adverse 
implications for their communities.  
 
However, by denying unfettered water, the maximum economic return on assets can 
never occur. It is an irrigator’s choice to maximize their own objective function, by 
either utilizing water on farm or sell water to the RtB or to the open market. Wheeler 
and Cheesman (2013) note that as the government’s willingness to pay exceeded 
the open market, it is logical that many farmers sold water to the highest bidder. 
 How Did the Buy-Back Work? 8.1.1
The RtB process is consistent with Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2013) description 
of a “budget-constrained, procurement-type auction” as the government fixed a 
budget of $3.1 billion and specified the conditions for purchasing water rights from 
irrigators for the CEWO. The RtB was widely supported by economists (Crase, 
O'Keefe & Dollery 2009; Dixon, Rimmer & Wittwer 2011) and economic institutions 
(PC 2010) as the most efficient way to obtain water for the environment due to its 
market approach to water reform. 
 
The RtB used a multistage regional tendering system to purchase water rights 
directly from irrigators. In each tender round the government announced: which 
catchment/s it wanted to purchase water rights from; the total maximum budget it 
was willing to spend; a set of selling rules; a set of purchasing rules and a final date 
of submission. Irrigators who wished to participate, submitted non-binding 
expressions of interest stipulating the price they were willing to receive for a 
specified bundle of entitlements they were willing to sell (Hone et al. 2010). Once the 
submission date closed, the Government then was able to determine which tenders 
it would accept against four assessment characteristics of value for money.  
1. “Priority of environmental assets that the water could be directed to. 
2. The watering needs of the targeted assets, particularly the deficiency of 
current arrangements to provide adequate water, including any 
urgency to provide additional water. 
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3. The scope to which the entitlement acquisition would benefit the 
targeted asset such as the capacity to deliver environmental water to 
the target site, and the long term security of the property right. 
4. The cost of the acquisition, including the price, transaction costs and 
costs of ongoing management and delivery” (Hyder Consulting 2008, p. 
15). 
 
This provided the government with complete temporal and spatial information to 
maximize environmental benefits (Latacz-Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort 1997). On 
review all tenderers were notified of their outcome. This tendering process provided 
a mechanism for price discovery for both buyers and sellers, in four ways. First, as 
the procurement budget did not have to be exhausted the maximum price the 
government was willing to pay for water reform was discovered. Second, unlike the 
‘budget-constrained, procurement-type auction’ irrigators could reject the offer, which 
revealed an individual’s price for water. Third, by summarizing and publishing the 
prices paid for each water entitlement after each round, irrigators could then learn 
about the price the government was willing to pay. Fourth, this information could be 
used to guide future irrigators tender bids and/or reveal price changes through time. 
 Optimizing the Portfolio  8.1.2
To optimize the CEWO’s portfolio: the complete description about the alternative 
property rights are needed, including: their location, their value and level of water 
security they provide (Randall 1975); and details about the river system, and Basin 
Plan are required. Crase and Gawne (2011) defined four key requirements to 
optimize the RtB process. First, the environmental goals of the CEWO’s 
environmental strategy need to be clearly defined. Second, the transmission losses 
between the point of property rights purchase and environmental targets must be 
known. Third, the reliability of each water property right structure to provide water 
security under existing and future climatic settings must be incorporated. Lastly, the 
timing schedule of water rights to provide water at a given time should be known. 
The model described in Section 6, has the capacity to encapsulate all but the inter-
seasonal timing issues due to its annual framework. Adamson (2012) added two 
further constraints to the RtB optimization process. The first was to ensure that the 
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CEWO’s portfolio could provide the two institutional goals of the Basin Plan 
(environment and social) under all possible climatic outcomes and the second was to 
include the RtB’s budgetary constraints. 
 Modeling the Net Change to Property Rights and the Portfolio 8.2
Adamson (2012) found that to examine the net welfare changes of the Basin Plan 
and the RtB process, irrigator’s use of surface water and groundwater had to be 
modeled separately. This separation then clarifies the signals being provided to 
irrigators from having the opportunity to sell surface water and increase production 
from groundwater. The following section describes how the SCA model described in 
Section 6 was altered to include both the portfolio optimization process and the 
changes to irrigator welfare. 
 Modeling the Irrigator’s Willingness to Sell to the CEWO 8.2.1
The irrigator’s willingness to sell entitlements was modeled as an opportunity cost 
from either using water to irrigate or permanently selling water entitlements69 to the 
CEWO. This was achieved by developing three new state contingent production 
systems (𝑥 = 23 𝑡𝑜 26), reflecting the total number of each alternative surface water 
entitlements in each catchment  𝑤𝑒𝑘
𝑛, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑁 = (1, . . ,3) . In this case 𝑛(1,2,3) maps 
to 𝑥(24,25,26) with a dimension of (𝐾 × 𝑁 ×  𝑆).  
 
Due to the annual nature of the model and as selling water is a permanent transition 
of water away from irrigation, the RtB price paid to irrigators by catchment was 
converted into an annuity to provide a constant return in each state of nature (𝑒𝑝𝑘
𝑛). 
The water security provided by each entitlement by catchment by state of nature is 
defined by 𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑠
𝑛 .  
 
For 𝑥 = (24, 25, 26), the vector of all input prices, 𝑎 were all equated to zero and the 
vector of input requirements 𝑏 (𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠, 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟)per Ha 
are described as follows. For simplicity 𝑏 (1, 0, 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑟𝑘𝑠
𝑛 ) per Ha. Where land is 
used to track the total number of property rights being traded and there are no fixed 
                                            
69
 Where trade implies a permanent trade of entitlements between a willing irrigator and the CEWO. 
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or variable costs to use the right once it’s sold. By setting the reliability as the water 
required per Ha, it then allowed the output 𝑧 to equal 1 and the price per unit of 
output to be 𝑒𝑝𝑘
𝑛. 
 
To separate irrigators welfare changes in surface and groundwater from the Basin 
Plan, production systems were separated for that; surface water can only be used to 
produce production systems 𝑥 = (1 𝑡𝑜 26)  and groundwater can only be used to 
produce production systems 𝑥 = (27 𝑡𝑜 48) . It has been assumed that all SCA 
production data applicable to 𝑥 = (27 𝑡𝑜 48)  align identically with 𝑥 = (1 𝑡𝑜 22) , 
meaning that the irrigator receives the same return from producing commodities 
produced with either surface or groundwater70.  
 Incorporating Land Used by Groundwater 8.2.2
By separating water used for irrigation into surface water and groundwater, the 
equations used to constrain production choice across the landscape were updated. 
Total available land can now be allocated to either SCA production systems 
produced with groundwater or SCA production systems produced with surface water. 
Consequently, Equation 6-12 and Equation 6-13  have been respectively replaced by  
 𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑥(1...7,27...33 ) ≤ 1.5𝐿𝑘𝑚(1...7) Equation 8-1 
and 
 𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑥(1...22,27…48) = 2𝐿𝑘𝑚(1…16) Equation 8-2 
 Changes to River Flow 8.2.3
River flow had to be updated to deal with the permanent trade of water to the CEWO 
and to deal with the separated groundwater and surface and their associated return 
flows from irrigation. To achieve this Equation 8-3 now replaces Equation 6-14 and 
the prior definition of 𝜃 has been altered. For the model to solve, 𝜃 now excludes the 
                                            
70
As 𝑥 = 23  is Adelaide and 𝑥 = 24 𝑡𝑜 26  are returns from selling water to the RtB, they are not 
required for modeling groundwater use. 
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groundwater SDL when determining inflows into a catchment, but the equation does 
pick up return flows from groundwater use71.  
𝑤𝑓𝑘,𝑠 = (𝜃𝑠,𝑘  ×  𝑤𝑐𝑠,𝑘)  − (𝑤𝑠,𝑘 − 𝑤𝑟𝑠,𝑘) + 𝑤𝑟𝑔𝑠,𝑘 + 𝑤𝑒𝑠,𝑘  Equation 8-3 
 
Now river flow is determined by the impact that conveyance losses 𝑤𝑐 have on water 
resources θ, minus water used 𝑤 to irrigation less return flows 𝑤𝑟 from its use, plus 
the return flows from the groundwater used 𝑤𝑟𝑔 and includes the volume of water 
purchased from the RtB program 𝑤𝑒. When this water reaches the next catchment 𝑘 
it forms part of θ and conveyance losses are then applied. Therefore conveyance 
losses are applied to water purchased for the CEWO, allowing for trade-offs between 
alternative regional entitlement prices and water security to be compared against the 
social and environmental constraints of the Basin Plan. 
 Basin Plan Objectives 8.2.4
To incorporate the new groundwater SDL and the specified surface SDL reduction 
by catchment and by regional trading zone as per specification in the Basin Plan 
(Table 7-5), Equation 6-8 was replaced with 6 new Equations. Where Equation 8-4 
deals with the new catchments based SDL and Equation 8-5 to Equation 8-9 ensure 
that the regional based SDL are enforced. 
 
∑ 𝑤𝑘 𝜋𝑠  ≤  ∑𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑆𝐷𝐿
𝑘  Equation 8-4 
∑𝑤𝑁𝑇𝑆 𝜋𝑠  ≤  143𝐺𝐿 Equation 8-5 
∑𝑤𝑆𝑇𝑉 𝜋𝑠  ≤  425.3𝐺𝐿 Equation 8-6 
∑𝑤𝑆𝑇𝑁 𝜋𝑠  ≤  462.9𝐺𝐿 Equation 8-7 
∑𝑤𝑆𝑇𝑆 𝜋𝑠  ≤  82.8𝐺𝐿 Equation 8-8 
∑𝑤𝑆𝑇𝐴 𝜋𝑠  ≤  450𝐺𝐿 Equation 8-9 
 
                                            
71
 By modeling increased groundwater access into 𝜃 nonsensical results were being generated. 
 161 
 
where: 
Symbol Definition 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑆𝐷𝐿 Total volume of surface water allowed for irrigation use 
𝑁𝑇𝑆 Water trading zones in the northern catchments (𝑘 = 1…8) 
𝑆𝑇𝑁 Water trading zones in the southern New South Wales (NSW) 
catchments (𝑘 = 10, 12, 14, 16, 18) 
𝑆𝑇𝑆 The South Australia (SA) water trading zone (𝑘 = 19) 
𝑆𝑇𝑉 Water trading zones in Victoria (VIC) (𝑘 = 11, 13, 15, 17) 
𝑆𝑇𝐴 Water trading zones in all southern catchments (𝑘 = 10 …19) 
 
Equation 8-10 was added to monitor the groundwater SDL and due to the specified 
spatial identification of new sources of groundwater Murray-Darling Basin Authority 
(MDBA) (2012c), it has been assumed that groundwater cannot be traded between. 
For simplicity, this analysis does not examine the opportunities for irrigators to 
convert surface water rights into groundwater rights. 
∑ 𝑤𝑘 𝜋𝑠 = ∑𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝐷𝐿
𝑘  Equation 8-10 
 
 The RtB Program & the Basin Plan 8.2.5
The RtB budgetary constraints for the optimization process are provided by Equation 
8-11. This equation ensures that the entitlement portfolio will on average provide, as 
a lower bound, sufficient water to meet the specified conditions of the SDL and the 
Basin Plan. 
 
∑(𝑊𝐸𝐾
𝑁 × 𝐸𝑃𝐾
𝑁  × 𝐸𝑅𝐾𝑆
𝑁 )
𝐾
𝜋𝑆  ≥  (𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐶𝐷𝐿 − 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑆𝐷𝐿)𝜋𝑆  
≤ $3.1 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
Equation 8-11 
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where: 
Symbol Definition 
(𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝐶𝐷𝐿
− 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑆𝐷𝐿) 
Total number of property rights purchased must provide sufficient 
flow to meet new SDL requirements 
𝑊𝐸𝐾
𝑁 Water entitlements by type (𝑁 = 1,2,3) in each catchment 
𝐸𝑃𝐾
𝑁 Water price is the cost to purchase entitlements in each catchment 
𝐸𝑅𝐾𝑆
𝑁  Entitlement reliability is the volume of water available in each state 
of nature 
 Data Used in this Analysis 8.3
The model uses the conjunctive water data set as presented in Table 7-1 and the 
Current Diversion Limits (CDL) and SDL data set from Table 7-4 & Table 7-5, 
respectively. The data for the 450 Climate Change scenario is found in Table 7-8. 
The location of all alternative property rights, the cost to purchase these rights for the 
CEWO, and the conversion of the RtB price paid into the annuity value is provided in 
Table 7-6. The water security provided by each water entitlement class by 𝑠 and by 𝑘 
is located in Table 7-7.  
 The Value of Alternative Property Right Structures 8.3.1
The data concerning the prices paid during the RtB process is incomplete as: to 
ensure individual confidentiality, the RtB only published the average price paid per 
megalitre (ML) in a catchment (SEWPaC 2013); not all catchments were involved in 
the RtB process; and not all classes of property rights were sold. Consequently 
some catchment’s data has been assumed to be identical to catchments along the 
same river section.  
 
The price paid for water in both the Condamine and Queensland (QLD) Border 
Rivers catchments appears excessive. However, in the absence of detailed data, 
these prices have not been altered. These high prices may have occurred when the 
RtB purchased entire properties to overcome the pre-mentioned coupled nature of 
water and land rights along the Darling River. 
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The annuity value for water sales was calculated using the same assumptions as 
when determining the annual cost of capital (Section 6.6.2, Table 7-11), where 
returns are calculated over 20 years at 7%. 
 The Reliability of Alternative Property Right Entitlements 8.3.2
SEWPaC (2013) data concerning their estimations about the reliability of water 
purchased by the RtB process helped define the average reliability of each 
alternative property rights structure by catchment. To convert this average value into 
a specific reliability by state of nature, data from historic diversions was used (Chart 
3-1).  
 
These assumptions about the reliability of water rights are limiting as the time series 
is short. Additionally these assumptions about current reliability of water entitlements 
(Table 7-7) have been held constant to examine climate change impacts. This 
assumption will preserve the reliability of all property right owners (inclusive of the 
CEWO) into the future, this assumption then transfers all future climatic risk onto the 
residual unallocated water, which reflects the water management practices 
described in Section 2.5.  
 Scenarios 8.4
Seven scenarios are used to analyze the welfare issues associated with net change 
in ownership of all property rights (i.e. between surface and groundwater and from 
private individuals to the CEWO) and determine the optimal portfolio of surface water 
entitlements needed to achieve the objectives listed in the Basin Plan (Table 8-1). 
The CDL scenario provides the business as usual scenario for the MDB (MDB) (i.e. 
without the Basin Plan). The remaining six scenarios analyze the impact that the 
changes to the conjunctive SDL and the changes to property rights ownership have 
for irrigators and the CEWO. The SDL scenario provides an optimal RtB purchasing 
strategy and the constrained social welfare solution, under existing climatic 
conditions. As defined in Section 4.6.3, the resilience of the RtB portfolio to climate 
change is tested in the last five scenarios where, the RtB’s purchasing strategy to 
purchasing a portfolio of property rights is made by decision makers who are aware 
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(‘ex-post’) and unaware (‘ex-ante’) about climate change impacts on water supply. 
Where climate change impacts on water supply occur in two ways the 450 Avg 
Scenario (CC) over two time periods 2050 and 2100, and where the frequency of the 
drought state increases (Droughts). 
 
Table 8-1 Scenarios Examined 
Model Intervention State probability Climate assumption 
CDL  (0.5,0.2,0.3) Current 
SDL Buy-Back (0.5,0.2,0.3) Current 
2050 CC, ex-post Buy-Back (0.5,0.2,0.3) 450 average, 2050 
2100 CC, ex-post Buy-Back (0.5,0.2,0.3) 450 average, 2100 
Droughts Buy-Back (0.5,0.3,0.2) Current 
2050 CC, ex-ante Buy-Back (0.5,0.2,0.3) 450 average, 2050 
2100 CC, ex-ante Buy-Back (0.5,0.2,0.3) 450 average, 2100 
 Results  8.5
The results presented here suggest that the RtB had sufficient funding to purchase a 
portfolio of property rights (i.e. CEWO’s portfolio) that would achieve all of the social 
and environmental objectives of the Basin Plan. However, the results from the 
scenarios illustrate that if the RtB process fails to take account of climate change and 
how the climate changes then the CEWO will be left with a portfolio that is unable to 
meet the Basin Plan goals. But by examining how the climate changes, a portfolio of 
entitlements can be purchased that provide on-going benefits for society and the 
environment.  
 
The results also indicate that for the MDB as a whole, the combination of selling $3.1 
billion worth of water property rights and the increased groundwater access could 
lead to a situation where the net returns from irrigation increase for all SDL 
scenarios. The results are dependent on water reform continuing to encourage the 
removal of all impediments to water trade within the MDB.  
 Comments on the Optimal Portfolio  8.5.1
Table 8-7 illustrates the changes to optimal portfolio for the SDL and the three ‘ex-
post’ climate change scenarios. Chart 8-1, Chart 8-2 and Chart 8-3 are used to 
illustrate how the portfolio needs to change its strategic targeting by purchasing 
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alternative classes of water entitlements and changing from which catchments it 
purchases water rights from, to meet the defined Basin Plan objectives, while 
maximizing irrigator economic returns.  
 
For $3.1 billion, the RtB could achieve the SDL scenario goals by purchasing 184GL 
of high security, 1,876GL of general security and 3,017GL of supplementary water 
entitlements (Table 8-7). To optimize the RtB portfolio all high security water would 
be sourced from the SA MDB (Chart 8-1) and the RtB would target the 
Murrumbidgee to provide the greatest number of entitlements under current climatic 
conditions. 
 
Chart 8-1 Optimal Bundle of Entitlements by Catchment, SDL 
 
 
However, the SDL scenario RtB portfolio fails to provide sufficient water for the 
CEWO if the climate changed. When the 450 Average Climate Change scenario is 
examined, the optimal RtB portfolio is still focused on purchasing water rights from 
along the Murrumbidgee but the portfolio would switch to purchase more general 
security rights (i.e. 1,976 versus 1,876 in the SDL scenario in Table 8-7) in order to 
provide sufficient water in the drought state of nature to meet the Basin Plan 
objectives (Chart 8-2). 
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Chart 8-2 Optimal Bundle of Entitlements by Catchment, Ex-post 450 Average 
2050 
 
 
However, if climate change is expressed by an increased frequency of droughts, the 
optimal portfolio remains very similar to the SDL strategy (Table 8-7) but the RtB 
would shift its focus towards strategically, purchasing water along the Murray River 
and not the Murrumbidgee River (Chart 8-3). 
 
Chart 8-3 Optimal Bundle of Entitlements by Catchment, Droughts 
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Chart 8-4 and Chart 8-5 are used to contrast the risks to the Basin Plan goals from 
failing to consider climate change 72 and how the climate changes (mean versus 
variability) when purchasing a portfolio of entitlements. The SDL scenario can clearly 
meet the environmental flow requirements to the Coorong (as represented by the 
horizontal line in Chart 8-4), the environmental flow benefits from the SDL are 
eroded through time under the new basin wide inflows that are predicted to occur 
under the 450 Avg Climate Change scenario in 2050 and 210073. By 2100, flows to 
the Coorong are anticipated to be 65GL less in the drought scenario when compared 
to the CDL (Table 8-6) and Adelaide’s water quality may be degraded by 210 EC on 
average. 
 
Chart 8-4 Flow to the Coorong, Ex-ante Climate Change (GL) 
 
 
Compounding the SDL scenario’s inability to meet environmental and social 
objectives under a changing climate, is that by reallocating irrigation resources in 
response to the RtB portfolio, the irrigator’s demands for water can no longer be 
provided by the river. All shaded cells in Table 8-11, represent a situation where the 
river system would have a negative flow (i.e. irrigators demands exceed the 
biophysical constraints of the river system) and this would result in irreversible 
capital loss to irrigators, the ecosystem and society.  
 
                                            
72
 Section 4.6.3 defined how the results for the ex-ante or unaware decision maker were determined. 
 
73
 Note in scenario where the frequency of the drought increases this allocation of resources does not 
alter water flow (as it doesn’t alter) but rather decreases economic returns for irrigators. 
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Chart 8-5 illustrates that by changing the portfolio (Table 8-7) to reflect the 
alternative climate risks 74  the CEWO would have sufficient water to meet the 
minimum flow requirements for the Coorong for the 450 Climate scenario in both 
2050 and 2100. If the RtB strategically purchased its portfolio to maximize welfare 
and its objectives in a climate future where droughts are more frequent, the 
environmental flow threshold is exceeded.  
 
Chart 8-5 Flow to the Coorong, Ex-post Climate Change (GL) 
 
 
As Table 8-7 suggests, these alternative portfolios of water may only provide water 
security of around 2,640GL for the environment and not the 3,200GL required by the 
Basin Plan and this is due to the water security of the portfolio and the design of the 
constraint. The CEWO will have to carefully manage its water over time, as the 
portfolio of rights (Table 8-7) does not deliver a constant supply of water but rather 
peaks (≈4,000GL in wet state of nature) and troughs (≈1,320GL in drought states). 
This pattern of water supply then alters the social benefits of reduced salinity as 
illustrated in Table 8-6. Adelaide’s residents should expect an improvement in their 
water quality by 96EC on average (Table 8-6) for the SDL scenario and this 
improves water quality by over 53%.  
 
                                            
74
 Section 4.6.3 defined how the results for the ex-post or aware decision maker were determined 
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All optimal portfolios 75  provide the CEWO with significant flexibility to manage 
drought events (Table 8-6), with at least a net increase in environmental flows of 
≈250% when compared to the CDL. This flexibility would help negate Howitt’s 
(1995a) applied policy limits and provide additional flows to help meet some 
additional environmental targets along the MDB, which are not included in this 
model. 
 Changes to Irrigator Welfare 8.5.2
Table 8-4 identifies the water used by irrigators for all scenarios by water type (i.e. 
groundwater and surface water), Table 8-5 details the economic returns from utilizing 
alternative sources of water for irrigation activities or selling it to the CEWO, and 
Chart 8-6 provides this data graphically. The results for SDL scenario suggest: that 
the extra 929GL of groundwater (Table 8-4) provides irrigators with increased 
economic returns of $336 million on average (Table 8-5); irrigators now use 2,488GL 
less of surface water, which reduces their returns by $416 million on average but 
they gain $293 million from selling water to the RtB. The data suggests that irrigators 
now use 1,599GL or 10% less water on average but their economic return has 
increased by $212 million or 7% on average.  
 
The data in Table 8-4 and Table 8-5 shows that this trend of decreased water use 
and increased economic return was found in all scenarios. Therefore it can be 
suggested that the access to more groundwater, constant returns from water sold to 
the RtB and the ability to engage in trade, will provide the capacity for irrigators to 
offset any negative impact from the Basin Plan or a changing climate. These findings 
complement Dixon et al. (2011) who argued that the prices paid under the RtB for 
entitlements adequately compensates irrigators. Additionally as the increased 
economic returns are greatest in the drought states of nature (e.g. a gain of nearly 
$550 million is anticipated in the increasing droughts scenario, Table 8-5), some 
wider economic benefits could occur. The second round benefits of these findings 
are not quantified in this thesis, it could be anticipated that some of the irrigators 
                                            
75
 Ex-ante solutions are not optimal, they are the SDL scenario which passively reacts to the 450 
Climate Change scenario. 
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increased economic returns may help delay the pressure on social services (PC 
2009). 
 
Chart 8-6 Economic Return by Scenario by State of Nature ($'m) 
 
 
Chart 8-7 Economic Return in Drought States of Nature by Scenario ($'m) 
 
 
However, welfare benefits are not uniform across the MDB. Table 8-12 illustrates the 
net change in total conjunctive water use and its value by catchment when the CDL 
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and SDL results are detailed. The assumptions that groundwater security is 
guaranteed and that regional trade is possible, allows resources to be reallocated so 
that total water used in irrigation only decreases by 1,560GL and that economic 
returns from water use (excluding sales) decreases by $80 million. By 
disaggregating this water use and economic return data into the Northern Murray-
Darling Basin (NMDB) and Southern Murray-Darling Basin (SMDB), these results 
suggest that the Basin Plan allows irrigators in the NMDB to be net winners and the 
SMDB irrigators lose. Irrigators in the NDMB gain an additional 451GL of water, 
increasing their economic returns by $50 million, on average. SMDB irrigators are 
expected to lose $130 million in economic returns on average when 2,000GL of 
surface water is removed from production. If the Basin Plan was solely a game of 
rent between NMDB and SMDB irrigators, the NMDB is a clear winner (Section 2.1). 
 
The economic benefits of guaranteed groundwater security allow irrigators to return 
≈$270/ML compared to $162/ML for surface water across the MDB, under the CDL 
(Table 8-2). The economic benefit to access groundwater ($/ML), increases both in 
response to an increased SDL, and due to climate change. Groundwater’s economic 
benefit is due to the water security it provides into the future. Unlike groundwater the 
economic return generated by surface water is expected to decline. 
 
Table 8-2 Value of Alternative Water Resources for Irrigators ($/ML), Compared 
to the CDL 
 Groundwater Surface Water 
CDL $269.98 $162.22 
   
SDL $25.77 -$12.10 
450, 2050, ex-post $43.78 -$21.65 
450, 2100, ex-post $50.75 -$23.95 
Drought States, ex-post $59.38 -$28.11 
 
As the economic returns from water use diverges between surface water and 
groundwater, the implementation of the Basin Plan will create wealth for owners of 
groundwater property rights. However, as discussed in 4.6.2, once the RtB 
purchases surface water rights, the supply curve shifts to the left (Figure 4-2) and the 
price of surface water rights may increase, which in the short term (i.e. before 
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climate change occurs), may partially offset the divergence in values between 
groundwater and surface water. However, the value of the three surface entitlement 
classes should not be expected to increase uniformly. It should also be expected that 
these prices should also lead to greater on-farm adaption and adoption of water-use 
efficient technology. 
 
The results in Table 8-8, Table 8-9 and Table 8-10 help illustrate how the increased 
economic returns are possible, as they detail: the area allocated by water source 
(groundwater or surface water); which commodities are produced by the alternative 
water sources; and a detailed catchment analysis of the land use change, 
respectively. Chart 8-8 is also used, to illustrate how the irrigators with surface water 
may adapt production systems compared to the CDL scenario. By increasing 
groundwater access, an additional 180,000Ha of irrigated land can be produced 
(Table 8-8) when the SDL is compared to the CDL. The new land irrigated with 
groundwater is expected to produce an additional 45,000Ha of horticulture, 
74,000Ha of cotton and 61,000Ha of grain crops (Table 8-9). At the same time the 
area produced with surface water is expected to contract by 292,000Ha, for a net 
reduction in irrigated area of 112,000Ha (Table 8-8). As the area irrigated by state of 
nature is not constant, it is expected that in the wet state of nature there is 313,000 
Ha less irrigated with surface water and the biggest single commodity loser will be 
dairy with 200,000Ha less of production (Table 8-9). The breakdown of the 
catchment based expansion and contraction in the area produced with groundwater 
and area produced with surface water is provided in Table 8-10, where the net 
increase in irrigated area for the NMDB is visible.  
 
As illustrated in Chart 8-8, the area dedicated to dairy is anticipated to contract in 
comparison to the CDL for all scenarios listed. However, this contraction in dairy 
area is still less than the 500,000Ha which transitioned to dryland during the 
Millennium Drought (Table 3-1). Irrigators will actively transition out of irrigation 
under the 450 Climate Change scenarios, as evident by the reduction in both the 
flexible and opportunistic SCA production systems in Chart 8-8. In the scenario 
where droughts become more frequent, the area dedicated to both flexible and 
opportunistic cropping is expected to increase as producers respond to the marginal 
cost of production in state 𝑠 and state 𝑡 (Equation 5-45).  
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Chart 8-8 Production Management Adaptation in Surface Water (Area ‘000Ha) 
 
 
This changing state-contingent marginal cost of production guides the RtB portfolio 
to purchase water from the Murray and not the Murrumbidgee in the drought 
scenario. Table 8-3, illustrates that the resulting change in economic return for the 
Murrumbidgee incentivizes the expansion of the rice industry at the expense of the 
wheat industry. In this case, the average return from Rice PSN increases from $75 to 
$85/ML and the return from wheat decreases from $85 to $76/ML.  
 
Table 8-3 Impacts from Increasing Droughts in the Murrumbidgee ($/ML) 
 Economic Return ($/Ha) Current 
Climate 
Increasing 
Droughts  Normal Drought Wet 
Rice PSN $768 $768 $58 $555 $626 
Flex Rice $303 $324 $58 $234 $261 
Wheat $358 $106 $434 $331 $298 
 Water Used ML/Ha   
Rice PSN 7.5 7.3 7.5   
Flex Rice 7.5 0.0 7.5   
Wheat 3.9 3.9 3.9   
 $ Return/ML   
Rice PSN $103 $105 $8 $75 $85 
Flex Rice $41   $8 $23 $22 
Wheat $92 $27 $111 $85 $76 
Data summarized from Appendix B 
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Table 8-4 Total Conjunctive Water Used by Scenario, Compared to CDL (GL) 
 Groundwater Surface Water (GL) TOTAL Diversions (GL) % Change 
Scenario All states (GL) Normal Drought Wet Average Normal Drought Wet Average (Average) 
CDL 2,373 12,013 6,899 17,632 12,676 14,386 9,272 20,004 15,049  
 
            
SDL 929 -2,449 -1,634 -3,122 -2,488 -1,520 -704 -2,193 -1,559 -10% 
450, 2050, ex-post 929 -2,775 -2,134 -4,325 -3,112 -1,846 -1,205 -3,396 -2,183 -15% 
450, 2100, ex-post 929 -2,768 -2,218 -4,410 -3,151 -1,839 -1,289 -3,481 -2,222 -15% 
Drought States 929 -1,375 -1,838 -1,878 -1,619 -446 -909 -949 -689 -5% 
 
Table 8-5 Economic Return from Conjunctive Resource use and Sales by Scenario, Compared to CDL ($’m) 
Scenario 
Groundwater Surface Water RtB TOTAL Economic Return % 
Change 
 Normal Drought Wet Avg
#
 Normal Drought Wet Avg All Normal Drought Wet Avg (Avg) 
CDL $590 $357 $914 $641 $2,399 $849 $3,573 $2,441   $2,989 $1,206 $4,487 $3,082  
 
               
SDL $300 $187 $495 $336 -$374 -$98 -$698 -$416 $293 $218 $382 $90 $212 7% 
450, 2050, ex-
post 
$350 $188 $610 $395 -$540 -$186 -$1,085 -$633 $293 $102 $295 -$182 $55 2% 
450, 2100, ex-
post 
$370 $202 $643 $418 -$573 -$203 -$1,134 -$668 $293 $89 $291 -$199 $43 1% 
Drought States $391 $243 $676 $447 -$334 $11 -$1,170 -$515 $293 $350 $547 -$201 $224 7% 
# avg = average 
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Table 8-6 Results for the Social Objectives, Flow to Coorong (GL) and Adelaide’s Water Quality (EC), by Scenario, 
Compared to CDL 
Scenario Flow to Coorong (GL) Adelaide Salinity (EC) % Change (Drought) 
 Normal Drought Wet Average Normal Drought Wet Average Coorong Salinity 
CDL 3,739 186 9,046 4,621 423 687 328 448   
Compared to CDL           
SDL 631 1,172 39 562 -49 -361 2 -96 629% -53% 
450, 2050, ex-post -1,316 464 -2,733 -1,385 158 -246 113 63 249% -36% 
450, 2100, ex-post -1,461 464 -2,913 -1,512 185 -250 123 79 249% -36% 
Drought States -122 1,333 349 310 36 -393 -18 -66 715% -57% 
           
450, 2050, ex-ante -459 589 -1,559 -579 54 -234 68 0 316% -34% 
450, 2100, ex-ante -1,680 -65 -3,349 -1,857 266 114 180 210 -35% 17% 
 
Table 8-7 Total Number of Property Rights to Purchase 
 
Property Rights Purchased Water Obtained 
Scenario High General Supplementary Normal Drought Wet Average 
SDL 184 1,876 3,017 2,352 1,324 4,002 2,641 
450, 2050 184 1,973 2,890 2,362 1,319 3,992 2,642 
450, 2100 184 1,972 2,892 2,362 1,319 3,992 2,642 
Drought States 184 1,859 3,017 2,356 1,349 3,998 2,647 
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Table 8-8 Land Allocated to Irrigation by Conjunctive Source by Scenario, Compared to CDL (‘000Ha) 
 Area Produced (‘000 Ha) by % Area Change (Average) 
Groundwater Surface Water TOTAL Ground Surface   
Scenario All states Normal Drought Wet Average Normal Drought Wet Average Water Water Total 
CDL 
475 1,744 1,260 2,230 1,793 2,218 1,735 2,705 2,268    
 
            
SDL 
180 -288 -271 -313 -292 -108 -91 -134 -112 38% -16% -5% 
450, 2050, ex-post 
246 -493 -437 -625 -521 -247 -191 -379 -275 52% -29% -12% 
450, 2100, ex-post 
250 -498 -451 -641 -532 -249 -202 -391 -282 53% -30% -12% 
Drought States  
136 -303 -397 -295 -319 -166 -261 -159 -183 29% -18% -8% 
 
 
Table 8-9 Area of Production System, by Scenario, Compared to CDL (‘000Ha) 
 Maximum Area Produced with Groundwater Maximum Area Produced with Surface Water 
Scenario Horticulture Dairy Cotton Rice Grains TOTAL Horticulture Dairy Cotton Rice Grains TOTAL 
CDL 
82 0 99 10 285 475 171 771 968 2 318 2,230 
 
            
SDL 
45 0 74 0 61 180 -45 -200 -40 -2 -26 -313 
450, 2050, ex-post 
54 0 38 0 153 246 -54 -195 -210 22 -188 -625 
450, 2100, ex-post 
57 0 36 0 156 250 -57 -197 -225 35 -197 -641 
Drought States  
64 0 79 10 -16 136 -64 -222 26 205 -241 -295 
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Table 8-10 Area Irrigated by Conjunctive Water Change from CDL to SDL ('000 Ha) 
 Groundwater Surface Water Net Change 
 Hort# Dairy Cotton Rice Grains TOTAL Hort Dairy Cotton Rice Grains TOTAL Hort  Dairy Cotton Rice Grains TOTAL 
Condamine   13   13   -13   -13      0 
Border Rivers 
QLD 
5    11 15 -5  6  -2 0   6  9 15 
Warrego 
Paroo 
  5  71 76   -2   -2   3  71 74 
Namoi      0   -2   -2   -2   -2 
Central West   1   1   -13   -13   -12   -12 
Maranoa 
Balonne 
  8   8   -8   -8      0 
Border Rivers 
Gwydir 
  18   18   -7   -7   11   11 
Western   28  -30 -2   2   2   30  -30 0 
Lachlan     24 24   -3 -2 -2 -7   -3 -2 21 16 
Murrumbidgee 17    -43 -26 -17    -3 -20     -46 -46 
North East      0      0      0 
Murray 1      0      0      0 
Goulburn 
Broken 
    8 8  -89    -89  -89   8 -81 
Murray 2      0  -2    -2  -2    -2 
North Central      0      0      0 
Murray 3     0 0  -102    -102  -102    -102 
Mallee 7    19 26 -7    -19 -26      0 
Lower Murray-
Darling 
     0      0      0 
SA MDB 17 0    17 -17 -6    -24  -6    -6 
TOTAL 45 0 74 0 61 180 -45 -200 -40 -2 -26 -313 0 -200 34 -2 34 -134 
#Hort = Horticulture 
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Table 8-11 Residual Flow leaving a Catchment (GL), Shaded Cells Indicate a Negative or Infeasible flow 
 Ex-ante Ex-post 
  2050   2100   2050   2100  
 Normal Drought Wet Normal Drought Wet Normal Drought Wet Normal Drought Wet 
Condamine -58 239 -60 -122 202 -143 0 229 0 0 224 0 
Border Rivers QLD -35 9 -46 -76 -14 -99 0 151 0 0 148 0 
Warrego Paroo -16 62 -25 -33 53 -52 0 54 0 0 53 0 
Namoi -58 356 -75 -123 318 -158 0 323 0 0 318 0 
Central West -52 286 -70 -109 253 -147 0 256 0 0 252 0 
Maranoa Balonne -62 267 -84 -131 228 -178 0 212 0 0 208 0 
Border Rivers Gwydir 1,241 717 -184 1,082 625 -389 1,148 781 0 1,135 771 0 
Western -182 912 -262 -307 800 -555 0 955 0 0 942 0 
Lachlan 238 -38 -80 165 -81 -174 46 2 0 0 70 0 
Murrumbidgee 1,675 865 2,070 1,383 695 1,693 1,696 979 2,070 1,662 959 2,026 
North East 3,311 1,881 4,194 2,979 1,686 3,773 3,016 1,708 3,821 2,979 1,686 3,773 
Murray 1 1,203 679 1,547 1,032 579 1,330 1,051 590 1,355 1,032 579 1,330 
Goulburn Broken 2,264 995 3,240 1,676 653 2,480 1,716 875 2,534 1,649 836 2,447 
Murray 2 -42 -138 144 -311 -294 -214 179 0 379 157 0 352 
North Central 1,023 102 2,072 657 -106 1,568 863 131 1,803 824 115 1,750 
Murray 3 1,736 556 2,875 1,328 325 2,316 792 116 1,662 737 91 1,589 
Mallee 2,080 291 3,551 1,510 -29 2,778 1,494 151 2,852 1,415 152 2,764 
Lower Murray-Darling 2,509 1,708 4,328 1,733 1,277 3,266 2,102 1,620 3,779 2,021 1,607 3,683 
SA MDB 3,631 1,186 7,647 2,373 498 5,838 2,741 1,030 6,456 2,591 1,027 6,275 
Adelaide 3,880 1,375 7,950 2,621 687 6,141 2,989 1,219 6,759 2,840 1,215 6,578 
Coorong 3,280 775 7,487 2,059 122 5,697 2,423 650 6,312 2,278 650 6,133 
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Table 8-12 Estimated Change in Total Conjunctive Water Use (GL) & its Value ($m) CDL-SDL 
Catchment Conjunctive Water Use Economic Value 
Normal Drought Wet Avg Normal Drought Wet Avg 
Condamine  2.8 62.8 -0.6 13.8 -$2.9 $4.7 -$1.6 -$1.0 
Border Rivers QLD 41.4 13.6 38.2 34.9 $8.9 $4.5 $8.9 $8.0 
Warrego Paroo 126.0 132.0 120.0 125.4 $27.2 $13.2 $31.4 $25.6 
Namoi -8.0 0.0 -12.0 -7.6 -$3.9 -$1.2 -$4.3 -$3.5 
Central West -30.9 8.6 -81.9 -38.3 -$10.3 -$5.5 -$6.8 -$8.3 
Maranoa Balonne -1.4 41.9 0.3 7.8 -$2.0 $1.4 -$1.2 -$1.1 
Border Rivers Gwydir 128.7 128.7 65.7 109.8 $9.1 $12.3 $12.3 $10.7 
Western 142.6 95.5 98.4 119.9 $13.3 $18.7 $12.7 $14.2 
Lachlan 93.8 111.9 54.7 85.7 $3.8 -$0.5 $12.2 $5.5 
Murrumbidgee -177.6 -177.6 -213.1 -188.3 -$14.5 -$3.1 -$16.8 -$12.9 
North East 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
Murray 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
Goulburn Broken -737.8 -457.2 -891.8 -727.9 -$40.6 $21.9 -$123.6 -$53.0 
Murray 2 -20.8 -12.0 -25.2 -20.3 -$1.6 $0.2 -$3.1 -$1.7 
North Central 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
Murray 3 -1,020.2 -611.7 -1,224.4 -999.8 -$60.6 $19.8 -$117.6 -$61.6 
Mallee 0.0 0.0 -28.5 -8.6 $1.4 $1.4 $2.4 $1.7 
Lower Murray-Darling 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
SA MDB -58.5 -40.9 -92.4 -65.2 -$1.6 $1.0 -$7.1 -$2.8 
TOTAL -1,519.8 -704.5 -2,192.7 -1,558.6 -$74.5 $89.0 -$202.3 -$80.1 
NMDB  495 595 282.8 451.4 $43.2 $47.6 $63.6 $50.1 
SMDB -2014.9 -1299.4 -2475.4 -2010.1 -$117.5 $41.2 -$265.8 -$130.3 
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 Discussion and Limitations Associated with the Analysis  8.6
The constrained optimization approach of modeling the RtB and the changes to 
groundwater suggest that not only could the RtB be optimized to meet the objectives of the 
Basin Plan but as a whole, economic returns increase within the MDB. The combination of 
increased economic returns, improved water quality and meeting environmental objectives 
is what is expected when the ‘common property approach’ to internalizing externalities is 
adopted (Section 4.3.1). However, irrigator’s economic returns in this model only increase 
above the CDL returns, when increased groundwater access is included.  
 
The increased economic returns are not uniform and the analysis suggests that the dual 
benefits from increasing the quantity and reliability of water assets in the NMDB provide 
the necessary conditions to facilitate an irrigation ‘boom’. It is anticipated that irrigators in 
the SMDB will be worse off, with the noticeable exception of the SA MDB, as the SMDB 
does not gain access to new groundwater reserves. This loss of economic returns in the 
SMDB may provide guidance into why the expenditure on the SRWUIP has a SMDB 
basis, for example the $1 billion investment in the northern Victorian ‘Food Bowl 
Modernisation Project’ (Crase & O'Keefe 2009). The economic justification of the SRWUIP 
is examined in the next section. 
 
The increased water security offered by groundwater will continue to stimulate the 
discussion of transferring surface water entitlements into groundwater (Kirby et al. 2014). 
This conjunctive entitlement transfer of risk is possible and in 2011 (Grafton & Horne 2014) 
the National Water Commission (NWC) began establishing the rules for permanently 
trading entitlement rights between groundwater and surface water (NWC 2011b). 
However, while the Basin Plan reconfirmed these commitments to allow permanent trade 
between surface water and groundwater resources, they can currently only occur under 
strict conditions76. If these transfer conditions are maintained, this discussion of property 
right transfer between groundwater and surface water is unlikely to continue due to 
increased costs of accessing groundwater.  
 
                                            
76
 These conditions are listed in sections 12.24 to 12.26 of the Basin Plan (MDBA 2012c, pp. 131-2).  
 181 
 
The spatial and temporal water security offered by alternative rights can be optimized to 
purchase an optimal portfolio for the CEWO. However, climate change (mean and 
variance) alters both the spatial and alternative bundle of property rights purchased for the 
portfolio. With an uncertain future, it would be prudent for the CEWO to alter this portfolio 
over time in response to how the climate does change to maintain the benefits derived 
from having ‘common property’ managed in the nation’s interest. How, or if, the CEWO will 
interact with the water market (permanent and allocation) to gain additional flows is still to 
be determined, but in January 2014 the CEWO engaged in allocation water trade (via a 
tender system) by offering 10 GL of water to Gwydir valley irrigators (CEWO 2014). The 
role of water trade as a source of revenue has been recognized by the CEWO to offset 
both the management cost of the CEWO and the transaction and operation costs of 
managing its portfolio, and the water trade framework is yet to be finalized (CEWO 2013). 
It may be heroic to assume that this water trade framework will prevent both political 
pressure on the scale and scope of CEWO water placed on markets in drought periods, or 
that some irrigators assume that the CEWO’s portfolio can be used like a water overdraft 
facility. 
 
From the data provided, the RtB could achieve the Basin Plan’s goals for $3.1 billion. 
Therefore despite the concerns that the government paid above existing market prices, the 
RtB provides welfare gains. Irrigators correctly speculated that the government would be 
willing to pay above existing market prices to encourage their involvement in the RtB 
process (Cheesman & Wheeler 2012). The Government’s willingness to pay a higher price 
for water can be justified as the RtB process: helped overcome irrigator’s transaction costs 
associated with existing trade barriers (NWC 2011a); stimulate participation in what had 
been thin trade in the permanent entitlement market (Adamson, Quiggin & Quiggin 2011); 
allowed irrigators to become aware of the ‘true’77 social price of water (i.e. inclusive of the 
externality cost) (Randall 1981); and by managing the water portfolio in the national 
interest, both private water users and social gains are expected. Private water users are 
expected to gain welfare from improved water quality and increased property right values 
and society may gain from reallocating public expenditure which may have otherwise been 
required to ameliorate intra- and inter-generational externalities from water use.  
 
                                            
77
 Where ‘true’ implies no political interference in the determination of the price paid. 
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As water quality improves, irrigators can diversify into saline susceptible commodities 
(Connor et al. 2012) and gain increased flexibility to manage droughts. Mallawaarachchi 
and Foster (2009) found that some irrigators were forced into selling their water during the 
Millennium Drought, as river salinity exceeding 38,000EC and was unsuitable for on-farm 
use. Additionally some irrigators may be able to free-ride on the CEWO’s water ‘quality’ 
improvement by abdicating their current requirements to manage saline drainage water 
(Smith & Maheshwari 2002) without ‘adversely affecting’ end-of-valley targets. Improved 
water ‘quality’, will provide greater opportunity for salinity sensitive species to adapt to 
other unforeseen negative impacts derived from poor water quality (Kefford et al. 2006; 
Kingsford et al. 2011).  
 
The RtB has achieved these water quality improvements at prices which are comparable 
with investing in the SIS (Section 2.5.2). The analysis of the SDL revealed that the net 
reduction in irrigation returns from surface water is $416 million and salinity is reduced by 
96EC, which equates to a cost of $4.3 million in lost revenue per EC. This cost per EC is 
equivalent to the public cost of establishing a new SIS which cannot utilize existing 
infrastructure (i.e. >$4.5 million per EC in the Upper Darling SIS). If the cost differential 
between maintaining and operating the CEWO portfolio and SIS diverge in the future, and 
the true extent of climate change is understood, then future reviews of the salinity 
mitigation program may consider, all be it heroically, to mothball inefficient SIS assets.  
 
However, care needs to be taken with these due to the limitations of the model and 
assumptions used. First, the optimal solution is derived from a benevolent individual acting 
in the national interest ,which is not the same as multiple agents acting in their own 
interest (Perry et al. 1989). For example in the CDL solution, the benevolent individual did 
utilize all water available as they had complete information about all states of nature. In 
this case, the model has deliberately underutilized or did not utilize some water rights (i.e. 
mimicked irrigators ‘dozers’ or ‘sleeper’ behavior) while maximizing welfare. This result 
could either reflect the true nature of irrigation practices or it is a construct of the model. As 
Wheeler and Cheesman (2013) found, the RtB allowed irrigators to sell underutilized water 
assets to the CEWO. Alternatively, the risk minimization behavior used within this SCA 
model is not applicable to all farmers (Rasmussen 2011b). 
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Second, all scenarios provide a blank slate free from any binding institutional legacy that 
hindered past water reform (Cummins & Watson 2012). This approach overcomes 
institutional barriers and helps illustrates gains from reallocating resources outside of 
established irrigation zones, it can create misleading outcomes. For example, the model 
ignores natural flow constraint barriers like the Barmah and Millewa Chokes (Kingsford 
2000). Consequently, when these alternative theoretical optimized partial equilibrium 
solutions are compared, the errors can be compounded and are derived from the 
heuristics and bounds within the model. Therefore the optimal CEWO portfolio suggested 
by the model will differ to the realized portfolio due to: the model’s bounds; the incomplete 
understanding of the current and future water security provided by alternative property 
rights; the CEWO not revealing the complete set of their environmental objectives; and 
changes to future irrigator willingness to sell water to the CEWO. 
 
The use of a single known (assumed) variable to describe the reliability of alternative water 
rights allows the model to derive an optimal portfolio for the RtB process to target. In reality 
the reliability of these assets are not constant by state of nature and the adoption of a 
stochastic description of reliability of each alternative water right, by state of nature would 
help explore the environmental and economic return trade-offs in greater detail. This 
stochastic approach would change the portfolio’s spatial targeting and the desirable mix of 
alternative property rights. This information could also be used to reveal the economic 
benefits of having adaptable and not hard environmental flow targets as Adamson, 
Quiggin and Quiggin (2011) discovered in an analysis for the MDBA (see Section 10.3 for 
greater discussion on this issue). This new portfolio may then increase the cost for the RtB 
above the current budgetary constraint. However, the RtB appears to offer a cost-effective 
solution to achieve the goals stipulated in the Basin Plan. Any funding shortfall is likely to 
be relatively minor when compared to the funding available for the SRUWIP.  (next 
section) and policy makers would be advised to follow the PC’s (2010) recommendation to 
transfer more funds to the RtB program, if needed.  
 
How the CEWO uses its water to meet environmental watering plans and improve water 
quality will have direct impacts on the river flow. If the demand patterns between irrigators 
and the environment diverge, then conveyance patterns may alter, eroding potential gains 
from the CEWO and irrigators piggybacking on each other’s water supply, resulting in 
changes to environmental, social and economic outcomes.  
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The area constraints on horticultural expansion may underestimate the true value of 
groundwater now and into the future. When the solutions are compared in Table 8-9, the 
area contracting out of horticulture being produced with surface water is identical to the 
expansion in the horticulture area irrigated with groundwater. The economic benefits from 
improving water quality for production have not been examined. 
 
Debate has suggested that the second round losses associated with selling water would 
exceed any first round gain. However, Dixon et al. (2011) found that the wealth transfer to 
irrigators from the RtB has negated any real losses in the second round. If anything, a 
reduction in the number of private property rights, should increase their value and allow 
farm equity to increase (Section 10.2.2). This equity then provides the impetus for 
irrigators to invest in water saving technology, creating further wealth and this is where the 
RtB and the SRWUIP diverge in three critical features. 
 Summary 8.7
These results illustrate the benefits of modeling the conjunctive changes in property rights 
within a state-contingent framework to understand how private individuals adapt in 
response to a policy change to understand changes in welfare (Randall 1975). The state-
contingent approach helps illustrate the ability of decision makers to adapt to climate and 
policy signals by changing inputs to produce state described outputs. 
 
The analysis suggests that the $3.1 billion RtB program could achieve the stated Basin 
Plan’s objectives under a changing climate. Even with the limits of the model, a net wealth 
transfer to irrigators is evident. This wealth transfer could be justified from a social point of 
view as the Basin Plan may have second round impacts that this analysis can not 
examine. 
 
However, the correct optimization question the Basin Plan should have asked was,… 
…what optimal bundle of entitlements could achieve the social objectives at least 
cost under increasing climatic uncertainty? 
 
As the climate continues to change, the future reliability of alternative surface water 
entitlements will be discounted further and the owners of the golden groundwater receive 
increasing asset values. This was a deliberate decision to illustrate that decision makers 
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determined that groundwater resources are underutilized. Under a changing climate, the 
recharge rates to groundwater will reduce, leading to revised reliability rates in the long 
run, creating a call for further compensation. Until then a key adoption response for 
irrigators will be to take advantage of the ability to transfer surface entitlements in 
groundwater assets as allowed by the Basin Plan. This could create an over-exploitation of 
groundwater resources. Thus, as the Basin Plan directly tackles the visible consequences 
of over-allocated surface water by restoring surface flows, it may be creating externalities 
within aquifers (MacDonald and Young, 2001).  
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9. OPTIONS FOR RESTORING THE BALANCE: SRWUIP78  
 Introduction 9.1
By 2050, up to 3.9 billion people globally are expected to reside within river basins affected 
by severe water stress and supply scarcity (OECD 2012). Scarcity drives change, and 
consequently agricultural water within many of these basins has been targeted for 
reallocation to achieve multiple water use objectives (Saleth, Dinar & Frisbie 2011). 
Sustainable water use that maintains both agricultural production and the biophysical 
environment involves a complex trade-off between economic, social-cultural and 
ecological systems (Chiesura & de Groot 2003). One such example of complex economic, 
social and ecological water demand trade-offs can be found in Australia’s Murray–Darling 
Basin (MDB). This trade-off relationship has motivated an implementation of costly and 
contentious intervention strategies to reallocate water from economic (e.g. irrigated 
agriculture) to ecological (e.g. basin river flow) and social uses. Major MDB intervention 
approaches involve: (i) market purchase of agricultural water rights through an AUD$3.1 
billion program known as Restoring the Balance (RtB); and (ii) off-farm storage/delivery 
infrastructure upgrades and on-farm irrigation technical efficiency improvements through 
an AUD$5.8 billion program known as Sustainable Rural Water Use and Infrastructure 
[Program (SRWUIP)] (Crase & O'Keefe 2009).79 A target reallocation figure of 2750GL 
from these intervention programs by 2019 was established through a Basin-wide Plan, 
inclusive of a minimum 650GL/pa total flow to the River Murray mouth at the Coorong 
                                            
78
 The following section has been published as. 
Adamson, D & Loch, A 2104, 'Possible negative sustainability impacts from ‘gold-plating’ 
infrastructure', Agricultural Water Management, vol. 145 (November), pp 134-44, 
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.agwat.2013.09.022 
 
This section is presented as published, except for sections 9.3 to 9.6 which have been altered to discuss the 
modeling sections in greater detail and consistency with Section 8. In addition the section has also been 
edited for consistency with the rest of the thesis (e.g. SRWUI is now SRWUIP) and links to other parts of the 
thesis have been added. This results section has also been expanded. 
 
79
 For the purposes of this section, we apply a definition of water use efficiency consistent with Perry (2011), 
which differentiates between total water use efficiency (i.e. production yield per unit of total water used) and 
irrigation water use efficiency (i.e. production yield per unit of irrigation water applied). Herein, the concept of 
technical efficiency is consistent with the total water use efficiency definition above. 
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(Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) 2012c)80. Recently, a further AUD$1.7 billion was 
committed to purchasing additional water rights and addressing water delivery constraints 
in the MDB (DSEWPC 2013). Consequently, reallocation targets for environmental 
outcomes have increased by 450–3200GL and the completion timeframe by five years to 
2024. 
 
These intervention programs constitute a transfer of public funds to purchase water from 
irrigators and subsidized capital payments to upgrade infrastructure owned by both on-
farm and off-farm operators. Of the two intervention programs, SRWUIP represents the 
larger proportion of funding commitment (68%). However, water reallocation from this 
program may be limited to 40% of the 3200GL target if historic MDB water saving 
outcomes can be maintained 81 . As previous policy has divided water savings equally 
between irrigation and environmental uses, the total water reallocation from infrastructure 
projects may be as low as 20% of environmental needs. Further, climate change is 
predicted to reduce MDB surface water availability between 9% (northern MDB) and 13% 
(southern MDB) under the median 2030 scenario (CSIRO 2008). If accurate, this has 
important implications for future water saving outcomes from any executed SRWUIP 
projects between now and 2024. Finally, the MDB experiences high seasonal variability in 
surface water runoff into storage and delivery systems (Connor et al. 2012), which must 
factor into the environmental manager’s capacity to deliver environmental objectives 
across a temporal scale. The uncertainties related to the SRWUIP include water returned 
from capital works, future climate change impacts and MDB seasonal inflow variability; all 
of which require flexible water management arrangements to achieve the objectives listed 
in the Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan). The Basin Plan’s environmental flow 
objectives include providing habitat refugia or rejuvenation, sediment or nutrient flushing 
from the system, and ephemeral connections between spatially diverse species 
                                            
80
 The Coorong, located near the mouth of the River Murray in South Australia, is an iconic National Park 
and wetland environmental area which has been identified as a key bird-breeding and species habitat 
management site in the Basin Plan. 
 
81
 The Living Murray (TLM) program invested AUD$1 billion in purchasing water and (predominantly) 
infrastructure upgrade projects between 2004 and 2009 to generate 225GL of water savings from technical 
efficiency improvements (MDBA 2009a). These savings were divided equally between agricultural, 
environmental and urban uses (Quiggin 2012). With no discount factor—an unlikely outcome given an 
expected diminishing availability of suitable infrastructure investment projects over time (Crase & O'Keefe 
2009)—a further AUD$6 billion investment could generate ∼6 × 225 = 1350GL water savings; or 40% of the 
reallocation objective. Water recovered via TLM does not contribute in any way towards meeting the current 
Basin Plan target. 
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populations while maintaining low levels of salinity (Connor et al., 2013). Investing in fixed 
capital projects across the MDB may therefore be inconsistent with a flexible management 
approach to counter the inherent variability and uncertainty associated with future flow 
patterns.  
 
The size of the budget allocated to the Basin Plan requires careful scrutiny to justify public 
expenditure. This section reviews the SRWUIP program objectives and models the 
impacts subsidizing water-use efficiency could have for all water users under current and 
future climate outcomes. The technical efficiency gain implications are demonstrated using 
a modified version of the state-contingent MDB model developed by Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2009). This model can also highlight the differences 
between variability and climate change within the basin to allow for proactive water user 
responses to environmental stimuli. Qureshi et al. (2010) provide a useful base 
examination of the interaction between MDB intervention approaches and return flow 
outcomes.  
 
This analysis expands that study in three ways. First, a full-Basin model is optimized rather 
than focusing on a single-catchment example. Second, while the two studies share similar 
state of nature constraints, this study considers future risk and adaptation to both climate 
change and extended drought conditions. Third, where Qureshi et al. concentrate on 
return flow impacts from intervention, this section assesses capital work’s contributions 
towards achieving MDB Plan objectives (environmental, social and economic) to 
determine the net economic return from incentivized capital investments. Results suggest 
that increasing farm technical efficiency via capital investment may encourage production 
systems with reduced adaptive capacity to future water scarcity, thus exposing prevailing 
irrigation capital to unacceptable risk. Further, the modeling suggests that rather than 
freeing water for environmental use, the proposed technical efficiency investment creates 
second-best options for the MDB environment if changes to return flow are ignored. 
Finally, during climate change or drought-induced water scarcity, this approach results in 
significant reductions in the water supply available to achieve environmental, social and 
economic outcomes across the MDB. The remainder of this section outlines: general 
issues associated with technical efficiency improvement in the MDB; the modified state-
contingent MDB model and its application in this context; results from the modeling 
process; and implications for water managers. This section concludes that federal basin 
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water managers at multiple governance scales should avoid reallocation policy options 
that reduce the flexibility of managers to respond to the inherent variability and uncertainty 
associated with their systems. 
 Technical Efficiency Issues 9.2
The reallocation of water resources to the environment via investment in on-farm capital is 
based on an assumption of technical efficiency gains. In this paper, technical efficiency is 
expressed as both a reduction in the total volume of water required to produce (at least) 
similar original technology outputs, and a reduction in the rate of return flows (Cummins & 
Watson 2012). Irrigation water is applied to support plant growth and yield. The difference 
between applied water and plant uptake (return flow) then contributes water back into the 
hydrological system as irrigation runoff, seepage or evaporation. These return flows 
subsequently provide water for downstream water rights (Nieuwoudt & Armitage 2004). 
Thus, more efficient water use may result in reduced irrigation water use as well as less 
‘excess’ water availability as return flows to the hydrological system (Grafton & Hussey 
2007).  
 
Negative impacts from reduced return flows include less surface water runoff and 
groundwater recharge (Young 2010) water quality impacts from increased pollutants (e.g. 
salt or phosphate) or turbidity (Grafton & Hussey 2007), and magnified consumptive 
irrigation use (Connell & Grafton 2008) reducing water for the environment. Extended 
drought, drainage collection improvements and altered on-farm water use practices have 
reduced MDB return flows since the early 1990s (URS Australia 2010). Return flow 
reductions from changed water use practices to manage variable water supply conditions 
under climate change are also reported by Connor et al. (2012). 
 
The technical efficiency impacts explored herein are best highlighted through example. 
Where efficiency gain is expressed as both a reduction in the volume of water required to 
produce (at least) similar original technology outputs, and a reduction in the rate of return 
flows (Cummins & Watson 2012). Figure 9-1 illustrates efficiency gains for a perennial 
crop and follows notation from Section 3. Here the original production function PF (F(x) 
generated an output per hectare 𝑍  from water use 𝑊𝑈 . If more capital resources are 
invested, a new production function generates 𝑍 from a reduced water volume 𝑊𝑈′. For 
simplicity it is assumed that neither the operational or maintenance costs increase. Under 
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drought (climate change) conditions the available water will decrease proportionally for 
each production function to 𝑊𝑈𝑑/𝑊𝑈𝑑′  such that the reduction is equivalent (𝑊𝑈 −
𝑊𝑈𝑑 =  𝑊𝑈’ − 𝑊𝑈𝑑’). Farm output also falls from 𝑍 to /𝑍𝑑’ , where 𝑍𝑑’ <  𝑍𝑑. 
 
 
Figure 9-1 On-Farm Water Efficiency Gains 
 
During drought supply conditions we assume all saved water from capital transformation 
has been applied to perennial horticulture production, resulting in a higher capital level 
exposure to risk than in the original production function context. Further, where the capital 
transformation has not increased water supply security, or where the water savings are not 
used to improve flexibility in farm risk management, then subsequent droughts will result in 
additional negative capital returns (e.g. the perennial crop asset may be lost). Young et al. 
(2002) suggest that, over 20 years, water efficiency savings following capital 
transformation could reduce net (return) flows by as much as 723GL per annum—or 23% 
of reallocation objectives under the 3,200GL target. Climate change could further reduce 
return flows in the southern MDB. Quantifying the impacts of changes to land and water 
use, and the subsequent return flow implications under inherent basin water supply 
uncertainties, motivates our application of a modified state-contingent model. 
 
Output/Ha 
Water Use/Ha 
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𝑍𝑑 
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 Modeling the SRWUIP 9.3
The SRWUIP analysis aimed to follow the RtB approach (Section 8), of examining how the 
SCA model (Section 6) could be used to represent how the SRWIUP could influence 
irrigator’s profit maximizing behavior subject to the Basin Plan objectives and the cost 
constraints of the SRWUIP. However, after numerous attempts this approach had to be 
abandoned as no feasible solution could be found and these infeasibility problems are 
discussed in the results (Section 9.6). To obtain a feasible optimization solution for the 
SRWUIP both the model and approach were altered as follows.  
 
First, severe restrictions were placed on how the SRWUIP program operated, including: 
restricting the SRWUIP to only spend funds in the Southern Murray-Darling Basin (SMDB); 
SRWUIP funding could only be used by horticultural producers; and the SRWUIP had to 
obtain only 971GL for the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office (CEWO). Second, a 
new set of perennial state-contingent production systems were developed to represent 
how the SRWUIP program altered: water-use requirements, capital costs; and variable 
costs. Third, irrigator behavior towards subsidized capital investment was represented by 
changing prior land use constraints on perennial producers. Fourth, the water reflow 
equations were modified to represent the difference between existing water-use 
technology and the new subsidized water-use technology. Fifth, additional constraints 
were introduced to ensure that both the SRWUIP and the Basin Plan objectives were 
obtained. 
 Placing Limits on the SRWUIP 9.3.1
After extensive testing, the SRWUIP has been limited to obtain the 971 GL of water from 
the southern connected system. This SRWUIP target value is then the summation of the 
Sustainable Diversion Limit (SDL) targets to be obtained from all southern trading zones 
(Section 7.3.2 ) (i.e. 971GL = Southern New South Wales (NSW) (462.9GL) + Victoria 
(VIC) (425.3GL) + South Australia (82.8GL) trading zones in Table 7-5). This approach 
then provided the SRWUIP with the flexibility it required to obtain water for the 
environment at least cost across regions. It is assumed that all other water required by the 
CEWO comes from the RtB but to prevent any signals from the RtB entering the model, no 
prices have been attached to the transfer of property rights to the CEWO. 
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 New State-Contingent Production Systems 9.3.2
Due to a lack of published data about the expected on-farm water-use efficiency gains, it 
was assumed that the new capital intensive horticultural crops would experience a net 
reduction in water use of 20-30% depending on their existing technology settings (Table 
9-1). In this case seven new horticultural commodities were developed  𝑥 =  (24 to 30). 
This assumption that SRWUIP funding is only allocated to horticultural crops, allows the 
model to examine if capital subsidies, could encourage irrigators to ignore existing drought 
management strategies. The horticultural production systems are divided into six perennial 
production systems 𝑥 =  (24 to 29) and an annual vegetable crop. The annual vegetable 
crop is described in Section 7.7.1, and allows it provides the opportunity for the irrigator 
not to irrigate in a drought year. 
 
The following assumptions have been made for the SRWUIP program. Only 50% of the 
water efficiency gained from capital expenditure goes to the environment. A total budget of 
$7.6 billion exists (MDBA 2012c) to recover 971GL and the program only occurs in the 
Southern Basin. This then provides an annuity per megalitre (ML) of $367 at 9% over a 20 
year period. By assuming that the capital is subsidized by the total volume of water 
returned to the environment per hectare, the reduced capital and by commodity by 
catchment is determined. The reduction in variable costs is determined by the total water 
efficiency gain multiplied by the price of water set at $25/ML as consistent with the model. 
 Modeling Irrigator Behavior to Subsidized Capital 9.3.3
The Base scenario described below, follows the same rules for horticulture and total land 
use as described in Equation 6-12 and Equation 6-13. However, this constraint was 
relaxed in the SRWUIP scenarios (Section 9.5) to deliberately illustrate perverse policy 
outcomes of how cheap capital could alter investment patterns. In this case, the 
subsidized production systems can expand into the total area irrigated (Equation 9-2) and 
expansion of unsubsidized, old horticultural technology, is still restrained by Equation 9-1.  
 
 𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑥(1...7) ≤ 1.5𝐿𝑘𝑚(1...7) Equation 9-1 
 𝐿𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑥(1...22,24…30) = 2𝐿𝑘𝑚(1…16) Equation 9-2 
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 Modeling Changes in Reflow 9.3.4
Irrigation returns flows (𝑤𝑟) are one of the parameters required to determine water flow 
within the SCA model (Equation 6-14). As stated in Section 6.7.2, 𝑤𝑟 is determined by a 𝑠 
defined reflow variable for each production system (𝑥𝑘) based on the technology used (-L 
or –H). The separation of the state-contingent production systems into those produced 
with and without SRWUIP funding, then allowed for the reflow variables used by 𝑥𝑘,𝑠 to be 
altered to represent changed reflow rates due to subsidized technology. This approach 
then provided the capacity to model the spatial impacts of SRWUIP investment on water 
flow without having to modify Equation 6-14. 
 Basin Plan Objectives 9.3.5
However, to model the Basin Plan, Equation 8 had to be transformed into Equations 13 to 
17 to model both the specified catchment and trading region SDL (Table 7-5). As 
discussed in Section 7.1, of the two defined unconnected catchments (MDBA 2011e), only 
the Lachlan (k = 9) is included within the model. These equations allow irrigation water can 
to be carried over between states of nature by only requiring water on average to equal the 
specified SDL.  
 
∑𝑤𝑘 𝜋𝑠  ≤  ∑𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑆𝐷𝐿
𝑘  Equation 9-3 
∑𝑤𝑁𝑇𝑉 𝜋𝑠  ≤  143𝐺𝐿 
Equation 9-4 
∑𝑤𝑆𝑇𝑉 𝜋𝑠  ≤  425.3𝐺𝐿 Equation 9-5 
∑ 𝑤𝑆𝑇𝑁 𝜋𝑠  ≤  462.9𝐺𝐿 
Equation 9-6 
∑ 𝑤𝑆𝑇𝑆 𝜋𝑠  ≤  82.8𝐺𝐿 Equation 9-7 
∑𝑤𝑆𝑇𝐴 𝜋𝑠  ≤  450𝐺𝐿 
Equation 9-8 
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Symbol: Definition: 
𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑆𝐷𝐿 Total volume of surface water allowed for irrigation use 
𝑁𝑇𝑉 Water trading zones in the northern catchments (𝑘 = 1…8) 
𝑆𝑇𝑁 Water trading zones in the southern New South Wales (NSW) 
catchments (𝑘 = 10, 12, 14, 16, 18) 
𝑆𝑇𝑆 The water trading zone in South Australia (SA)(𝑘 = 19) 
𝑆𝑇𝑉 Water trading zones in Victoria (VIC) (𝑘 = 11, 13, 15, 17) 
𝑆𝑇𝐴 Water trading zones in all southern catchments (𝑘 = 10 …19) 
 
For the SRWUIP program Equation 9-9 then replaces Equation 9-5 to Equation 9-7 to 
allow the model to find the best places within the southern connected system to undertake 
capital works to get 971GL for the environment. 
 
∑𝑤𝐶𝑇𝑍 𝜋𝑠 =  971𝐺𝐿 Equation 9-9 
 
Where 𝐶𝑇𝑍 is the water from capital programs in southern trading zones (𝑘 = 10…19). 
 
Equation 9-9 can then record the water gained from investing in water-use efficient 
technology and the equation retains all water saved in the river. For example, each Ha of 
Citrus-H produced with SRWUIP technology uses 2.3 ML less water than Citrus-H 
produced with existing technology (Table 9-1), which then provides 1.15ML for the 
environment (i.e. 50% of 2.3 = 1.15ML). However, this approach then treats all 
environmental water as improvements in the rivers base flow and does not assign the 
environmental water gained from the SRWUIP with defined property rights (see Section 
9.6.4 for a discussion on this assumption). 
 
Another limitation in the approach is that the model considers that all water diverted is 
used on farm. The model therefore cannot track conveyance losses in built capital 
infrastructure. 
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 Data Used in this Analysis 9.4
The data used in this analysis for SDL, climate change, and all production systems 
produced without subsidized capital can be found in Section 7. The data for the seven 
SRWUIP subsidized horticultural production systems developed are detailed in Table 9-1.  
 
Table 9-1 How Capital Investment has Been Modeled to Influence Water Use, Return 
Flow Rates and Subsidized Capital Expenditure in the Murrumbidgee Only 
𝑿 
Production 
System Name 
Reduction in Water 
Requirements 
Return flow Rates Reduction 
in Capital 
Drought Normal  Wet Drought Normal  Wet 
𝑥24 Citrus-H 2.3 2.3 2.7 0.05 0.15 0.15 $828 
𝑥25 Citrus-L 2.0 2.0 2.4 0.05 0.15 0.15 $736 
𝑥26 Grapes 1.8 1.8 2.2 0.05 0.15 0.15 $677 
𝑥27 Stone Fruit-H 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.05 0.15 0.15 $331 
𝑥28 Stone Fruit-L 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.05 0.15 0.15 $474 
𝑥29 Pome Fruit 2.1 2.1 2.5 0.05 0.15 0.15 $773 
𝑥30 Vegetables 0.0 2.5 1.8 0.05 0.15 0.15 $904 
Note: Half of the water reduction is estimated to go to the environment by state of nature 
The reduction in water costs is reflected in the changes to variable costs under constant $/ML 
 Scenarios 9.5
The scenarios listed in Table 9-2, are used to analyze the outcomes from investing in 
water use efficiency to obtain 971GL of water for the environment, compared to simply 
removing the water away from irrigators. The Base scenario assumes that the water is 
simply taken away from irrigators without compensation. The WRF-100 scenario assumes 
that reflow rates do not change under increased efficiency gains and the two WRF-50 
scenario assumes that reflow rates halve under increased efficiency. By comparing WRF-
100 to the two WRF-50 scenarios, impacts on return flows and downstream users can be 
examined from subsidizing in water-use efficient technology. The WRF-50 ex-ante and the 
WRF-50 ex-post scenarios provide the difference between decision makers being unaware 
or aware of how a reduced reflow rates could alter the outcome for all downstream water 
users and investment s. The climate change (CC) scenarios are both ex-ante for the 450 
Avg Climate shock in 2050 and 2100. These analyses examine what would occur if both a 
reflow reduction and climate change occurred after the subsidized investments were 
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made. The Droughts scenario examines a new optimal strategy for strategically investing 
in the SRWUIP with perfect knowledge that droughts will become more frequent in the 
future. The increased frequency of the drought state occurring is identified in the fourth 
column and is consistent with Section 8.  
 
Table 9-2 Model Runs 
Model Intervention Return Flow State probability Climate assumption 
Base Full trade 100% (0.5,0.2,0.3) Current 
WRF-100 Capital works 100% (0.5,0.2,0.3) Current 
WRF-50 ex-ante Capital works 50% (0.5,0.2,0.3) Current 
WRF-50 ex-post Capital works 50% (0.5,0.2,0.3) Current 
2050 CC scenario Capital works 50% (0.5,0.2,0.3) 450GL average, 2050 
2100 CC scenario Capital works 50% (0.5,0.2,0.3) 450GL average, 2100 
Droughts Capital works 50% (0.5,0.3,0.2) Current 
 Results 9.6
The Base model assumes what would occur if the SDL was achieved by simply trading the 
water away from irrigators. All other runs examine the SRWUIP and assume that 971GL of 
water must come from water savings via capital works. The Base scenario provide 
sufficient water to meet all defined objectives of the Basin Plan by using 10,127 GL of 
water to irrigate 1.8 million Ha of land. The Base model would generate average returns of 
$2.4 billion and this would require farmers repaying $1,674 million per annum on capital 
investments. On average, Adelaide’s water quality is expected to be 282EC and the 
Coorong would receive 5,546 GL of water. Flows to the Coorong are expected to decrease 
to 1,164 GL in a drought state of nature (Table 9-3).  
 
The WRF-100 results provided Coorong flows of 867GL under drought conditions while 
salinity was maintained at 308EC, meeting important constraints. By comparison, in the 
model where it was known that capital works would result in 50% return flow reductions 
(WRF-50 ex-post) constraints were still able to be met. That is, Coorong flows of 650GL 
were achieved in drought conditions with a moderate increase in salinity (348EC); 
providing a feasible outcome from the capital works program (see italicized Coorong flow 
volumes in Table 9-3). In the normal state, agricultural water use remained reasonably 
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consistent between the Base and WRF-100/WRF-50 (ex-post) models, but economic 
returns increased dramatically (from $2,436 to ~$7,760 million) as the subsidization of 
capital investment transformed the southern Basin towards increased production of citrus 
and grape perennials. This transformation naturally involved corresponding increases in 
farm capital exposure to risk under different states of nature. However, to achieve this 
increased income the annual cost of capital would need to be $5,755 million. 
 
Table 9-3 Summary Results from Model Runs 
Model Normal 
water 
use 
(GL) 
Normal 
Coorong 
flows 
(GL) 
Drought 
Coorong 
flows 
(GL) 
Normal 
Salinity 
(EC) 
Normal $ 
returns 
($million) 
Area 
under 
production 
(‘000 Ha) 
Annual 
Capital 
Repayments 
($’m) 
Base 10,127 5,546 1,164 282 $2,436 1,800 $1,674 
WRF-100 10,120 5,565 867 243 $7,762 1,269 $5,755 
WRF-50 
(ex-ante) 
 4,841 582 277    
WRF-50 
(ex-post) 
10,133 4,832 650 280 $7,763 1,269 $5,756 
2050 CC 
scenario 
 2,524 0 474    
2100 CC 
scenario 
 2,374 0 497    
Droughts 11,365 3,894 650 353 $8,336 1,348 $6,109 
Note: Full outcome sets were not always calculated for each model where they involved minor alterations 
to previous runs (e.g. 2050 CC scenario effects based on WRF-50 ex post). This accounts for any 
missing values above. 
The resilience of the optimized solutions was testing by examining what could occur to 
capital investments and environmental gains from a changing climate. The CC represents 
the 450 Avg Climate scenario in 2050 and 2100 (i.e. 2050 CC and 2100 CC, respectively). 
While ‘Droughts’ examines the impact on water resources from an increased frequency of 
the drought state occurring.  
 
Although not optimized (ex-ante), the models showed decreasing return flows in northern 
Basin catchments in normal and wet states, and large southern Basin catchment return 
flow reductions in the drought state of nature. In both models Coorong flows are reduced 
to zero, and salinity impacts range between 1,750EC (2050 CC) and 2,371EC (2100 CC). 
This suggests that any early environmental benefits derived from a MDB capital works 
program could be entirely undone by 2100 under climate change impacts. It also suggests 
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a significant requirement for future MDB structural adjustment under a capital works 
intervention approach. 
 
An increased frequency in drought states, encourages land use to increase across the 
Basin. Setting return flows at 50%, allows an additional 492GL of water use during the 
drought state and an additional 79,000 hectares of land is irrigated. In this case, southern 
Basin production mainly transforms toward annual vegetable crops (Table 9-4). This then 
provides the capacity for irrigators to adapt to drought conditions. However, in line with our 
technical efficiency discussion above, perennial crop production also decreases, 
suggesting negative capital returns for the Basin as a whole. Overall the model estimates 
an increase in economic returns under the drought state; rising from $957 million (Base) to 
$4,935 million (Drought). Notably, the annual capital repayment required to achieve this 
needs to increase to $6,109 million. 
 Implications for Water Managers 9.6.1
The capital works scenarios performed according to a priori expectations of water user 
behavior, within the context of severely relaxed Basin constraint parameters. Irrigators 
adopt subsidized capital works readily and adjust their water and land use to 
accommodate changed availability. However, this clearly has a number of implications for 
irrigators, water managers and projected MDB governance arrangements. Our findings 
indicate that full agricultural water reduction requirements cannot be achieved through 
capital works models, particularly in southern MDB catchments without significant 
relaxation of existing flow, trade and zone constraints. The use of capital works as a policy 
instrument appears to: (i) expose agricultural water users to increased economic risk 
under production transformations; (ii) decrease social wealth via large public to private 
transfers to achieve capital investment (relative to Base trade model results); and (iii) 
where capital investment results in return flow reductions, undermine Basin Plan 
environmental flow objectives. We detail each of these in turn. 
 Production Transformation 9.6.2
Generally, a public subsidization of private on-farm infrastructure will lead to suboptimal 
allocation of resources, with high net social costs. More specifically in the MDB, any 
transformation of production towards perennial cropping in response to subsidized capital 
works programs, possibly as a consequence of perceived water supply increases from 
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efficiency, may drive a number of additional specific perverse outcomes. For example, if 
annual cropping production shifts towards higher rates of perennial production, reduced 
non-planting during scarcity will decrease future water flexibility and increase the need for 
water market allocation purchasing (Wheeler, Zuo & Bjornlund 2013). Further, although 
some irrigators improve their reliability of supply via the transformation of lower security 
licenses (e.g. general security licenses in New South Wales) into high security licenses, 
overall the reliability of water supply will not be improved via capital works. During a return 
to reduced supply conditions, increased on-farm capital investment will raise perennial 
irrigator exposure in the form of subsidized (public) or individual (private) risk. Where 
irrigators more generally choose to expand their irrigated cropping area in response to 
subsidized capital investment (i.e. shifts from IA to IA’ in Figure 9-2), such that all ‘saved’ 
water is applied on-farm, they will also be exposed to increased levels of private risk 
during adverse states of nature. 
 
 
Figure 9-2 Possible Efficiency Gain Effects on Total Irrigated Area (IA) 
 
The SRWUIP allows the Jevons Paradox (Alcott 2005; Jevons 1865) or rebound effect 
(Gómez Gómez, Blanco & Dionisio 2013; Gutierrez-Martin & Gómez Gómez 2011) in 
water-use efficiency to occur where instead of environmental gains (Huffaker & Whittlesey 
2003), the demand for water increases and the area irrigated increases at the expense of 
national welfare (Scheierling 2011; Scheierling, Young & Cardon 2006). Unlike other 
studies, the combination of the SDL and the SRUIP obtaining a share of the water-use 
efficiency gain then helped curb the area expansion. However, this analysis expects up to 
1.37 million Ha to be upgraded (Table 9-4) and in this case, as Connell (2007) discusses, 
IA 
IA’ 
 200 
 
the SRWUIP clearly represents a policy decision makers dream about production and not 
the environment. 
 
One unintended consequence of dreaming about production is that the SRWUIP provides 
sufficient incentives to transform industries. In this case, if irrigators on mass converted 
annual production systems into perennial systems, then the past drought adaption of 
purchasing water from annual producers to keep perennials alive will be lost.  
 
Table 9-4 Area Irrigated (‘000Ha) 
 Subsidized Non-Subsidized TOTAL 
 Citrus Grapes Veg Hort Cotton Rice Cereals Dairy Hort TOTAL 
Base    201 792 420 33 208 201 1,654 
WRF-100 402 867  31 792 57   1,300 2,149 
WRF-50  
(Ex-post), CC 
2050 & 2100 402 867  31 792 59   1,300 2,151 
Droughts 364 790 193 31 704 73 90 4 1,379 2,249 
 
This increased exposure to risk is underlined in the climate change and drought models, 
where any future reductions in water supply will logically need to be borne by irrigators, the 
environment and society as a consequence of the capital works subsidy incentives. An 
example helps illustrate the link between efficiency improvements from capital works and 
possible perverse contributions to environmental flow objectives, Table 9-5. 
 
In this example, a 30% efficiency improvement from the adoption of new technology 
reduces water use per hectare from 10 ML/Ha to 7 ML/Ha. Originally, return flows 
contributed 3ML/Ha in normal and wet states of nature, and 1ML/Ha in the drought. 
Savings generated from capital works lower return flows by 50%, but since water use is 
also reduced, this has a proportional impact on return flows. Consequently, return flows fall 
to 1.05ML/Ha in the normal and wet states, and 0.35ML/Ha in drought. If savings are 
shared on a proportional basis between irrigators and the environment then irrigators 
effectively receive 1.5ML/Ha for existing or increased use. This use contributes to return 
flows, and it does so at a reduced rate, resulting in 0.22ML/Ha relative environmental flow 
reductions during normal and wet states of nature. Note that in the drought state 
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environmental return flow increases by 0.93ML/Ha as a consequence of the capital works, 
which may be considered positive. It should be noted that some irrigators might choose 
not to utilize their saved water in this way, electing instead to retain that water as a buffer 
for risk-management purposes, and thereby decrease their risk exposure (Wheeler & 
Cheesman 2013). However, if MDB environmental watering plan objectives seek to mimic 
natural conditions, then increased flows during dry periods may be at odds with 
management goals. This strategy of preserving water to minimize risk during dry periods is 
evident in the drought model where, instead of investing all subsidized capital into 
perennial crops that require water in all states of nature (see Table 9-1), investment in 
vegetables occurs (i.e. 193,000Ha, Table 9-6) where water is not needed in the drought 
state of nature. If irrigators are then not utilizing their water resources it may suggest that 
the recent drought may have left a permanent transition towards greater flexibility in the 
management systems. 
 
Table 9-5 Water Efficiency Impacts on Environmental Flow 
 Existing technology New technology 
Water use/Ha 10ML 7ML ( = 3ML saving) 
Return flows by state  
(normal, drought, wet) 
100% return flows  
(0.3, 0.1, 0.3) 
50% return flow 
 (0.15, 0.05, 0.15) 
Return flow outcomes 3.0ML, 1.0ML, 3.0ML 1.05ML, 0.35ML, 1.05ML (extra 
water) 
Water saving split (50/50)  1.50ML (increased use) 
Increased farm water use  2.55ML, 1.85ML, 2.55ML 
Environmental supply 3.0ML, 1.0ML, 3.0ML 2.55 + (0.15*1.5) = -2.78,  
1.85 + (0.05*1.5) = 1.93,  
2.55 + (0.15*1.5) = -2.78 
Difference: 3.0ML-2.78ML=-0.22ML(N), 1.0ML+1.93=0.93ML(D), 3ML-2.78ML=-
0.22ML(W) 
 
Table 9-6 Change in Capital Investment by Enterprise, Comparing Climate Change 
Production 
System Name 
WRF-100, 2500 CC, 
2100 CC 
Drought Run 
Citrus-H 402 366 
Citrus-L   
Grapes 867 790 
Stone Fruit-H   
Stone Fruit-L   
Pome Fruit   
Vegetables  193 
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 Wealth Transfer Misallocation  9.6.3
The SRWUIP attempts to prevent the ‘Swiss cheese’ impacts by rewarding inefficient 
producers and locking capital into existing production areas. Thus the SRWUIP appears to 
have fallen into the methodological trap noted by Randall (1975). Randall argued that 
when the returns from the existing allocation of property rights are used in an analysis, a 
bias towards the status-quo occurs, preventing increased welfare. 
 
Under the SRWUIP program a proportion of public expenditure will also be allocated to 
owners of large scale capital (i.e. those that manage diversions before allocating water to 
farmers). The limited public data on proposed MDB capital works prevents a breakdown 
on which group (i.e. irrigators or irrigation infrastructure operators (IIOs)) in the MDB would 
receive the funding. This prevents a clear understanding of whether rent seeking is 
occurring and, if so, whether the wealth transfer is equalized between the groups. 
However, it is possible that water savings are predominantly created by conveyance 
system improvements, not on-farm efficiencies. Therefore farm water use may not 
decrease (Table 9-2).82 
 
Thus, although the policy intent may be to allocate wealth transfers across irrigators, IIOs 
will also be obtaining subsidies to provide environment ‘gains’. It is possible that once 
implemented, the SRWUIP may heavily favor IIOs to provide environmental water allowing 
for the development of ‘gold-plated’ water infrastructure. As a consequence, irrigators (in 
particular) and environmental water managers will be adversely impacted through 
exposure to higher infrastructure operating costs over time. Economically marginal 
irrigators may be forced to exit sub-systems, thus creating the ‘Swiss Cheese’ impact that 
the SRWUIP appears to be designed to negate83.  
 
In addition, the state of nature analysis highlights the importance of considering climate 
change impacts on capital investments (Kingwell 2006). Future climate trends are 
expected to place pressure on dryland and irrigated agriculture systems to relocate 
towards favorable areas. By refurbishing existing IIO infrastructure, the chance for 
redesigning the irrigation industry for maximum social benefit is ignored. This reallocation 
                                            
82
 Contrary to the buyback recovery program, capital works creates net debt; whereas Wheeler and 
Cheesman (2013) show reduction of farm debt via buyback investment. 
 
83
 Assuming no termination charges are applied. 
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of irrigation assets was witnessed in the results for the 2050 CC and 2100 CC scenarios 
where irrigated land use trended towards southern catchments. By rewarding the current 
inefficient owners of capital to remain where they are, results in further wealth transfers 
towards irrigators and IIOs. 
 
Importantly, these irrigation water delivery schemes were originally public assets, which 
were increasingly privatized (New South Wales) or corporatized (Victoria) to meet reform 
requirements (Cummins & Watson 2012). If the economic benefits from water savings 
were obvious to MDB IIOs, we might expect them to finance capital works investments 
themselves. Since they are no longer public assets84, private incentives to invest appear 
limited and industry privatization no longer enjoys the political support afforded it in 
previous periods (Sirasoontorn & Quiggin 2007). Questions should therefore be raised 
about why public investments are being undertaken to ‘gold-plate’ these assets where 
economic capital losses are likely in future. Affecting such a substantial public investment 
(i.e. $7.75 billion) to not achieve Basin Plan outcomes, as suggested in the results, 
indicates that capital works do not provide an appropriate economic intervention. This 
contention is detailed further below. 
 Inconsistency with Basin Plan Environmental Objectives 9.6.4
To maximize the volume of water to be returned to the environment, the SRWUIP must 
allocate funds towards areas that are highly inefficient in their water use. However, this 
rewarding of resource wastage via capital subsidy then negates one of the critical aims of 
the Basin Plan, the liberalization of trade. By subsidizing inefficient producers to take on 
more debt, this policy instrument then locks land, labor and capital resources back into 
existing land use patterns, which essentially fails to embrace the concept of maximizing 
resource rents via trade.  
 
Unlike the RtB which purchased clearly defined property rights from irrigators, the property 
rights obtained from the SRWUIP are not clear. As Crase and O'Keefe (2009) argue that 
despite the rhetoric, the SRWUIP will not deliver the projected flows to the environment, 
due to the scheme being locked into the past history of mistakes including: the 
misunderstanding of the concepts, hydrology, and scale associated with river basins; 
                                            
84
 Victoria is the exception as they are owned by the minister and in this case it’s a wealth transfer to the Vic 
government.  
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questionable ‘rigor’ associated with the predicted benefits; and a lack of clear 
understanding of which property rights are being purchased. These concerns are well 
founded as the CEWO notes… 
“…SRWUIP water recovery is reported at the point at which water savings have 
been received, estimated or agreed in signed project works contracts. Until water 
transfer contracts have been exchanged however, these figures may be subject to 
change over time.”85 
 
The model results show that, if water recovered for environment benefit is not fully 
stipulated, the short-term gains of the program will be potentially undone through 
significant water resource losses; especially via climate change impacts. Importantly, no 
capital works model is able to achieve the required Basin Plan full trade zone water 
reduction target. Further, if return flows reduce as a consequence of this investment, then 
we also jeopardize Basin Plan environmental objectives. This is because return flow 
reductions diminish supply reliability for downstream users, particularly the environment 
(Table 9-3). Within a reduced return flow context, failure to fully consider states of nature 
and climate change in Basin planning may result in over-investment in capital programs, 
leading to additional diminution of environmental gains from other policy approaches (e.g. 
buyback). 
 
Finally, if we persist with previous proportional water saving sharing arrangements (50/50), 
we will likely reduce environmental flows even further. This implies that such arrangements 
may have to be reviewed to either alter share proportions to account for this imbalance 
(e.g. 75% environment, 25% irrigation), or scrap proportional sharing arrangements 
altogether. 
 
Crase, Cooper and Rose (2014) provide an analysis which suggests that SRWUIP funds 
could be better used to adjust irrigators out of the industry. Their study suggests that VIC 
irrigators had a preference for having access to reduced termination fees. This may 
suggest that the termination fees are preventing some irrigators transitioning out of the 
industry or from having the opportunity to fully engage in the RtB process. So rather than 
using subsidized capital to trap irrigators back into an activity, they may prefer to leave. 
                                            
85
http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/16cfc337-7c02-4a77-ab57-fb0e8483b58b/files/water-
recovered-under-rtb-and-srwuip.pdf 
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The SRWUIP funds could improve national welfare by reallocating these funds towards 
providing an exit strategy out of irrigation. 
 Implications from Model Limitations 9.6.5
Like all models there are limitations in the approach and assumptions. A major limitation is 
the use of discrete parameters in the optimization solution, which implies perfect 
knowledge about the future. If the model used stochastic information relating to the state of 
nature (i.e. total volume of conjunctive water) or the inputs required by state of nature (i.e. 
how much water is required to produce one hectare of a commodity), then the results 
would transition towards less area being irrigated and more water being saved to mitigate 
climatic variability in the drought state of nature and ensuring that the minimum flow and 
salinity levels are achieved. 
 
At the same time, the use of stochastic descriptions of return flows would also highlight the 
problems with water scarcity in droughts. Secondly, although providing reasonable 
estimations of flow and conveyance loss throughout the system, the model is flawed by its 
scale and scope. By modeling at a catchment management region level, clear information 
about economic return along political boundaries is provided but political boundaries do 
not align with hydrological boundaries. Consequently, the data does not necessarily align 
well with other studies that use the CSIRO sustainable yields data and/or detailed models 
that are concerned with diversions versus allocations. However, at the same time this 
simply allows for additional fundamental questions to be asked: are we irrigating in the 
right areas; should we be irrigating at all; and what are the benefits from trade? 
 Summary 9.7
The intended MDB capital works program is at odds with the Basin Plan objectives in 
terms of economic, social and environmental outcomes. By subsidizing capital investment, 
irrigation farmers in the MDB will take the opportunity to modernize their water use 
arrangements, in turn increasing farm debt levels and reducing their flexibility to future 
water supply shocks. Further, the process of ‘gold-plating’ MDB irrigation infrastructure will 
not increase the reliability or security of water assets owned by irrigators or IIOs. This 
mixture of increasing risk exposure and over-investment in capital works will compound 
losses under a future return to drought states of nature, or climate change impacts. In that 
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eventuality, irrigators (and IIOs) will: still have to cover the costs of maintaining that capital; 
and when the face value of entitlements is re-discovered under drought the pressure to 
meet new use charges and debt liabilities will likely require governments to again act as 
the final insurer. Capital investments may marginally increase: (i) on-farm water use 
efficiency; (ii) irrigators’ capacity to improve farm viability and sustainability; and (iii) rural 
structural adjustment to water reforms through regional job creation resulting in reduced 
short-term political risk. However, there is a potential trade-off associated with return flows 
that requires greater investigation. These unknowns and increased on-farm efficiency may 
be exposed under climate change.  
 
Thus, where climate change or drought-induced water scarcity present management 
issues for federal basin water managers, policy options should encourage flexibly manage 
inherent variability and uncertainty. Capital works investment policy solutions do not 
facilitate long-term flexible responses to future scarcity problems.  
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10. REVIEWING THE HYPOTHESES & CONCULUDING COMMENTS 
 Introduction 10.1
The 2007 Water Act was designed to ‘restore the balance’ between irrigators and the rest 
of the society, to improve national welfare. From a theoretical perspective the design of the 
contraction stage of water reform, utilizes the common property approach to improve 
welfare. The common property approach occurs as water is transferring water away from 
irrigators and provided to a ‘public trustee’ who manages the water resources for the 
benefit of all. This is achieved by, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) who are 
responsible for developing the Murray-Darling Basin Plan (Basin Plan). The Basin Plan 
defines the sustainable diversion limits (SDL), which cap the maximum amount of water 
that irrigators can own. The two metrics of a successful Basin Plan are defined by, an 
improvement in the ‘quality’ of the resource base and a minimum water flow target.  
 
The change between Current Diversion Limits (CDL) and the SDL is then, the total 
quantity of common property provided to the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office 
(CEWO). The CEWO will manage this water in the national interest to improve water 
quality and achieve the water flow targets. Two alternative strategies have been funded to 
obtain water for the CEWO: the ‘Restore the Balance’ where property rights are purchased 
from irrigators; and the Sustainable Rural Water Use and Infrastructure Program 
(SRWUIP). The SRWUIP subsidizes the adoption of efficient water-use technology and 
the CEWO shares the water saved with the irrigator. 
 
The economic debate about the Basin Plan has not focused on the economic foundations 
of the policy. Rather the economic debate has been centralized on: the institutional 
designs; removing barriers in water markets; exploring the impacts climate change could 
have on the SDL to critique if the balance will be restored; debating if the trade-offs from 
moving from the CDL to the SDL are justified; and justifying the cost-effectiveness of the 
alternative strategies for obtaining the CEWO water. This thesis has not explored the 
institutional questions but has explored the changes in welfare from the new SDL and 
alternative strategies for obtaining water for the CEWO. The thesis has also explored the 
welfare consequences of failing to consider climate change when attempting to implement 
the Basin Plan. 
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By using a constrained welfare approach this thesis has been able to define welfare as the 
economic return from irrigation and the constraints as the institutional goals of the SDL, 
minimum water flow objectives and a defined upper bound on water quality. Climate 
change impacts on each of the two implementation strategies have also been explored. 
The findings presented in Section 8 & 9 are re-examined in light of the hypotheses.  
 Discussion 10.2
The five hypotheses presented on evaluating if the Basin Plan was a true reflection of the 
contractionary stage of water reform were:  
Ho: by internalizing externalities social welfare will increase; 
Ho: the Restoring the Balance (RtB) provides the most efficient way to return water 
to the environment; 
Ho: the change in conjunctive water resources creates wealth;  
Ho: the failure to incorporate climate change risks into the Basin Plan solution will 
reduce long run economic welfare gains; and 
Ho: the Basin Plan has some, but not all, characteristics of the contractionary 
phase of water resource development. 
 
The SCA model of the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) developed by Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2007) was used to test the hypotheses. The model was 
used to determine a constrained welfare maximization solution to: determine an optimal 
portfolio of water rights for the CEWO; examine the impact increased groundwater 
supplies could have on future investment patterns; evaluate changes in irrigation 
investment patterns from subsidizing capital investments in water-use efficiency upgrades; 
and review how climate change may alter the three above questions. 
 
 Did Social Welfare Increase From Internalizing Externalities? 10.2.1
The thesis identified welfare as: the economic return from irrigation activity; water quality; 
and the volume of water reaching the Coorong wetlands. The analysis suggests that the 
RtB improves water quality and increases water flowing to the Coorong. However, as the 
results indicate the environment will not receive a net increase of 3,200GL but rather 
2,600GL on average, as underutilized water entitlements may be developed. The 
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reduction in the quantity of surface water owned by irrigators then contracts economic 
returns by around $416 million, but water quality is expected to improve by 96EC. This 
change in water and returns suggests that to obtain a 1 EC improvement in water quality, 
irrigator’s economic returns fall by $4.3 million, which is equivalent to the current public 
cost of the Salinity Interception Schemes (SIS) at $4.5 million per EC. In this case 
irrigators and not society are paying for the improvements in water quality. 
 
In the case of the SRWUIP, the evidence is less clear. Unlike the RtB evaluation, no 
feasible solution existed, where the SRWUIP could obtain all the water the CEWO needed, 
while achieving the Basin Plan’s goals. Therefore the SRWUIP must be used in 
conjunction with the RtB program. The SRWUIP solution for the ERF-50 (ex-post) (Table 
9-3) does suggest that that environmental welfare increases on average as water quality 
has improved by 2 EC, and there are sizable economic benefits ($5 billion) for irrigators. It 
creates a situation where water use has increased and there is less water flowing to the 
Coorong in a normal state of nature. This outcome of the SRWUIP increasing water use 
and economic returns, then suggests that policy implementation is still concerned with 
production and not the environment The SRWUIP results also suggested that the real 
beneficiaries of the wealth transfer may be irrigation infrastructure operators (IIO). The 
SRWUIP may leave irrigators investments exposed to climate shocks as they may have 
high levels of debts, increased fixed and variable costs to access water, and there may be 
less water available for trade if upgrades are directed towards perennial production 
systems. 
 
The state contingent analysis (SCA) model cannot determine the second round impacts of 
water reform. However, Wittwer and Dixon (2013) analyzed the second round impacts of 
both the RtB and the SRWUIP using the TERM-H2O CGE model (see Section 1.3) and 
determined that the SRWUIP (upgrades) provide... 
“…a windfall gain to the MDB regions at the expense of the rest of Australia. 
Upgrades represent an additional $3.5 billion NPV of funds transferred to the MDB 
region, meaning that buyback plus upgrades outperforms buyback only in the MDB 
region in terms of GDP” (Wittwer & Dixon 2013, p. 416). 
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Therefore any implementation strategy which is reliant on the SRWIP for obtaining the 
largest share of environmental water is likely to reduce net welfare gains for the wider 
community. 
 Was the RtB more efficient than the SRWUIP for obtaining the CEWO’s 10.2.2
portfolio? 
Since the 2007 Water Act (Commonwealth of Australia 2008) it has been estimated that 
$13 billion (Vidot 2014) of public funding has been allocated to the contractionary state of 
water resource development. This thesis has limited the upper bound of the public 
expenditure as $10.6 billion (based on $3.1 billion for the RtB and $7.5 billion for the 
SRWUIP, as detailed Section 9.1). This simplistically implies that if all public expenditure 
was allocated to farmers, then each megalitre (ML) of water returned to the environment 
would have a social value exceeding $3,300/ML or alternatively each of the Basin’s 18,634 
irrigation farms would receive nearly $569,000 to forgo a proportion of their water rights.  
 
The results suggest that the RtB could obtain all the water needed to implement the Basin 
Plan for $3.1 billion or for $969/ML. As the evaluation of the SRWUIP could only find a 
solution where the SRWIUP would be used to obtain 971 GL of water for the CEWO, then 
the SRWUIP would need to pay in excess of $8,000/ML. By assuming that the remainder 
of the water required for the Basin Plan is purchased at the RtB rate ($969/ML), an 
additional $2.159 billion would be needed, giving an average cost of $3,112/ML by using a 
joint RtB and SRWUIP approach. In this case, the RtB provides greater efficiency in 
obtaining the water for the CEWO.  
 
In this analysis, as the alternative costs to recover water are paid to irrigators, this data 
suggests that a clear pricing signal has been provided to irrigators to embrace the 
SRWUIP. 
 
 Does the Change in Conjunctive Water Resources Create Wealth? 10.2.3
The Basin Plan specifies a surface and groundwater SDL and as the RtB, SDL analysis 
suggests, the Northern Murray-Darling Basin (NMDB) benefits from selling low security 
surface water rights to the CEWO and gaining access to highly reliable groundwater. To 
this effect, irrigators in the NMDB would have access to an additional 450GL of extra water 
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resources and without the addition of new groundwater entitlements, irrigators in the 
Southern Murray-Darling Basin (SMDB) lose access to 2,010GL of water to irrigate with 
(Table 8-12). Overall the MDB experiences a contraction in water resources of 10% (Table 
8-4) but the combination of greater access to groundwater and returns from selling water 
to the CEWO allows economic returns in the MDB to increase by 7% (Table 8-5). In the 
second round, those irrigators who own the water entitlements should gain increased 
wealth, as the value of water entitlements remaining in a productive capacity is expected 
to increase (Dixon, Rimmer & Wittwer 2011). Therefore, yes, wealth would increase across 
the MDB as a whole but some regions in the SMDB will be worse off. 
 
However, a note of caution is required regarding the increased returns from groundwater, 
as there is no guarantee that irrigators will have access to all or part of the new 
groundwater entitlements. If the new groundwater entitlements are sold on an open 
market, other industries (e.g. mining and coal seam gas) or other users may place greater 
value on owning these resources and may out bid irrigators to purchase the rights. The 
development and utilization of water by other users may create negative externalities for 
irrigators (Davis & Hoffer 2012). Due to the complexity in determining sustainable levels of 
groundwater extraction (Section 4.3.1) and the optimistic assumptions about guaranteed 
reliability, the results may be misleading. It is possible that in the future both the SDL and 
reliability of the groundwater resources may need to be revised. 
 Is Welfare Reduced by Ignoring Climate Change? 10.2.4
The results presented within this thesis are consistent with the findings of Adamson, 
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2009) where adaption to climate change has the following 
two patterns. First, the failure (i.e. ex-ante scenarios) to incorporate climate change into 
the decision making framework over allocates investments into perennials and exposes 
capital to excessive risk. In turn this could increase farm debt as if the demand for water 
exceeds the capacity of the river to deliver water, then capital investments will be lost 
(Table 8-11). Second, if decision makers incorporate climate change risk (i.e. ex-post 
scenarios) into their long term planning then structural transformation will occur in the 
MDB. The results suggest that the greatest transformation to irrigation practices in the 
MDB will be driven by changes to the variability of water supply (i.e. droughts become 
more frequent) rather than a mean reduction in water supply (i.e. the 450 Avg Climate 
Change Scenario). The adoption of flexible and opportunistic irrigating production systems 
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will be favored by irrigators to help minimize the climate change risk posed to capital 
(Table 9-4). It is this ability of SCA to model strategic behavior responses to risk and 
uncertainty, by altering inputs to produce a specified output that provides insights into 
future adaption strategies. 
 
The heterogeneity in temporal and spatial characteristics of future water supplies (Jones et 
al. 2008) will create uncertainty for the future reliability and values of alternative water 
property rights. The analysis here assumed that the security of alternative entitlements 
would remain constant into the future. This approach transferred all climate risk to the 
residual claimant on the water resources, the unpreserved environmental share. 
Consequently, the analysis highlighted how climate change impacts on water inflows 
altering the CEWO’s optimal portfolio by structure (i.e. different combinations of rights) and 
spatial location (Chart 8-5). 
 
Climate change is also anticipated to create a divergence in the value of rights by security 
between groundwater and surface water entitlements. As the reliability of water assets 
diverge, an inter and intra-generational wealth transfer occurs between the alternative 
water right owners. The results suggested that the NMDB will gain wealth from having 
greater access to more groundwater resources. Future changes to entitlement security 
could also change the quantity and quality of water in the MDB, furthering changing 
Australia’s welfare.  
 
The subsidization of capital to invest in water-use efficiency not only allows inefficient 
producers to remain within the irrigation industry but incentivizes producers into increasing 
the area irrigated. If large-scale landscape transformation occurs primarily into the 
production of perennial crops, then past drought adaptation strategies may no longer 
provide the capacity to deal with negative climatic change impacts on water supply. Under 
climate change, this combination of high debt, increasing fixed and variable prices to 
access water from ‘gold plated’ infrastructure, an inability to either pay for (i.e. choke price, 
Section 2.2) or access water, could result in a debt legacy and ultimately force wide-scale 
industry exit.   
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 Is the Basin Plan a Contractionary Stage of Water Development? 10.2.5
Table 10-1 compares and contrasts the main features of the three key policy components 
of the Basin Plan: changes to groundwater; the RtB; and the SRWUIP, against the 
idealistic characteristics of the fourth stage of water resource development. This 
information is designed to examine if the signals provided by the key policy components 
are designed to help facilitate the transition towards the contraction stage of water 
resources development. 
 
If the SDL for groundwater is correct, then aquifers provide a natural storage solution for 
water and the social cost for developing these resources are low. This combination of lows 
costs and increase storage then suggests that the development of sustainable 
groundwater levels resembles the expansion stage water resource development.  
 
By defining the groundwater SDL, the demand for groundwater should be high due to its 
reliability and overall this should increase the quantity of water used in the MDB (i.e. 
expansion stage of water resource development). As groundwater is accessed at the point 
of use it has been assumed that the costs of upgrading and maintaining the infrastructure 
are assumed to be the responsibility of the private user. This demand for water and private 
maintenance of infrastructure are characteristics of the contraction stage of water reform. 
 
The non-convexity for water use still exists but with the SDL being correctly set, no 
externalities should be associated with its removal from the aquifer (i.e. contraction stage). 
However, externalities may be generated if, new SDL for groundwater is incorrect or its 
use creates pollution for other users (i.e. coal seam gas). In summary the development of 
new groundwater exhibits the characteristics of both the expansion and contraction stage 
of water resource development.  
 
The RtB provides a clear example of a contractionary stage of water resource 
development by meeting every idealistic characteristic of the contraction stage. There is a 
small proviso that if the RtB was used on its own, it is uncertain who would pay (private or 
public) to upgrade the degraded delivery infrastructure, but with clearer market signals, 
this cost should be borne by the water user. 
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Table 10-1 Comparing Key Components of the Basin Plan to the Stages of Water Development 
Market Characteristic Ideal Characteristics of 
the Contraction Stage  
Basin Plan Components 
Groundwater RtB SRWUIP 
Long run supply of 
impounded water 
 
Inelastic Elastic in SR Inelastic Inelastic 
Demand for delivered 
water 
 
 
 
High but stable demand. 
Elastic at low prices; 
inelastic at high prices. 
High but stable demand. Elastic at 
low prices; inelastic at high prices. 
Water use increases. 
High but stable demand. Elastic 
at low prices; inelastic at high 
prices. Water use decreases. 
High, potentially increasing 
demand in droughts. Elastic at 
low prices; inelastic at high 
prices. Water use may 
increase. 
 
Physical condition of 
impounded and 
delivery system 
 
Infrastructure maintained 
by user. 
All infrastructures new and 
maintained by user. 
On-farm infrastructure 
maintained by user, off-farm 
unknown 
All infrastructure (on and off-
farm) new and subsided. 
Competition for water 
between all users 
 
 
Reallocation reduces 
competition between all 
users. 
Reallocation of groundwater 
towards irrigators. 
Reallocation reduces 
competition between all users. 
Reallocation reduces 
competition between all users 
but not to the extent of the 
RtB. 
 
Non-Convexity  
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Externalities 
 
 
Reduction in 
externalities. 
No impact on externalities Reduction in externalities and 
social costs 
Some reduction in externalities 
but social costs remain high 
Social cost of 
subsiding increased 
water use 
 
Nil Nil to very low  Nil High and rising  
Sustainable in the long-
run 
 
Yes Depending on final water user Yes No 
Component the stage 
resembles 
 
 It has elements of the expansion 
and contraction stage 
Contraction stage It has elements of the 
expansion and maturity 
stage 
Resilient in the long run Yes Possibly yes Yes No 
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Cummins and Watson (2012) discuss that the Living Murray Initiative was trapped in an 
incremental step between the third and fourth state of water resource development when 
attempting to obtain 500 GL of water with water-efficient technology, the SRWUIP has 
embraced this approach to restore the balance. For the SRWUIP to obtain 1,700GL of 
water, it is not an incremental step in water reform progress but rather a regression back to 
a step between the expansion stage and the maturity stage of water reform, all be it with a 
limit on extraction. The SRWUIP then prevents society from tackling the economic, social 
and environmental problems with market reform but rather embraces the engineering 
solution. The subsidization of infrastructure effectively provides almost identical conditions 
of the maturity stage but with ‘good to new’ infrastructure and perhaps a slight reduction in 
externalities. The SRWUIP is not a mechanism for the immaculate conception of water but 
rather the SRWUIP is likely to cannibalize the water gained from the RtB.  
 
Overall, the Basin Plan provides a conflicted stage of water resource development.  
 
 Areas of Further Study 10.3
The notion of bounded rationality in modeling to create unawareness (black swans) is 
discussed within the relationship of curbing the effectiveness of past reform. This thesis 
has also created its own black swans by the way the: economic problem was 
conceptualized; subjectivity defined the bounds around data sources, assumption and the 
choice of analytical programing tools; and from the way scenarios were defined and 
analyzed. By drawing attention to the key gaps, new future areas of study are revealed. 
The thesis has discussed a range of limitations during the application of the SCA to 
evaluate both the SRWUIP and RtB programs, see Section 9.6.5 and 8.6 respectively.  
 
This section limits the discussion towards articulating three issues associated with the 
analyses presented in this thesis. The first discusses how optimization can create 
misleading results and why care in the interpretation of these results is required. The 
second explores how the model in Section 6 could be adapted to utilize stochastic rather 
than discrete parameters. The third discusses why there is a need to provide an expected 
value approach of the model described in Section 6. 
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 Conceptual definition 10.3.1
The partial-equilibrium optimization approach used in this thesis examines a resource 
allocation at a future point time and is not bound by existing allocations of capital, historic 
investments in irrigation infrastructure, farmers’ preferences, forward contracts and other 
binding policy requirements that decision makers face. By using a profit maximization 
function, resources are allocated towards a given production system until a binding 
constraint is realized (e.g. land in one catchment), then resources are allocated towards 
the next best production system and so on, until one or more binding constraints (e.g. 
water inputs in Equation 6-5, the river stops flowing Equation 6-7, or Basin Plan 
requirements Equation 6-8 to Equation 6-10) prevent the allocation of further inputs. Such 
an approach can lead to an unrealistic reallocation of resources towards a given farming 
system as the second round impacts on prices driven by an oversupply of output are not 
considered.  
 
The policy analysis here has compared one theoretically optimal allocation of resources 
(i.e. CDL analysis) to an adjustment (i.e. Basin Plan). This then internalizes the error 
between the allocation of resources, ex-ante and ex-post derived from a change in policy 
or climate change event. However, the analysis does not provide a guide on how 
resources would transition from one investment pattern to another. A recursive 
optimization model could be used to illustrate how temporal transition could occur by 
states of nature and the state based decisions made through time, but the value of such a 
model would have to be thoroughly tested. This recursive optimization model should also 
consider the transaction costs of prior investment strategies. 
 
On reflection, this thesis missed an opportunity by not illustrating the benefits of the SCA 
model against either a discrete expected value model or a stochastic expected value (EV) 
model. The only example of direct comparison between the SCA and EV approaches 
exists and that is by Rasmussen (2006) who compared the approaches to generate 
production functions. A key feature of the state-contingent approach is, illustrating why and 
how decision makers respond. The SCA then overcomes the limitations in other 
approaches to deal with risk and uncertainty as discussed by Keynes (1937) , Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1970, 1971), Just and Pope (1978) and Just (2003), who all adding to the 
argument that...  
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“…our understanding [and representation] of the farmers’ decision-making process 
remains incomplete” (Chavas, Chambers & Pope 2010, p. 370) 
 
The state-contingent approach attempts to gain knowledge of how and why producers 
reallocate resources. By representing risks and uncertainty (known and unknown) into the 
decision making process, it illustrates not only how we adapt but helps explain why. The 
insight into the adaptation process under scarcity and towards the increased probability of 
droughts, provided by the state-contingent approach, highlights the dangers of the 
‘immaculate conception of water’ that occur from traditional approaches to risk and 
uncertainty. 
 
 Technological limits 10.3.2
Despite the Water Act encouraging the collection and dissemination of data (Section 4.3) 
gaps in the available literature still exist and in many cases these gaps facilitate the need 
for assumptions. For example, the data concerning the property rights in Section 7.4; the 
complexity in obtaining current water data (Section 4.3.1), and the errors that occur when 
attempting to predict future water resources (see Sections 3.2 and 4.4). There are errors in 
data sets used.  
 
Additionally, the model also assumes that all catchments experience the same state of 
nature at the same time and that expectations about the states are uniform in each 
catchment. There are numerous issues that this model could examine. For example: the 
decision makers’ choice between permanent and allocation trade (see Section, 4.5, 4.4); 
changes in the comparative advantage of production derived from drought resistant or 
saline tolerant species or alternative production systems; the optimal allocation of 
environmental water between ecological site; and the possible reallocation of resources in 
absence of restrictive SDL trade rules. 
 
Experience and comparison between the GAMS version of the model and the Excel 
version of the model have been carried out. The GAMS version of the model provides a 
better and more robust optimization algorithm. However, the GAMS model cannot 
undertake the ex-ante analysis of climate change. Future model development should 
consider merging the two platforms to obtain the best features form each. 
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 Analytical Conceptual constraints 10.3.3
The state-contingent model used in this thesis relies on discrete data and parameterization 
of the model. For example, the model uses a fixed volume of water to describe each state 
of nature (water flow), producers have complete knowledge about inputs (capital, water, 
labor and costs), output (yield) and prices for all production systems in each state of 
nature, and that all producers within a catchment are homogenous. The complete 
information not only applies to the decision maker being able to determine the state of 
nature but also having a complete knowledge about all possible management options from 
which to maximize their objective function. The model then ensures that the producer can 
operate on the state-contingent frontier line (or transformation curve), see Section 5.3.  
Therefore, based on the model’s description for water flow and water use (see Equation 
6-7), the model can allocate water resources up until the point that there is zero flow out of 
a catchment (as illustrated in Table 8-11).  This poses a dilemma as we know that society 
has imperfect knowledge about the future water supply (see Section s 3.2, 4.3.1 and 4.4). 
Therefore, the model may be misrepresenting risk and uncertainty associated with future 
water supply by state of nature, which then has implications for how producers adapt to 
the water scarcity, and therefore the results may provide misguiding policy 
recommendations.  
 
Section 5 discussed that it was the choice of the producer if they wished to operate on the 
transformation curve and the equations are stochastic in nature. Rasmussen (2006) adds 
to this discussion by reminding us that outcomes (yields and prices) are in fact 
consequences of states of nature. This opens up a range of opportunities to examine 
climate variability and resource allocation. For example, Chavas (2008) examined the role 
of the ‘output-cubical’ technology (Section 5.4.3) to explain ex-post allocation of inputs in 
the agricultural system in the United States of America.  
 
In a commissioned study, Adamson, Quiggin and Quiggin (2011) highlighted the risks to 
achieving the 2011 Basin Plan objectives by developing a version of the model that 
explored the role of stochastic states of nature (Chart 10-1). In 2011 the Basin Plan 
suggested that 1,000GL should arrive at the Coorong every year. The commission report 
developed a discrete model solution (‘SDL + Trade’) and compared it against a ‘Simulated’ 
solution and ‘Optimised’ solution.  
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The ‘Simulated’ solution is a case where ‘input decisions have to be made before 
uncertain outputs are known’ (Chavas 2008, p. 444). This approach utilizes the land 
allocation data from the discrete model run and then relaxes the information about the 
state of nature to examine the implications for river flow. This approach is then similar to 
the ex-ante climate solutions and highlighted that approximately 37% of the time, less than 
1,000GL of water would reach the Coorong.  
 
The ‘Optimised’ solution is similar to the ‘ex-post’ climate change solution. In this case by 
adapting the model to represent stochastic states of nature and introducing a chance 
constraint. The model can be optimized to ensure that the objectives listed in the Basin 
Plan objectives could be achieved, at least 95% of the time. 
 
This strategy could then be used to examine: the water security provided by each water 
entitlement by state of nature; the associated risks to the CEWO optimal water rights 
portfolio; and examine new drought adaptation strategies. By carefully determining the 
stochastic description of the parameters and the bounds of the state-contingent input and 
output sets (see Section s 5.4.1 and 5.4.2), it would then allow for the level of risk 
associated with the state description and input use to be explored and perhaps overcome 
Rosser’s (2011) issues of fat tails and dealing with non-linear climate change events and 
unawareness. 
 
Chart 10-1 Stochastic SCA and Environmental Targets (GL) 
 
Source Adamson, Quiggin and Quiggin (2011)
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In Section 3.2 unawareness was classified into three groups of swans: white, grey and 
black based on Taleb (2007). This thesis has modeled climate change as a white swan.. 
By representing white swan problems within a SCA, they can be solved using standard 
optimization techniques applied to problems not involving uncertainty (Chambers & 
Quiggin 2000). 
 
However, Climate change is a grey swan as the problem is known, but a complete 
description of the data set and the decision maker’s contingency plans are unknown. A 
stochastic description of a climate change within the SCA framework would provide a clear 
separation of signals and the management response to the signal. This would allow for 
increased examination of the tails of the distributions to explore tipping points in existing 
management options. This approach then opens up a range of other issues to be 
explored, including: how to internalize cognitive heuristics of decision makers to illustrate 
the rapid adaption of information generated from ‘ecologically rational’ (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer 2002) (i.e. state of nature) experiences to bound the SCA input and output 
sets; optimizing strategies for broadacre and perennial producers when engaging in the 
permanent and allocation trade market; and exploring the value of property rights under a 
changing climate. By testing for tipping points greater awareness and knowledge could be 
gained.  These insights may lead to better solutions. However, despite all best intentions 
the approach, in practice, is still limited by the eventual bounds on awareness of its user 
and the inevitable black swan. 
 Concluding remarks 10.4
Despite the identified limitations of the Basin Plan and its implementation, it must be 
remembered that this is still the largest transfer of water to the environment ever in 
Australia and perhaps in the world. In addition, unlike many of the other stages of water 
reform in the MDB, the Basin Plan has been well (perhaps too well) funded. Inevitably, like 
any large program there is always some form of resource waste when implementing a 
policy (Colebatch 2006; Ostrom 1990). Waste can occur from dealing with: the legacy from 
past policy (Connell & Grafton 2008), the nature and objective of the new policy design 
(Chambers 1992; Önal et al. 1991), the public and private transaction costs involved 
(Griffin 1991), dealing with rent seeking and compensation (Boyce 1998), combatting 
market failure (Bromley 2007) at the micro and macro level (Castle 1978) and the temporal 
life of the policy (Clark, Clarke & Gordon 1979). 
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The MDB is of economic, social and environmental significance to Australia and the recent 
embarkation towards the contractionary phase in water policy signifies that attempts to 
encapsulate externalities into the decision making approach is occurring. The adoption of 
common property provides the clear strategy to reduce the quantity of water rights held by 
private individuals. The establishment of the MDBA, the CEWO and the National Water 
Commission (NWC) has created a stimulus for the production of data and knowledge 
about the MDB that has stimulated significant public debate. However, this new data and 
knowledge has not altered the economic signals and recommendations that occurred 
before or during the early stages of the Basin Plan development but rather has provided 
clarity towards the final numbers.  
 
The final Basin Plan, at first glance, suggested it was a contractionary stage of water 
resource development with the transfer of 3,200GL of water from private individuals to the 
CEWO. However by carefully reviewing the three key features of the Basin Plan, the RtB, 
the SRWUIP and change in groundwater SDL. It can be concluded that only the RtB is a 
clear application of a contractionary phase of water resource development. The access to 
groundwater may not necessarily be a contractionary stage as it expands irrigation. 
However, if the groundwater SDL is correct it provides production certainty under a 
changing climate. However, if the groundwater SDL is not sustainable or badly developed 
then externalities of development have been relocated from the surface to underground. 
The SRWUIP provides publicly funded upgrades of existing infrastructure and locks 
irrigation into the maturity stage of water resource development and although it may 
eventually provide some water to the environment its public costs cannot be justified.  
 
To mitigate climate risk posed to future reliability of water property rights, irrigators could 
have traded what will become increasingly unreliable surface entitlements for high security 
groundwater entitlements. This transfer of climate risk away from irrigators to the CEWO 
was possible in the NMDB and will have been realized by informed irrigators. Unless the 
irrigators who took advantage of the SRWUIP incorporated flexibility into their water 
management strategy by either having water surplus to their production needs or allocated 
water towards an annual crop, then as the climate changes they face the real prospect of 
having to deal with a debt legacy created from lost capital invested in perennials. 
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The world is uncertain and the outcomes from decisions have known risks and unknown 
and potentially irreversible costs that impair the future perceived economic rents. But the 
failure to adequately encapsulate the variability in current runoff and the management 
response to that variability in the MDB, seams counterproductive when the opportunity 
costs of public resources is high (Wittwer & Dixon 2013). The state-contingent approach 
highlights the problems of supply scarcity and how irrigators respond. By developing a 
model that explicitly details the constrained economic welfare problem, externalities are 
reduced and threats to the Basin Plan by ignoring climate change have been discussed.  
 
The thesis strongly suggests that the RtB on its own could obtain all the water required for 
restoring the flow for $3.1 billion. The combination of the RtB and the increased 
groundwater entitlements, adequately compensate the MDB community for any loss of 
welfare from reduced assess to surface water. To maximize social welfare the $7.5 billion 
in funding allocated to the SRWUIP, should be allocated elsewhere (Quiggin 2012; Wittwer 
& Dixon 2013).  
 
Unfortunately, a political reply already exists to this funding reallocation choice. In 
February 2014, it was announced that the RtB could only purchase 1,500GL of water from 
irrigators (Vidot 2014). Therefore the SRWUIP strategy presented in Section 9 is a fair 
reflection of what could occur. As we enter the next 100 years of this on-going policy 
experiment in water resource development, the countdown to the next wealth transfer has 
begun. As the inevitable forthcoming drought will create a policy battle over rural debt 
derived from the SRWUIP while the environment and society remain penalized. 
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APPENDIX A. PRODUCTION DATA  
Table A-1 Economic Return, Normal State of Nature 
 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6 𝑥7 𝑥8 𝑥9 𝑥10 𝑥11 𝑥12 𝑥13 𝑥14 𝑥15 𝑥16 𝑥17 𝑥18 𝑥19 𝑥20 𝑥21 
𝑘1 -$3,820 -$3,764 $614 -$15,098 $1,965 -$4,856 $791 $1,166 $859 $1,166 $500 -$550 -$550 -$4 $351 $186 $501 $316 -$275 -$753 -$550 
𝑘2 -$3,820 -$3,764 -$5,672 -$15,098 $1,965 $2,346 -$687 $952 $678 $952 $500 $0 $0 -$4 $351 $252 $501 $310 -$275 -$753 -$551 
𝑘3 $0 $0 -$3,319 $0 $0 $0 -$687 $1,059 $769 $1,059 $500 $0 $0 -$4 $351 $218 $501 $269 -$275 -$785 -$658 
𝑘4 -$3,820 -$3,764 $4,314 -$23,373 $1,965 -$4,856 $8,783 $2,517 $2,004 $2,517 $726 -$550 -$550 -$89 $257 $173 $291 $135 -$321 -$913 -$728 
𝑘5 $4,972 $5,141 $4,314 -$16,714 $1,965 -$1,944 $5,030 $1,091 $790 $1,091 $726 $490 $490 -$53 $118 -$353 $291 $45 -$428 -$660 -$461 
𝑘6 -$3,820 -$3,764 -$3,319 -$4,856 -$4,856 -$4,856 -$687 $953 $678 $953 $500 $0 $0 -$4 $351 $247 $501 $310 -$275 -$803 -$678 
𝑘7 -$3,820 -$3,764 $4,314 -$23,373 $1,965 $2,346 $8,783 $1,092 $789 $1,092 $726 $0 $0 -$40 $257 $211 $291 $211 -$321 -$873 -$684 
𝑘8 $6,154 $6,449 $4,314 -$16,714 $1,965 -$4,856 $5,030 -$334 -$423 -$334 $726 $0 $0 -$4 $351 $247 $501 $310 -$275 -$803 -$678 
𝑘9 $6,154 $6,500 $4,314 -$5,552 $3,965 $2,346 $1,277 -$410 -$489 -$410 $726 $541 $541 -$40 $118 -$130 $314 -$42 -$348 -$749 -$564 
𝑘10 $4,417 $4,770 $4,314 -$14,446 $289 $671 -$440 $563 $255 $563 $248 $768 $768 $58 $358 $257 $336 -$130 -$180 -$1,079 -$370 
𝑘11 -$5,496 -$5,439 $4,314 -$14,446 $289 $671 -$440 $0 $0 $0 $0 $594 $594 -$157 $110 $9 -$439 -$247 -$198 $648 $640 
𝑘12 $3,649 $3,918 $4,314 -$14,446 $289 -$8,485 -$440 -$983 -$983 -$983 -$983 $588 $588 $58 $258 $120 $336 -$130 -$85 $1,108 $1,741 
𝑘13 $3,649 $3,918 $520 -$14,446 -$1,056 -$382 -$2,355 $0 $0 $0 $0 -$550 -$550 -$157 $110 $48 -$439 -$247 -$200 $327 $693 
𝑘14 $3,649 $3,918 $2,243 -$6,531 -$6,531 -$6,531 -$440 $563 $255 $563 $248 $712 $712 $58 $258 $120 $336 -$130 -$147 $320 $857 
𝑘15 $3,649 $3,918 $4,756 -$14,446 $1,619 -$13,459 -$440 $0 $0 $0 $0 $260 $260 -$157 $24 $19 $218 $55 -$239 $113 $455 
𝑘16 $3,649 $3,918 $2,243 -$14,446 $289 -$6,531 -$440 $563 $255 $563 $248 $588 $588 $58 $258 $120 $336 -$130 -$275 $177 $694 
𝑘17 $4,766 $5,035 $2,243 -$10,330 $1,406 $671 $4,560 $0 $0 $0 $0 -$550 -$550 -$157 $530 $303 $218 -$247 $9 -$19 $308 
𝑘18 $4,417 $4,678 $2,243 -$11,836 $1,406 -$6,531 -$440 -$545 -$739 -$545 -$134 $0 $0 -$157 $110 -$27 $218 -$247 -$240 -$2,267 -$2,465 
𝑘19 -$3,820 -$3,764 $614 -$15,098 $1,965 -$4,856 $791 $1,166 $859 $1,166 $500 -$550 -$550 -$157 $110 $9 -$439 -$247 -$201 $515 $517 
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Table A-2 Economic Return, Drought State of Nature 
 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6 𝑥7 𝑥8 𝑥9 𝑥10 𝑥11 𝑥12 𝑥13 𝑥14 𝑥15 𝑥16 𝑥17 𝑥18 𝑥19 𝑥20 𝑥21 
𝑘1 -$3,840 -$3,764 -$831 -$21,106 -$1,680 -$4,876 $7,680 $500 $859 $352 $107 -$550 -$529 -$4 $141 $804 $205 $88 -$224 -$1,142 -$1,099 
𝑘2 -$3,840 -$3,764 -$7,117 -$21,106 -$1,680 -$3,303 $7,680 $500 $678 $529 $107 $0 -$529 -$4 $141 $804 $205 $82 -$224 -$1,142 -$1,099 
𝑘3 -$20 $0 -$4,764 -$20 $0 -$20 $7,680 $500 $769 $437 $107 $0 -$529 -$4 $141 $804 $205 $41 -$224 -$1,151 -$1,106 
𝑘4 -$3,840 -$3,764 $2,377 -$29,153 -$1,680 -$4,876 $7,680 $726 $2,004 $75 $298 -$550 -$614 -$89 $26 $738 $39 -$57 -$200 -$1,268 -$1,221 
𝑘5 $1,489 $3,217 $2,377 -$23,720 -$1,680 -$7,164 $7,680 $726 $790 -$815 $298 $140 $160 -$53 -$92 $547 $39 -$153 -$300 -$1,033 -$989 
𝑘6 -$3,840 -$3,764 -$4,764 -$4,876 -$4,856 -$4,876 $7,680 $500 $678 $518 $107 $0 -$529 -$4 $141 $804 $205 $82 -$224 -$1,100 -$1,047 
𝑘7 -$3,840 -$3,764 $2,377 -$29,153 -$1,680 -$3,303 $7,680 $726 $789 $223 $298 $0 -$572 -$40 $26 $738 $39 -$17 -$200 -$1,237 -$1,191 
𝑘8 -$3,840 -$3,764 -$4,764 -$4,876 -$4,856 -$4,876 $7,680 $500 $678 $518 $107 $0 -$529 -$4 $141 $804 $205 $82 -$224 -$1,100 -$1,047 
𝑘9 $2,435 $4,445 $2,377 -$10,692 $320 -$3,303 $7,680 $726 -$489 -$138 $298 $210 $185 -$40 -$92 $547 $31 -$255 -$132 -$1,109 -$1,064 
𝑘10 $697 $2,715 $2,377 -$20,546 -$3,355 -$4,978 $5,963 $248 $255 $67 -$180 $303 $324 $58 $106 $888 $21 -$358 $38 -$1,472 -$922 
𝑘11 -$5,516 -$5,439 $2,377 -$20,546 -$3,355 -$4,978 $5,963 $0 $0 $0 $0 $161 $67 -$157 -$116 $579 -$439 -$475 $67 $23 -$425 
𝑘12 $83 $1,948 $2,377 -$20,546 -$3,355 -$13,804 $5,963 -$983 -$983 -$983 -$983 $204 $324 $58 $16 $758 $21 -$358 $311 $483 $676 
𝑘13 $83 $1,948 -$1,210 -$20,546 -$4,608 -$6,902 $5,963 $0 $0 $0 $0 -$550 -$689 -$157 -$116 $579 -$439 -$475 $63 -$217 -$194 
𝑘14 $83 $1,948 $513 -$6,551 -$6,531 -$6,551 $5,963 $248 $255 -$285 -$180 $329 $324 $58 $16 $758 $21 -$358 $198 -$215 -$12 
𝑘15 $83 $1,948 $3,026 -$20,546 -$2,117 -$17,578 $5,963 $0 $0 $0 $0 -$96 $67 -$157 -$194 $471 -$96 -$161 $46 -$409 -$384 
𝑘16 $83 $1,948 $513 -$20,546 -$3,355 -$6,551 $5,963 $248 $255 -$285 -$180 $204 $324 $58 $16 $758 $21 -$358 -$73 -$338 -$134 
𝑘17 $1,200 $3,065 $513 -$16,430 -$2,239 -$4,978 $7,963 $0 $0 $0 $0 -$550 -$689 -$157 $220 $1,195 -$96 -$475 $267 -$524 -$496 
𝑘18 $697 $2,623 $513 -$17,456 -$2,239 -$6,551 $5,963 -$134 -$739 -$524 -$562 $0 -$689 -$157 -$116 $579 -$96 -$475 -$9 -$2,567 -$2,765 
𝑘19 $83 $562 $4,337 -$20,546 -$9,665 -$4,978 $5,963 -$1,365 -$1,365 -$1,365 -$1,365 $0 -$689 -$157 -$116 $579 -$439 -$475 $83 $78 -$138 
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Table A-3 Economic Return, Wet State of Nature 
 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6 𝑥7 𝑥8 𝑥9 𝑥10 𝑥11 𝑥12 𝑥13 𝑥14 𝑥15 𝑥16 𝑥17 𝑥18 𝑥19 𝑥20 𝑥21 
𝑘1 -$3,840 -$3,864 $3,444 -$9,131 $9,154 -$4,876 -$12,183 $1,066 $859 -$1,734 $524 -$550 -$650 -$650 $406 -$198 $549 $430 -$616 $98 -$102 
𝑘2 -$3,840 -$3,864 -$2,842 -$9,131 $9,154 $13,584 -$12,183 $852 $678 -$1,948 $310 $0 -$100 -$100 $406 -$110 $549 $424 -$616 $98 -$103 
𝑘3 -$20 -$100 -$489 -$20 -$100 -$20 -$12,183 $959 $769 -$1,841 $417 $0 -$100 -$100 $406 -$155 $549 $383 -$616 -$452 -$510 
𝑘4 -$3,840 -$3,864 $8,128 -$17,633 $9,154 -$4,876 -$12,183 $2,417 $2,004 -$1,289 $1,699 -$550 -$650 -$650 $322 -$179 $318 $232 -$732 -$69 -$256 
𝑘5 $8,416 $8,889 $8,128 -$9,749 $9,154 $8,436 -$12,183 $991 $790 -$1,982 $415 $28 -$457 -$559 $173 -$838 $318 $143 -$807 $232 $26 
𝑘6 -$3,840 -$3,864 -$489 -$4,876 -$4,956 -$4,876 -$12,183 $853 $678 -$1,947 $310 $0 -$100 -$100 $406 -$117 $549 $424 -$616 -$209 -$309 
𝑘7 -$3,840 -$3,864 $8,128 -$17,633 $9,154 $13,584 -$12,183 $992 $789 -$1,984 $416 $0 -$100 -$100 $322 -$132 $318 $325 -$732 -$28 -$218 
𝑘8 -$3,840 -$3,864 -$489 -$4,876 -$4,956 -$4,876 -$12,183 $853 $678 -$1,947 $310 $0 -$100 -$100 $406 -$117 $549 $424 -$616 -$209 -$309 
𝑘9 $9,834 $10,510 $8,128 -$452 $11,154 $13,584 -$12,183 -$510 -$489 -$2,814 -$956 $71 -$419 -$523 $173 -$549 $356 $64 -$763 $81 -$104 
𝑘10 $8,096 $8,780 $8,128 -$8,386 $7,479 $11,909 -$13,899 $463 $255 -$2,737 -$157 $266 -$251 -$362 $434 -$167 $393 -$16 -$663 -$249 $62 
𝑘11 -$5,516 -$5,539 $8,128 -$8,386 $7,479 $11,909 -$13,899 -$100 $0 -$100 -$100 $119 -$375 -$481 $173 -$379 -$539 -$133 -$663 $2,617 $1,575 
𝑘12 $7,175 $7,758 $8,128 -$8,386 $7,479 $2,092 -$13,899 -$1,083 -$983 -$1,083 -$1,083 $108 -$390 -$497 $328 -$290 $393 -$16 -$625 $3,078 $2,675 
𝑘13 $7,175 $7,758 $3,920 -$8,386 $5,948 $12,598 -$13,899 -$100 $0 -$100 -$100 -$550 -$650 -$650 $173 -$335 -$539 -$133 -$665 $1,910 $1,459 
𝑘14 $7,175 $7,758 $5,643 -$6,551 -$6,631 -$6,551 -$13,899 $463 $255 -$2,737 -$157 $212 -$303 -$413 $328 -$290 $393 -$16 -$663 $1,878 $1,616 
𝑘15 $7,175 $7,758 $8,156 -$8,386 $8,991 -$5,281 -$13,899 -$100 $0 -$100 -$100 -$173 -$634 -$730 $84 -$339 $275 $164 -$702 $1,589 $1,174 
𝑘16 $7,175 $7,758 $5,643 -$8,386 $7,479 -$6,551 -$13,899 $463 $255 -$2,737 -$157 $108 -$390 -$497 $328 -$290 $393 -$16 -$733 $1,657 $1,422 
𝑘17 $8,292 $8,874 $5,643 -$4,270 $8,596 $11,909 -$10,899 -$100 $0 -$100 -$100 -$550 -$650 -$650 $635 -$217 $275 -$133 -$577 $1,409 $1,013 
𝑘18 $8,096 $8,688 $5,643 -$6,256 $8,596 -$6,551 -$13,899 -$645 -$739 -$3,397 -$1,178 $0 -$100 -$100 $173 -$435 $275 -$133 -$689 -$2,267 -$2,465 
𝑘19 $7,175 $6,371 $8,661 -$8,386 -$1,495 $11,909 -$13,899 -$1,465 -$1,365 -$1,465 -$1,465 $0 -$100 -$100 $173 -$379 -$539 -$133 -$668 $1,606 $1,072 
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Table A-4 Water Use, Normal State of Nature 
 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6 𝑥7 𝑥8 𝑥9 𝑥10 𝑥11 𝑥12 𝑥13 𝑥14 𝑥15 𝑥16 𝑥17 𝑥18 𝑥19 𝑥20 𝑥21 
𝑘1   5.0 3.3 6.4  4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0     1.5 2.6 4.0 4.0 4.8 9.0 10.0 
𝑘2   5.0 3.3 6.4 7.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0     1.5 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.8 9.0 10.0 
𝑘3   5.0    4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0     1.5 2.6 4.0 4.0 4.8   
𝑘4   6.1 5.0 6.4  5.9 5.6 5.6 5.6     3.4 3.0 2.9 3.0 5.7 12.6 14.0 
𝑘5 5.0 7.8 6.1 1.7 6.4 7.0 7.1 6.3 6.3 6.3  8.4 8.4  5.4 6.2 2.9 5.4 6.7 11.7 13.0 
𝑘6   5.0    4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0     1.5 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.8 13.5 15.0 
𝑘7   6.1 5.0 6.4 7.0 5.9 7.0 7.0 7.0     3.4 3.5 2.9 5.0 5.7 11.7 13.0 
𝑘8   5.0    4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0     1.5 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.8 13.5 15.0 
𝑘9 5.0 7.8 6.1 3.6 6.4 7.0 8.2 9.8 9.8 9.8  8.5 8.5  5.4 6.6 5.2 6.7 6.7 11.7 13.0 
𝑘10 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 8.2 10.3 10.3 10.3  7.5 7.5  3.9 6.3 7.5 8.0 6.0 8.1 9.0 
𝑘11   6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 8.2     7.4 7.4  3.9 6.2  8.0 6.0 7.7 8.5 
𝑘12 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 8.2     7.0 7.0  3.5 5.9 7.5 8.0 5.8 7.7 8.5 
𝑘13 7.5 10.0 6.8 3.0 6.0 6.0 4.7        3.9 6.3  8.0 6.0 8.1 9.0 
𝑘14 7.5 10.0 6.1    8.2 10.3 10.3 10.3  7.0 7.0  3.5 5.9 7.5 8.0 5.8 8.6 9.5 
𝑘15 7.5 10.0 5.5 3.0 6.9 8.0 8.2     6.1 6.1  3.5 4.1 7.5 3.5 5.8 8.1 9.0 
𝑘16 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 0.0 8.2 10.3 10.3 10.3  7.0 7.0  3.5 5.9 7.5 8.0 5.8 9.0 10.0 
𝑘17 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 8.2        3.9 6.2 7.5 8.0 6.0 9.0 10.0 
𝑘18 7.5 9.6 6.1 3.3 6.4 0.0 8.2 10.1 10.1 10.1     3.9 6.5 7.5 8.0 6.0   
𝑘19 7.5 9.9 6.5 3.0 10.5 7.0 7.4        3.9 6.2 0.0 8.0 6.0 9.0 10.0 
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Table A-5 Water Use, Drought State of Nature 
 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6 𝑥7 𝑥8 𝑥9 𝑥10 𝑥11 𝑥12 𝑥13 𝑥14 𝑥15 𝑥16 𝑥17 𝑥18 𝑥19 𝑥20 𝑥21 
𝑘1   5.0 3.3 6.4    5.0 3.8     1.5 1.7 4.0 4.0 7.4 6.3 6.0 
𝑘2   5.0 3.3 6.4 7.0   5.0 3.5     1.5 1.7 4.0 4.0 7.4 6.3 6.0 
𝑘3   5.0      5.0 3.6     1.5 1.7 4.0 4.0 7.4 0.0 0.0 
𝑘4   6.1 5.0 6.4 0.0   5.6 2.6     3.4 3.7 2.9 3.0 7.5 8.8 8.4 
𝑘5 5.0 7.8 6.1 1.7 6.4 7.0   6.3 7.0  7.1   5.4 5.9 2.9 5.4 7.7 8.2 7.8 
𝑘6   5.0      5.0 3.5     1.5 1.7 4.0 4.0 7.4 9.5 9.0 
𝑘7   6.1 5.0 6.4 7.0   7.0 3.5     3.4 3.7 2.9 5.0 7.5 8.2 7.8 
𝑘8   5.0      5.0 3.5     1.5 1.7 4.0 4.0 7.4 9.5 9.0 
𝑘9 5.0 7.8 6.1 3.6 6.4 7.0   9.8 7.8  7.3   5.4 5.9 5.2 6.7 7.7 8.2 7.8 
𝑘10 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0   10.3 8.7  7.3   3.9 4.3 7.5 8.0 7.6 5.7 5.4 
𝑘11   6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0      7.1   3.9 4.3  8.0 7.6 5.4 5.1 
𝑘12 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0      7.0   3.5 3.9 7.5 8.0 7.6 5.4 5.1 
𝑘13 7.5 10.0 6.8 3.0 6.0 6.0      0.0   3.9 4.3  8.0 7.6 5.7 5.4 
𝑘14 7.5 10.0 6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0   10.3 8.4  7.0   3.5 3.9 7.5 8.0 7.6 6.0 5.7 
𝑘15 7.5 10.0 5.5 3.0 6.9 8.0      5.6   3.5 3.9 7.5 3.5 7.6 5.7 5.4 
𝑘16 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 0.0   10.3 8.4  7.0   3.5 3.9 7.5 8.0 7.6 6.3 6.0 
𝑘17 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0         3.9 4.3 7.5 8.0 7.6 6.3 6.0 
𝑘18 7.5 9.6 6.1 3.3 6.4 0.0   10.1 9.0     3.9 4.3 7.5 8.0 7.6   
𝑘19 7.5 9.9 6.5 3.0 10.5 7.0         3.9 4.3  8.0 7.6 6.3 6.0 
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Table A-6 Water Use, Wet State of Nature 
 𝑥1 𝑥2 𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6 𝑥7 𝑥8 𝑥9 𝑥10 𝑥11 𝑥12 𝑥13 𝑥14 𝑥15 𝑥16 𝑥17 𝑥18 𝑥19 𝑥20 𝑥21 
𝑘1   5.0 3.3 6.4  6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0    1.5 3.2 4.0 4.0 3.5 6.3 6.0 
𝑘2   5.0 3.3 6.4 7.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0    1.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 6.3 6.0 
𝑘3   5.0    6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0    1.5 3.1 4.0 4.0 3.5   
𝑘4   6.1 5.0 6.4  6.0 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6    3.4 3.0 2.9 3.0 4.8 8.8 8.4 
𝑘5 5.0 7.8 6.1 1.7 6.4 7.0 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 8.4 8.4 8.4 5.4 6.8 2.9 5.4 6.2 8.2 7.8 
𝑘6   5.0    6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0    1.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 9.5 9.0 
𝑘7   6.1 5.0 6.4 7.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0    3.4 3.6 2.9 5.0 4.8 8.2 7.8 
𝑘8   5.0    6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0    1.5 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 9.5 9.0 
𝑘9 5.0 7.8 6.1 3.6 6.4 7.0 6.0 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 8.5 8.5 8.5 5.4 7.4 5.2 6.7 6.2 8.2 7.8 
𝑘10 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 6.0 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 7.5 7.5 7.5 3.9 7.4 7.5 8.0 5.1 5.7 5.4 
𝑘11   6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 6.0     7.4 7.4 7.4 3.9 7.3  8.0 5.1 5.4 5.1 
𝑘12 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 6.0     7.0 7.0 7.0 3.5 7.1 7.5 8.0 4.9 5.4 5.1 
𝑘13 7.5 10.0 6.8 3.0 6.0 6.0 6.0        3.9 7.4  8.0 5.1 5.7 5.4 
𝑘14 7.5 10.0 6.1    6.0 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 7.0 7.0 7.0 3.5 7.1 7.5 8.0 4.9 6.0 5.7 
𝑘15 7.5 10.0 5.5 3.0 6.9 8.0 6.0     6.1 6.1 6.1 3.5 4.6 7.5 3.5 4.9 5.7 5.4 
𝑘16 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 0.0 6.0 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 7.0 7.0 7.0 3.5 7.1 7.5 8.0 4.9 6.3 6.0 
𝑘17 7.5 10.0 6.1 3.0 6.4 7.0 6.0        3.9 7.3 7.5 8.0 5.1 6.3 6.0 
𝑘18 7.5 9.6 6.1 3.3 6.4 0.0 6.0 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1    3.9 7.7 7.5 8.0 5.1   
𝑘19 7.5 9.9 6.5 3.0 10.5 7.0 6.0        3.9 7.3  8.0 5.1 6.3 6.0 
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